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ABSTRACT
Recent  major  natural  disasters  in  Australia  have  highlighted  how  some  of  the
economic costs of living in risk-prone areas are borne by the rest of society. This
study used the town of Exmouth, in north-western Australia, to investigate economic
strategies for coastal disaster risk reduction, as it typifies expanding development in
coastal  areas  prone  to  extreme  weather  events.  Using  a GIS,  coastal  inundation
scenarios from cyclonic storm-surge were investigated relative to coastal property,
infrastructure and shire planning. It showed that some areas developed in the past
decade are at high risk of storm-surge inundation. There has been a loss of disaster-
mitigating ecosystem functions as well as increased risk to previously unaffected
areas. The extent to which risk perceptions of cyclonic storm-surge inundation and
flooding influenced the price buyers paid for residential property in Exmouth over
the  period  1988-2010  was  examined  using  a  Hedonic  Price  Model.    This
incorporated dwelling variables, proximity to the coast, cyclone Vance storm-surge
and  1-in-100  year  flood  levels  and  indicated  that  prices  did  not  reflect  the  real
societal  cost  of  risk.  To  internalize  these  costs,  a  mandatory  private  insurance
scheme  for  high-risk  properties  (with  a time-phased  government  subsidy)  and
penalties for local councils undertaking new high-risk developments are proposed.
Further, a hybrid  economic instrument aimed  at correcting the market  failure in
coastal land which comprises an environmental offset by developers, a property-
owner tax and special disaster risk mitigation fund, is also proposed. This study is
highly relevant in view of the planned revision of the Western Australian Coastal
Planning Policy, the expansion of industry along the coast of northern Australia and
the predicted effects of climate change on sea levels and extreme weather events.-1-
Table of contents
Chapter 1: Introduction 7
1.1. Coastal disaster risk 7
1.2. Research aims 14
1.3. Definitions 15
Chapter 2: The nexus of economics, natural disasters and environmental
policy 18
2.1. Disaster policy in Australia 18
2.2. Economics of natural disaster risk in Australia 27
2.3. Coastal disasters, economics and the environment 30
2.4. Key concepts in environmental economics 34
2.5. Conclusions 41
Chapter 3: Background on the case study site: Exmouth town 43
3.1. Geography 43
3.2. Climate 47
3.3. Social and demographic attributes 51
3.4. Town planning and development 53
3.5. Residential property 60
3.6. Coastal property, disaster risk and market failure at Exmouth 66
Chapter 4: Coastal policy and planning implications of cyclonic storm-
surge risk at Exmouth 71
4.1. Introduction 71
4.2. Approaches to assess coastal vulnerability 72
4.3. Methods 75
4.4. Results 83
4.5. Discussion 93
4.6. Conclusions 99
Chapter 5: Hedonic price analysis for properties in relation to cyclonic
storm-surge inundation risk at Exmouth 101
5.1. Introduction 101
5.2. Theoretical background on the Hedonic Price Model 101
5.3. Property at Exmouth 111
5.4. Methods 115
5.5. Results 127
5.6. Discussion 143
5.7. Conclusions 155
Chapter 6: Natural disaster insurance for cyclonic storm-surge
inundation risk in northern Australia 157
6.1. Introduction 157
6.2. Theoretical background 158
6.3. Failures of natural disaster insurance 162-2-
6.4. International experience with flood risk insurance 167
6.5. Natural disaster insurance in Australia 176
6.6. Cyclonic storm-surge inundation insurance in Australia 182
6.7. Proposed approach for cyclonic storm-surge inundation insurance 186
6.8. Implementation challenges and the political economy of government 203
6.9. Conclusions 211
Chapter 7: The role of environmental economic instruments for the
management of cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk 213
7.1. Introduction 213
7.2. Environmental economic instruments 215
7.3. Environmental user charges and taxes 218
7.4. Environmental subsidies 225
7.5. Environmental bonds 228
7.6. Environmental offsets 231
7.7. Tradable environmental permits 238
7.8. Special environmental funds 243
7.9. Examination of the market failure at Exmouth 248
7.10. Proposed hybrid instrument 254
7.11. Implementation challenges and the political economy of government 265
7.12. Conclusions 269
Chapter 8: Conclusions 270
References 279
Appendices 325-3-
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to extend special thanks to my supervisors, Professor Lynnath
Beckley from the School of Environmental Science and Professor Malcolm Tull
from the Murdoch Business School. I am greatly indebted to them both for their
tremendous support and guidance which was instrumental in completing this thesis.
Thank you for challenging me to develop my research and writing skills; this has
been a growing experience. I am immensely grateful to Dr Ranald Taylor for his
assistance with the Hedonic Model and the many useful suggestions. I would also
like to thank Dr Halina Kobryn for help with the GIS.
I would also like to acknowledge the financial support of Murdoch University for
their  international  research  and  completion  scholarships  and  the  School  of
Environmental Sciences for PhD running costs. I am especially grateful to the staff
at Landgate and the Western Australian Department of Transport in Fremantle who
provided me with data and answered all my queries. I would also like to thank the
Shire of Exmouth for their assistance, especially the engineer Keith Woodward.
I  extend  huge  thanks to  my  all  my  friends  in  Sri  Lanka  who  have  given  me
tremendous  moral  support  and  encouragement  through  it  all.  I  am  especially
indebted  to  my  friends  Roshanara  De  Croos  and  Vasanthi  Thevanesan  whose
friendship, support and guidance provided me with the courage and determination to
continue with my studies even during the most challenging moments. Thanks so
much to Nishan De Mel and Evangeline Ekanayake who have also given me really
wonderful  support.  Marlene  Buizer,  Wendy  Vance  and  Noraisha  Oyama,  the-4-
coffees, lunches, dinners and your friendship has got me through the long days.
Thanks also to Julie Heeley and Lisa Kirby for their kindness and friendship in
various ways. I would like to also acknowledge my friends, Alex and Julie Aitken,
and Jodi Gratton for their flexibility, encouragement and time off work to allow me
to complete the examination revisions in the final stage of my thesis. You have been
such kind and generous people, thank you!
I would like to thank my family, especially my uncle and aunt, David and Daphne
Perera, and cousin Tania Perera for the many hot meals and support through my
time in Western Australia.  I would like to also thank my sister Sandra Obeyesekere
and my nephews Jason and Josh for their love and support. Vivienne Cass, there are
no  words  to  say  how  much  I  appreciate  everything  you’ve  done  for  me,  from
checking my references, to having an eye on my nutrition and keeping my stress
levels under control in the last few months. Your never-ending encouragement and
belief in me has brought me to where I am now and I cannot express sufficiently my
indebtedness to you.
I  am  enormously  thankful  to  my  mother  Neiliya  who  has  showed  her  love  and
support to me throughout and her quiet, practical wisdom. I also remember with
thanks, my late father, Ben, whose love of the ocean has lived on in me. I dedicate
this thesis to them, in appreciation of all they have been to me.-5-
Abbreviations for Australian States and Territories
ACT Australian Capital Territory
NSW New South Wales
NT Northern Territory
VIC Victoria
SA South Australia
QLD Queensland
TAS Tasmania
WA Western Australia
Acronyms
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics
ACE CRC Antarctic Climate Change and Ecosystems Cooperative
Research Centre
ARI Average Recurrence Interval
AU$ Australian Dollars
BoM Bureau of Meteorology (Australian Government)
BTRE Bureau of Transport Research Economics (Australian
Government)
COAG Council of Australian Governments
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
DCCEE Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency
DEM Digital Elevation Model
DoP Department of Planning
DoW Department of Water
EMA Emergency Management Australia-6-
EPA Environmental Protection Authority (Western Australian
Government)
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (United States
Government)
FESA Fire and Emergency Services (Western Australian Government)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIS Geographic Information System
HPM Hedonic Price Model
HSD Horizontal Setback Datum
ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MSL Mean Sea Level
n.d. Not dated
NDIR Natural Disaster Insurance Review
NFIP National Flood Insurance Program
NSCT National Sea Change Taskforce
OECD Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development
SKM Sinclair Knight Mertz
SRTM Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission
UK United Kingdom
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNEP United Nations Environmental Program
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
US, USA United States of America
US$ United States Dollars
WANDRRA Western Australian Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery
Arrangements-7-
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Coastal disaster risk
As the January 2011 cyclone and flood disaster in Queensland, Australia clearly
demonstrated, the combination of injudicious land-use decisions and unpredictable
extreme weather events can translate into high costs for the rest of the economy.
Worldwide, major coastal disasters in the last decade have resulted in a massive loss
of life and huge costs to the global economy. Examples include the Asian tsunami,
hurricane  Katrina,  the  Japanese  tsunami  and  cyclone  Yasi  in  Queensland  (Table
1-1).
Table 1-1 Economic and human costs of some major recent coastal disasters
Disaster Date
Impacts
Deaths
Economic
damage costs
(AU $ billion)
Asian tsunami December 2004
Indonesia 165,708 4.28
Sri Lanka 35,399 0.98
Thailand 8,345 0.96
Hurricane Katrina, United States August 2005 1,322 120.19
Earthquake and tsunami, Japan March 2011 20,319 201.92
Cyclone Yasi, Australia February  2011 - 1.33
Source: EM-DAT (2012).
Globally, around US $ 1.5 trillion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is exposed
to  natural  disaster  risk.  There  has  been  a  262%  increase  in  the  economic  risk
associated  with  losses  from  tropical  cyclones  in  high-income  countries  such  as
Australia (UNISDR 2011). With predictions that the number of people living on the-8-
coast will increase by 34% by 2025, vulnerability to major coastal disasters will
grow as a result of climate change and associated sea-level rise (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] 2007).
Australia  has  had  its  share  of  major  coastal  disasters.  In  early  2011,  while
Queensland was coping with the massive riverine flood-event from the Brisbane
River, category five cyclone Yasi, crossed the northern coastline, creating a storm-
surge of around 5 metres (m) (Chagué-Goff et al. 2011). Areas in the north-western
parts of Australia are particularly vulnerable, and storm-surge flooding as a result of
cyclones constitutes a major environmental threat (Lourensz 1981, Holland 1984,
Chan 1985, Australian Government, Bureau of Meteorology [BoM] 2012a).
Australia, as an island continent, is very susceptible to coastal disaster risk, with a
coastline  of 34,000  km  and  85%  of  its  total  population  living  near  the  coast
(Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] 2004a,b, Australian Government, Geoscience
2010). A recent assessment indicated that, nationally, between 187,000 and 274,000
residential buildings are exposed to the combined impact of coastal inundation and
shoreline recession, with a potential loss of AU$ 51 - $72 billion (2008 replacement
value)  (Australian  Government,  Department  of  Climate  Change  and  Energy
Efficiency [DCCEE] 2011). As a consequence of coastal planning carried out under
the  assumption  of  a  relatively  stable  sea  level  over  the  last  century, coastal
communities in Australia are particularly vulnerable. Building in low-lying areas has
continued  over  the  last  couple  of  decades,  despite  increasing  cognizance  of
inundation risk in these areas (Australian Government, DCCEE 2009a).-9-
The greater exposure of coastal communities to various kinds of risks also requires
strong  public  policy,  emergency  services,  and  disaster  finance  being  available
(Beringer 2000, Rasker & Hanson 2000, Frentz et al. 2004, Hunter et al. 2005).
Unconstrained development along the coast will also result in a legacy of risk for
future coastal dwellers and taxpayers, especially in dealing with what infrastructure
and land-uses are to be protected or relocated in the future.
Drivers of risk
By 2050, the population in coastal Australia is projected to grow by 94%, reaching a
total of around 13.2 million (National Sea Change Taskforce [NSCT] 2011). There
are two main factors that have driven coastal population growth. One is amenity-
driven  movement  towards  coastal  areas,  also  known  as  the  ‘Sea Change’
phenomenon (Burnley & Murphy 2004, Gurran et al. 2005). This has led to many
socio-economic changes  among  coastal  communities  in  Australia,  including  the
development of real-estate in areas adjacent to the ocean (Harvey & Clarke 2007).
The natural resources boom is  another  pull  factor  which has  led  to  a  growing
demand for housing in regional Australia (Haslam-Mckenzie et al. 2009). Many of
these newly developed coastal areas are subject to periodic cyclonic storm-surge
inundation, wind damage and erosion (Australian Government, DCCEE 2009a).
As a result of amenity-driven growth, and the resources boom driving town planning
in remote coastal areas of Australia, economic goals appear to supersede resilience
goals. Potential buyers drive the demand for residential property and the premium-10-
associated with coastal property provides a high incentive for developers to build as
close to the coastline as possible, despite the risks associated with living near the
dynamic land-ocean interface. Land developers cater for continued coastal growth
and  pressurise  governments  to  release  previously  undeveloped  coastal  land. The
allocation of residential land close to the low-lying shoreline also influences the
decision of buyers to purchase high-risk property. These property owners are able to
enjoy the full benefits of the amenity gained from living so close to the ocean, but
they do not, however, pay the full costs associated with the risk of living in these
areas.
Australian  coastal  governance  has  come  a  long  way  since  the  1990s,  with  the
introduction of new legislation and management policies (Thom & Harvey 2000).
Rapidly  growing  coastal  development,  however,  continues  to  encumber  local
councils with difficult trade-offs between economic decisions, equity, and coastal
resilience. There is pressure to support the growing demand of lifestyle and holiday
destinations, with an increasing number of towns, buildings, amenities, transport
networks,  and  utilities  constructed  proximal  to  the  coastline  (Smith  &  Doherty
2006). Short-term economic planning perspectives will, however, create a financial
burden to government and the rest of society, with high costs of future disaster
management and mitigation. Poor planning decisions on the coast, in turn exacerbate
risks caused by oceanographic processes and climate-change induced risks (Stocker
et al. 2011).
While Australia has a well-developed system of response and disaster preparedness,
there  is  still  room  for  improvement  of  long-term  measures  of  disaster  resilience-11-
(Australian  Government, Department  of  Infrastructure  &  Transport,  Bureau  of
Transport  Research  Economics  [BTRE]  2002, Australian  Government,  Attorney
General’s Department 2011a). In the recent National Progress Report on the Hyogo
Framework for Action the issue of disaster funding and the current liability of the
Australian government, and thereby the wider society, for a large portion of disaster
losses  was  highlighted (Australian  Government,  Attorney  General’s  Department
2011a). Directly related to this is the ‘moral hazard’ issue, where the expectation
that  the  government  will  provide  compensation  in  the  event  of  a  major  disaster
results in development in risk-prone areas (Kunreuther 2006). This, in turn, creates a
burden on government budgets, which is then passed on to the rest of society. The
temporary nation-wide flood-levy imposed following the 2011 Queensland floods
(Australian Government, Treasury 2011a) is an example of this.
Response to risk
A major aim of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) is to recognise the
threat to coastal zones by climate change and the increased intensity of extreme
weather events and protect against the loss of life, property damage, and social and
economic disruption (World Bank 1993). Planning requires a fine balance between
economic  development,  environmentally  appropriate  development,  and  equity
(Schwartz 2005). Resilience is compromised when developments reconfigure the
natural protective features of the coast. The associated changes to the land cover, for
instance,  concrete  covering  areas  that  were  previously  wetlands,  grassland  or
forested areas, can change the impacts of future disasters. The functional integrity of-12-
the  natural  ecosystems  must  be  protected,  to  allow  self-adaptation  and  absorb
recurring hazards without collapsing into an undesirable state (Pérez-Maqueo et al.
2007).
Equity considerations require that development in one area does not put other areas
at greater risk, or create additional costs to the rest of society (Duxbury & Dickinson
2007, Masozera et al. 2007). In coastal disaster mitigation, the concept of equity
pertains to development in an area that does not increase risk to others. It must also
not impose a financial burden on the rest of society. It can be argued that equity
goals  are  compromised  when costs are borne by  those who have no part in the
benefits. Furthermore,  policy that  drives such  development  result  in  greater
vulnerability and loss of equity.
Planning for the use of coastal land is about balancing the competing values of its
ecological  and  aesthetic  qualities,  its  recreational  opportunities,  and  its  social,
cultural  and  economic  importance. Coastal  governance  must  also  take  into
consideration  the  complexities  associated  with  private  property  rights  versus
environmental and equity values (Thom 2004). Coastal stewardship must be able to
translate policy and planning ideals into pragmatic applications. Planning of coastal
land-use cannot be carried out in isolation, but needs to link into the broader context
and the temporal perspective, which is often several decades (Thom 2004, Costanza
& Farley 2007). Unknowns and uncertainties about dynamic coastal processes, and
changing sea-levels, require application of the ‘precautionary’ principle (Australian
Government, DCCEE 2009a). Coastal resilience is compromised, however, due to
lack of state funding of vulnerability assessments and inadequate planning for future-13-
adaptation to climate change (Harvey et al. 2011).
Focus of this study
The 2011 Queensland floods and cyclone Yasi triggered a great deal of debate on
the impacts of natural disasters on the Australian economy (Keen & Pakko 2011,
Kline  2011,  Packham  &  Massola  2011,  PriceWaterHouseCoopers  2011, Reserve
Bank of Australia 2011a, Smith 2011). Climate change and associated disaster risks
to the coast also imply that prospective property buyers will increasingly need to
factor natural risk into their choice of where to buy, where to build, and whether to
insure their properties. Appropriate policy on the management of natural hazard risk
requires an understanding of how coastal populations account for disasters in their
purchasing  decisions.  Especially  important  is  an  understanding  about  how
individuals perceive changes in welfare in response to risk.
As  has  been  evident  from  the  recent  debate  over  government  spending  versus
taxation  to  fund  the  cost  of  the  Queensland  flood  disaster  (Wilson  2011),  the
underlying question is ‘who pays the price?’ Should this be at the point of initial
choice made between local government and private property developers in terms of
what kind of land to build on? Or, should it be in the hands of prospective property
buyers in terms of the types and location of land they purchase? Can this decision be
influenced by property insurers, who might build into their policies an aversion to
insure high risk coastal properties? Or, will this choice be influenced  only after
public  outcry  about  excessive  taxation,  redirected  government  spending,  and-14-
decelerated growth in other sectors of the economy as a result of funding the heavy
costs of major disasters?
1.2. Research aims
Given the magnitude of the issues identified above, the overall aim of this thesis is
to  investigate  economic  strategies  for the reduction  of  coastal  disaster  risk  in
Australia, using the town of Exmouth, in cyclone-prone north-western Australia, as
a case study.
The objectives of this thesis are to assess:
 The vulnerability of Exmouth to cyclonic storm-surge inundation in terms of
current development policies and practices;
 The influence of risk perception to cyclonic storm-surge inundation and flooding
on the price buyers paid for residential property at Exmouth;
 The application of insurance to cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk; and
 The  use  of  environmental  economic  instruments  for  mitigating  risk  in  new
coastal property developments.
The findings of the above assessments are presented in several chapters. Chapter 2 is
a description of the nexus between disasters, economics and environmental policy in
Australia. Chapter 3 describes the Exmouth study area and identifies town planning
issues  in  relation  to  coastal  disaster  risk. Chapter  4  presents  the  findings  of  the
Geographical Information System (GIS) scenario analysis of cyclonic storm-surge-15-
inundation at Exmouth. Chapter 5 features the results of a Hedonic Price Model on
the  influence  of  risk  on  residential  property  prices. Chapters  6  and  7  analyse
economic  approaches  to  factor  risk  into  coastal  development  through  disaster
insurance and environmental economic instruments. Chapter 8 discusses the policy
implications of this study for coastal disaster risk in cyclone-prone northern areas of
Australia and indicates some future research directions.
1.3. Definitions
This section provides working definitions of three terms used in this thesis: coast,
coastal disaster, and cyclonic storm-surge inundation.
Coast
According to the Oxford Australian Dictionary (2008) the coast is defined as ‘the
seashore; the land close to it’. What constitutes the coast in Australia has been
subject  to  much  debate,  and  various  definitions  of  the  coast  are  used,  based  on
whether it is used for scientific, management or policy purposes (Harvey & Caton
2010).  For  example,  under  the  ‘Land-Ocean  Interaction  in  the  Coastal  Zone’
(LOICZ)  project  carried  out  as  part  of  the study  of  global  change  by  the
International  Council  of  Scientific  Unions,  the  coastal  zone  was  defined  as
‘extending  from  the  coastal  plains  to  the  outer  edge  of  the  continental  shelves’
(Holligan & de Boois 1993).
This was further refined such that the coastal domain is also considered to be the
area ‘200 m above to 200 m below the sea level’ (Pernette & Milliman 1995, p.16).-16-
All  areas  located  within  7  km  of  the  coastline  are considered  to  be  the  coast
(Australian  Government,  Geoscience 2010).  The  Western  Australian  Planning
Commission (Western Australian Government, Planning Commission 2003a, p.1.3)
considers the coast to include ‘the area where coastal management problems are
occurring,  and  coastal  land  managers  and  communities  are  working  to  address
these’. This is the definition used for the purpose of this thesis.
Coastal disaster
For the purpose of this thesis, coastal disasters are considered to be only natural
events and do not include those caused by humans. It is important to note here that
there has been considerable reflection on the differences and convergences between
natural hazards, such as increasing cyclone frequency due to anthropogenic climate
change. The use of the above definition in this thesis is meant to include only those
disasters caused directly by natural forces and to distinguish this term from those
that might be classified as ‘technological disasters’ such as oil spills in the coastal
and marine environment.
The division of Emergency Management, Australia uses definition:
A natural disaster is a serious disruption to a community or region, caused by
the impact of a naturally occurring, rapid onset event that threatens or causes
death, injury or damage to property or the environment and which requires
significant  and  coordinated  multi-agency  and  community  response.  Such
serious disruption could have been caused by any one or combination of the
following natural hazards: ‘bushfire, earthquake, flood, storm, cyclone, storm-
surge,  landslide,  tsunami,  meteorite  strike  or  tornado        (Australian
Government, Department of Transport & Regional Services 2002, p.4).
The definition for coastal disaster is derived from the above definition, where a-17-
coastal disaster is considered to include an event that is caused by natural forces of
nature.  While  the  impact  of  the  disaster  may  be  indirectly  exacerbated  by
anthropogenic impacts like climate change, the direct source of devastation will be
as a result of a naturally occurring phenomenon.
Cyclonic storm-surge inundation
The  term  ‘cyclonic  storm-surge  inundation’,  as  used  in  this  thesis,  pertains  to
landward movement of seawater under the influence of low barometric pressure,
very  strong  winds  and  high  waves  associated  with  tropical  revolving  storms
(cyclones) (Beer 1997). This is distinguished from riverine or inland flooding, flash
flooding, storm water and rainfall run-off. While a cyclone can also result in heavy
rainfall, resulting in flooding of coastal areas, this is derived from runoff over large
catchment  areas  or the  overflow  of  rivers,  creeks  or  artificial  catchments.  This
differentiation of terms follows those used by the Insurance Council of Australia
(2010).-18-
Chapter 2: The nexus of economics, natural disasters and
environmental policy
2.1. Disaster policy in Australia
Australia has had a long history of disaster management, with efforts coordinated by
the  Australian  Red  Cross  from the  early  1900s  till  the  1970s,  when massive
catastrophes such as the Brisbane floods and cyclone Tracy highlighted the need for
a central government body to coordinate disaster relief and response (Table 2-1).
The  National  Disasters Organisation  was  established  in  1974, which  was later
replaced by Emergency Management Australia in 1993. As evident from Table 2-1,
the Australian approach has shifted from a focus on ex-post responses, common in
the early 1900s, to greater emphasis on preparedness and mitigation by the 1970s.
The change came about as a result of historical influences, such as civil defence and
military  traditions, as  well  as  the experience  of  various  extreme  natural  disaster
events devastating Australian communities over the years (Smith 2006).
Australian and international disaster policy in the 1960s and 1970s was directed by
various influential publications at the time. A major study, commissioned through
the International Geographical Union, assessed a range of hazards from relatively
small-scale deviations to the most extreme events (White 1974). Haas et al. (1977)
reported the findings of an investigation into the underlying forces which reshape
the city and its institutions in reconstruction efforts following a natural disaster,-19-
including the economic costs and speed of recovery, level of future vulnerability and
how  the  pattern  of  urban  reconstruction  changed  the  functional  zonation,  social
stratification and access to public urban amenities. Taking a geographic approach to
coastal occupation problems, Burton et al. (1977) analysed risk using a typology of
coastal  occupation  related  risk  of  marine  inundation.  Gaps  in  understanding  the
processes  through  which  human  society  sought  to  assess and  comprehend  the
significance of environmental threat were reported in a major publication by Kates
(1978).
Recently,  there  have been  concerted  efforts by  the  government  to improve
Australia’s ability to manage disasters. A key initiative was an in-depth review, in
2004, of current disaster policy approaches, culminating in a set of 12 commitments
for reform at all levels of government (Council of Australian Governments [COAG]
2004). This review recommended a shift from reactive responses towards pro-active
actions that focused on improving resilience through various mitigation measures.
Australia  now  takes  a  whole-of-nation,  nationally  integrated,  resilience-based
approach to disaster management, as outlined in the National Disaster Resilience
Framework (Australian  Government,  Attorney-General’s  Department,  Emergency
Management Australia [EMA] Division 2008). Currently disaster management is
largely  the  responsibility  of  State  and  Territory  governments,  with  oversight  by
Emergency Management Australia. On occasions where a disaster is so large that it
is  beyond  the  capacity  of  individual  states,  Commonwealth  assistance  is  sought
(COAG 2011).-20-
Table 2-1 Timeline detailing the evolution of disaster management in Australia from the early
1900s to the national disaster insurance review in 2011
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disaster services
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
,
 
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
d
n
e
s
s
 
&
 
m
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
1974
Natural Disasters Organisation established within the Department of Defence
Following Brisbane flooding and cyclone Tracy (1974) a group focusing specifically on
disaster preparedness under the umbrella of the Red Cross was established
1975
Australian Red Cross formed a National Disaster Relief Committee, and the Red
Cross Disaster Services Department with increasing involvement in disaster
preparedness initiatives, education and first aid training
1993
Emergency Management Australia (EMA) was established replacing the Natural
Disasters Organisation to provide national leadership in the development of measures to
reduce risk to communities and to manage the consequences of disasters
1996
The National Disaster Mitigation Strategy was endorsed the national Emergency
Management Committee, which was the first cohesive strategy for Australia. It outlined
mitigation for several hazards, including floods, earthquakes, cyclones, severe storms
and bushfires
2001
Emergency Management Australia (EMA) was made lead agency and moved from its
position in the Department of Defence to the Attorney-General’s Department reflecting a
change in the responsibilities and duties. A review of Australia’s approach to natural
disasters was also commissioned
2004
A report entitled ‘Natural disasters in Australia: Reforming mitigation, relief and
recovery arrangements’ was released and which was a culmination of the review, with
a set of 12 commitments for reform at all levels of government
The National Emergency Management Committee was established by the federal
government, consisting of federal, state and territory representatives, to provide high-
level guidance on disaster management to various entities
2008
A National Disaster Resilience Framework was outlined by the Ministerial Council for
Police and Emergency Management, detailing the means by which Australia would
prevent, prepare, respond to and recover (PPRR) from disasters. It also emphasised a
whole-of-government commitment and nationally integrated approach
2009
A National Strategy for Disaster Resilience was developed by the emergency
management committee comprising of a working strategy to implement the framework.
It focused on governance and the coordination of effort, knowledge, education and
communication of risk, community empowerment and supporting capabilities
Under the National Partnership Agreement on Natural Disaster Resilience a Natural
Disaster Resilience Program created in partnership with state governments, aimed at
addressing natural disaster risk priorities. It replaced the previous Natural Disaster
Mitigation Program, Bushfire Mitigation Program and National Emergency Volunteer
Support Fund. It includes a funding initiative which provides around AU $ 27 million
annually to State and Territory governments
2011
Flood levy, spending cuts and Natural Disaster Insurance Review reflect a change in
approach, where economic strategies were implemented to fund the costs of recovery
following the 2011 Queensland disaster
Sources: Compiled from Smith (2006), COAG (2004, 2009, 2011), Australian Government, Treasury (2011a).-21-
Australia is one of the signatory countries under the Hyogo Framework for Action
and  is  required  to  provide  a  biennial  assessment  on  its progress.  The Hyogo
Framework for Action is a United Nations agreement at global scale, ratified by 168
member states, adopted just a few weeks after the Asian tsunami (UNISDR 2005).
Australia’s most recent assessment (2009-2011), reported substantial achievement in
four out of five of the major goals set out under this framework (Table 2-2). There
is,  however, still  room  for  improvement  in  addressing  the  underlying  drivers  of
disaster risk (Australian Government, Attorney General’s Department 2011).
Table 2-2 Benchmarks  for  national  progress  reporting under  the  Hyogo  Framework  for
Action (2005-2015)
Thematic areas Key priorities
Governance Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong
institutional basis for implementation
Knowledge and
education
Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning
Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all
levels
Environmental,
social and
economic policy
Reduce the underlying risk factors
Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels
Source: UNISDR (2005).
To  build and strengthen  national  resilience  to  natural  disasters,  a  key  initiative
carried  out  by  the  Commonwealth  government  has  been  the  Natural  Disaster
Resilience Program. This provides State and Territory governments with funding for
long-term mitigation and other disaster reduction activities. In WA funds for 2010-
11 have mainly been invested in the mitigation of fire and riverine flood risk (Figure
2-1).-22-
Figure 2-1 Natural Disaster Resilience Program (NDRP) projects funded in Western Australia
by disaster type (2010-11)
Source: This figure was compiled based on the list of NDRP funded programs provided on the website of the
Western Australian Government, Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA) (n.d.a).
Initiatives to mitigate coastal disaster risk in Australia
Emergency Management Australia is not the only body involved in natural disaster
reduction activities in Australia. Much work on coastal risk has been carried out
through the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (DCCEE). Since
the establishment of the DCEE in 2007, there  have been several major national
initiatives focusing on risks to Australia’s coast as a result of climate change, sea
level rise and associated implications on extreme meteorological events (Table 2-3).
Various  topics  have  been  covered,  ranging  from  physical  trends, impacts  on
infrastructure and residential property and future governance of the coast.-23-
Table 2-3 Key government research initiatives on climate change and coastal risk in Australia
over the period 2008-2011
Date Title of report Main focus
Sep
2008
Variability and trends in the
Australian wave climate and
consequent coastal
vulnerability
Effect of climate driven variations on waves around the Australian
coast, including extreme wave events (Australian Government,
Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency 2008)
Jun
2009
Climate change adaptation
actions for local government
Various adaptation options at local government level in relation to
infrastructure and property services, health, planning and
development approvals, water and sewerage, recreational facilities
and natural resource management (Australian Government,
Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency 2009a)
Jul
2009
Climate change 2009: Faster
change and more serious
risks
Synthesis on the latest state of knowledge on climate change science
after the release of the AR4 IPCC (2007) report (Australian
Government, Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency
2009b)
Oct
2009
Managing our coastal zone in
a changing climate
Outlined findings of an 18-month public inquiry into climate change
and coastal risk in Australia and detailed several recommendations for
future governance of the coast (Australian Government, Department
of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency 2009c)
Oct
2009
Australian Government
response to the report
‘Managing our coastal zone
in a changing climate’
The government stated its intention to work through the COAG to
develop a national coastal adaptation agenda. This will form the basis
of a new intergovernmental agreement on the coastal zone in
Australia (Australian Government, Department of Climate Change &
Energy Efficiency 2009d)
Nov
2009
Climate change risks to
Australia’s coast
Findings of a national assessment of commercial, industrial and
residential infrastructure at risk around the coast of Australia. This
report resulted in the establishment of a national climate change
forum to develop a national coastal adaptation agenda (Australian
Government, Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency
2009e)
Feb
2010
Adapting to climate change
in Australia: First pass
national assessment
Strategy for the implementation of the Commonwealth’s vision for
Australia, including the roles of national, State and Territory and local
government in various areas, including coastal adaptation Australian
Government, Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency
2009a)
Feb
2010
Developing a national coastal
adaptation agenda
Main considerations in developing a national agenda on coastal
issues. Key areas discussed under this report included sea level rise
benchmarks, risk guidance, legacy issues, legal liability and property
rights, building codes and development planning and also information
needs to support decision making (Australian Government,
Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency 2010b)
June
2011
Climate change risks to
coastal buildings and
infrastructure: A supplement
to the first pass national
assessment
Supplements the analysis presented in the ‘Climate change risks to
Australia’s coasts’ report with additional data on the exposure of
commercial buildings, light industrial buildings and transport systems
in Australia’s coastal areas. It also provides information risk exposure
of residential properties and implications in terms of population
growth in coastal areas (Australian Government, Department of
Climate Change & Energy Efficiency 2011)-24-
Having acknowledged the gap in research on legal issues in relation to coastal risk in
Australia,  the  House  of  Representatives  Committee  has  recommended  that  the
Australian Law Reform Commission undertakes an urgent inquiry into determining
the liability of public authorities in terms of climate change adaptation and possible
coastal hazards; the liability and actions of property owners in this regard; legal
issues  pertaining  to  the  impacts  of  climate  change  on  existing  developments,  as
opposed to planned new developments; mechanisms to implement mandatory risk
disclosure to the public about climate change risks and coastal hazards across all
states  in  Australia;  and  whether  broader  indemnification  of  local  government
authorities  should  be  required  to  broaden  that  currently  in  existence  (Australian
Government, Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency 2009c,d).
In addition to work carried out by the DCCEE presented above, a great deal of
research on sea level rise impacts at national, regional and local scale has also been
carried out in Australia (Table 2-4). As evident in the table, a wide range of areas
has  been  covered.  These  include  socio-economic  regional  and  local-scale
vulnerability  assessments  as  well  as  linkages  with  sectors  such  as  coastal
infrastructure and assets, communities and tourism. Evaluation of the vulnerability
of natural coastal features comprises of research on the impacts of sea level rise
extremes, erosion and flood risk.-25-
Table 2-4 Recent research on sea level rise and climate change-related coastal risk in Australia
Focus and locations References
Vulnerability assessments
Queensland, the Northern Territory,
Tasmania, New South Wales and
Victoria
Bayliss et al. (1997)
Aboudha & Woodroffe (2006)
Cowell et al. (2006)
Voice et al. (2006)
Johnson and Marshall (2007)
Middelmann (2007)
Small Group Solutions (SGS) Economics and Planning (2007)
Wheeler et al. (2007)
New South Wales Government, Department of Planning (2008)
Green (2008)
Preston et al. (2008)
Purvis et al.( 2008)
Sharples (2008)
Guillaume et al. (2010)
Coastal infrastructure and  assets
Victoria, Tasmania  and whole of
Australia
CSIRO et al. (2007)
Maunsell Australia (2008)
Tasmanian Government, Department of Primary Industries and
Water (2008)
Neumann and Price (2009)
Communities
Victoria and the tropical north of
Australia
Kinrade et al. (2008)
Green et al. (2009)
Tourism
Whole of Australia Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (2009)
Turton et al. (2009)
Sea-level rise extremes
Southwest  Western Australia,
southeast Australia and Victoria
Bishop and Womersley (2009)
McInnes et al. (2009a,b)
Kuhn et al. (2011)
Flood-risk
Adelaide and Western Australia Tonkin (2005)
Eliot (2012)
Coastal erosion
New South Wales, Darwin and
Gippsland Coast
McInnes et al. (2007)
Gippsland Coastal Board (2008)
Jones et al. (2008)
Future losses to insurers
Whole of Australia Insurance Australia Group (2003)
Collins and Simpson (2007)
Insurance Australia Group (2008)
Planning and governance responses
Whole of Australia, Southeast
Queensland
White et al.(2007)
Berwick (2007)
Church et al. (2008a)
Abel et al. (2011)
Alexander et al. (2011)
Of  relevance  to this  thesis, is  a  study  carried  out  by  Abel  et  al.  (2011), on
governance principles pertaining to planned retreat responses to sea level rise, using
a case study in southeast Queensland. This paper discusses institutional challenges-26-
in land-use and development planning in relation to conflicting state government
versus local council objectives; possible loss of property value as a result of coastal
rezoning; cumulative impacts of development; and continuing political pressure for
structural defences as opposed to natural measures. The study highlights the need for
in-depth investigation into the behaviour of coastal developers, property buyers and
insurers in Australia, especially with regard to possible economic policy incentives
that could be used to motivate more resilient planning.
Research into cyclones has had a long history in Australia. In 1970s, the Australian
Academy of Science’s National Committee for Geography convened a symposium
which culminated in an influential publication entitled ‘Natural hazards in Australia’
(Heathcote & Thom 1979). The Brisbane flood of January 1974 and Cyclone Tracy
that devastated Darwin in December 1974 were two key disasters that prompted this
symposium.  This  study  reported  on  issues  such  as  the  linkages  between natural
hazards and quaternary climate change and atmospheric factors, wind, storm and
flooding hazards, variations in storm-surge characteristics, engineering and hazard
design in the context of tropical cyclones, coastal erosion and the identification of
floodplain hazards.
Turning to more recent research on cyclonic risk in Australia, focus has centred on
the physical nature of cyclones, with some investigation into impacts on community
vulnerability. Studies on cyclone risk have mainly been carried out for the cyclone-
prone areas in the north and southeast Queensland and Darwin (Table 2-5). As is the
case with sea level rise and coastal risk, there appears to be no research within the
nexus  of  cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk, environmental  changes, land-use-27-
planning and economics.
Table 2-5 Recent research on cyclonic and climate change-related coastal risk in Australia
Focus References
History and future projections
of cyclones
Lourensz (1981)
Chappell et al. (1983)
Harper (1999)
Nott and Hayne (2001)
Abbs et al. (2006)
Nott (2006)
Changes  to  or  magnitude  of
coastal inundation, flood and
wind risk
Dimego et al. (1982a,b)
Holland (1984)
Sinclair (1993)
Foley & Hanstrum (1994)
Granger et al. (1999)
Granger et al. (2000)
Harper et al. (2001)
Jones et al. (2005)
Geoscience Australia (2006a, b)
Ginger et al. (2007)
McInnes et al. (2007)
Australian Government, DCCEE (2009e)
Stewart & Li (2009)
Wang & Wang (2009)
Climate change impacts McInnes et al. (2003)
Hardy et al. (2004)
Systems Engineering Australia (2006)
Church et al. (2006)
Church et al. (2008a,b,c)
Wang et al. (2010)
2.2. Economics of natural disaster risk in Australia
Whilst  there is  a considerable body  of work  on  coastal  disaster  risk  under  the
broader umbrella of natural disaster management and climate change, there has not
been a much research into the economics of natural disaster risk in Australia. Of the
work that has been done, a key activity was an analysis on the economic cost of
natural  disasters  (Australian  Government,  Department  of  Infrastructure  and
Transport,  Bureau  of  Transport  and  Regional  Economics  2001).  More  recently,-28-
macroeconomic analyses of the 2011 Queensland flood and cyclone, and discussions
surrounding the nationwide temporary flood levy and public spending cuts can be
said to be the main highlights in the natural disaster-economics nexus.
Analysis on the economic costs of natural disasters in Australia
In an analysis on government spending on natural disasters carried out over the
period  1990-2001,  it  was found  that  the  combined  Commonwealth  and
State/Territory government expenditure on natural disasters was around AU$ 814
million or $ 42 per person in the 1992/1993 financial year, and approximately AU$
1  billion  or  AU$  52  per  person  over  2000/2001 (Australian  Government,
Department  of  Infrastructure  and  Transport,  Bureau  of  Transport  and Regional
Economics 2001) (Table 2-6). This analysis also found that over the period 1967 to
1999, natural disasters cost the Australian economy an average of AU$ 1.14 billion
each year, with the total cost per event amounting to over AU$ 10 million (in 1999
prices)
Table 2-6 Commonwealth and State/Territory natural disaster expenditure for 1999/00 and
2000/01 (AU$ million)
Expenditure
category
1990/00 2000/01
State &
Territory Federal Total State &
Territory Federal Total
Preparedness & response 383 13 397 13 441 454
Relief & recovery 183 123 306 263 167 430
Mitigation 51 41 92 47 60 106
Other related expenditure 8 12 20 14 10 23
Total expenditure 625 189 814 337 677 1,014
Source: Australian Government, Department of Infrastructure and Transport, Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics
(BTRE) (2001).-29-
An analysis of the split between the expenditure categories of preparedness and
response, relief and recovery, mitigation and other related costs over 1999-2001,
showed  that  almost  half  of  the  total  government  expenditure  was  invested  on
preparedness and response. Relief and recovery expenditure accounted for 38% in
1999/2000 and 42% in 2000/2001, while mitigation and other related expenditure
were relatively small contributors
Queensland flood and cyclone disasters in 2011
The  high  cost  of  the Queensland  flood  and  cyclone  disasters in  2011 triggered
research into the macroeconomic effects of these events (Table 2-7).
Table 2-7 Macro-economic impacts of the flood and cyclone disaster in Queensland, 2011
Consequences on
sectors
Description of impacts
Damage to public and
private infrastructure
and assets
Costs of recovery and rebuilding
Opportunity costs of foregone revenue from production as a result of the loss of
infrastructure (e.g. roads, factories, property and machinery) and consequent
reduction in the productive capacity of the economy
Reduction in
agricultural,
commercial, industrial
and exports
production
Agricultural production decreased by AU$ 500 - $ 600 million, resulting in
shortages in various commodities
Decreased production from damage to capital assets and resources
Uncertainty caused by the disaster caused delays in business investment
Rising uncertainty from consumers, as well as declining inventory stocks, falling
exports (particularly coal), and reduced trading days
Increased demand for
building and
construction
Reconstruction of houses, businesses, factories and public infrastructure
Increased employment in the construction industry and increased wages during the
period of reconstruction
Burden on households Rising food and agricultural prices as a result of supply-shortages  and increasing
demand for construction materials, housing, and labour as a result of the post-
disaster reconstruction creating inflation throughout the economy
Costs to other sectors
such as health,
education and
environment
Opportunity costs that arise from redirecting government funds from other priority
areas (health, education, and other infrastructure projects) to fund the rebuilding
process in disaster affected areas, resulting in a redistribution of wealth
Sources: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) (2011), Certified
Practicing Accountants (CPA) Australia (2011), Kim (2011), PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011).-30-
Analysis found that the recovery would cost around AU$ 5.6 billion and would
result  in  a  potential  loss  of 0.5%  of  the  GDP,  for  the  fiscal  year  2010/2011
(Commonwealth Bank 2011). In addition to the costs of recovery, rebuilding and
compensation  of  victims,  studies  found  ripple  effects  through  the  rest  of  the
economy as a result of the loss of productive capital and resources, decrease in
agricultural,  commercial and industrial production, increase in commodity prices
and foregone public investments in other sectors, such as health and education.Flood
levy and spending cuts.
To  fund  the  cost  of  rebuilding  in  Queensland, the  Commonwealth  government
implemented a temporary nationwide flood levy, aimed at raising around AU$ 1.8
billion in recovery costs (Australian Government, Prime Minister's Office 2011).
The  government  also  announced  cuts  in  spending  on  public  environmental  and
infrastructure  projects,  raising  an  additional  AU$  3.8  billion  to  fund  recovery
(Australian Government, Prime Minister's Office 2011). This meant that funding for
several carbon abatement programs were cut, and a spending cap was implemented
on other public programs (Australian Government, Prime Minister's Office 2011). In
addition  to  the obvious  benefits  of  rebuilding Queensland,  reduction  in  public
spending  in  other  programs was  also  anticipated  to  reduce  the  rate  of  inflation
(Commonwealth Bank 2011).
2.3. Coastal disasters, economics and the environment
Disaster economics in Australia appears to have mainly focused on macroeconomic
aspects, such as the direct and indirect cost of natural catastrophes on the economy.-31-
Even though there has not been much research within the nexus of coastal disaster
economics and environmental factors at a regional or local scale, there is, however, a
significant body of international work. This has been carried out mainly under the
sub-discipline of ecological economics, focusing on the role and interactions of the
four types of capital: human, social, built and natural capital in planning for and
mitigating coastal disaster risk. Since Costanza et al.’s (1997) classic study, showing
that the annual, nonmarket value of the earth's ecosystem services are substantially
larger  than  the  global  Gross  Domestic  Product, and  the  Millennium  Ecosystems
Assessment  (2005)  which  highlighted  the  contribution  of ecosystems  to  human
wellbeing, there has been rising interest in understanding the economic contribution
of the natural environment in various areas, including disaster risk. Major coastal
disasters, such as the Asian tsunami and hurricane Katrina, catalysed interest in the
importance of disaster mitigating ecosystem services
1 in coastal areas.
The underlying basis of research has been, that coastal resilience is compromised by
economic drivers which degrade important natural disaster-mitigating functions (e.g.
Bagstad et al. 2007, Baker & Refsgaard 2007, Costanza & Farley 2007, Duxbury &
Dickinson  2007,  Farley  et  al.  2007,  Gaddis  et  al.  2007,  Martinez  et  al.  2007,
Masozera et al. 2007, Miles & Morse 2007, Pérez-Maqueo et al. 2007, Jonkman et
al. 2009, Zahran et al. 2009, Glenk & Fischer 2010, Schumacher & Strobl 2011).
1 Ecosystems contribute to human wellbeing through provisioning services, such as food,
fuel and water; regulating services such as natural hazard mitigation, erosion control and
water purification; supporting  services such  as  soil  formation  and  nutrient  cycling;  and
cultural  services such  as  recreational  and  other  nonmaterial  benefits (Millennium
Ecosystems  Assessment  2005).  Natural  regulatory  services,  including  disaster-mitigating
functions, are said to contribute to the greatest portion of the total economic value of the
environment (Costanza et al. 1997, United Nations Environmental Program [UNEP] 2009).-32-
Vital  to  disaster  management,  therefore,  is  the  understanding  that the  economy
comprises not  only of  human,  social,  and  built  forms  of  capital,  but  that  it  is
embedded within a highly complex natural environment (Costanza 1991, Anielski &
Rowe 1999, Goudy 2000, Limburg et al. 2002, Halpern 2005). Built infrastructure,
machinery and land can be substituted among each other and yield an economic
output over time (Prugh et al. 1999, Goudy 2000). Human activities are constrained,
however,  by  limitations  of  the  natural  environment,  many  of  which  have
irreplaceable functions that cannot be exchanged by other forms of capital (Costanza
1989, Costanza 1991, de Groot et al. 2003, Gaddis et al. 2007, Dietz & Neumayer
2007). Recognition of coastal disaster resilience as rooted in a healthy environment,
has led to several studies demonstrating the importance of natural buffers, such as
sand-dunes, mangrove forests, tree shelter belts and coral reefs and their role in
reducing the energy of waves that hit the shore and the resulting impacts during
extreme coastal events (e.g. Dahdouh-Guebas et al. 2005, Danielsen et al. 2005,
Kathiresan & Rajendran 2005, Marris 2005, Vermaat & Thampanya 2006). Hence,
disaster policy must comprise of a combination of built, social, human and natural
environmental  measures  (Godschalk  et  al.  1999,  United  Nations  Development
Programme [UNDP], Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery 2004, Adger et al.
2005, Baker & Refsgaard 2007, Gaddis et al. 2007, Perez-Macqueo et al. 2007).
In WA, there have been several studies that have assessed the dynamic nature of the
coastline in relation to ecological features and coastal hazards, but they have been
mainly focused on southwest Australia. These include the examination of the rocky
shore sequences along southwestern Australia in relation to the information they-33-
provide on Quartenary sea-level history (Semeniuk 1985a), the barrier dune system
along  the  Leschenault  Plateau  and  its  continued  existence  since  Holocene  times
despite sea-level fluctuations (Semeniuk 1985b), historical indices of Holocene sea-
level and climate in southwestern WA (Semeniuk 1986a,b, 1996), and patterns of
sedimentary  accretion  and  erosion,  cementation,  limestone  ridge  and  bedrock
formation and their dynamics with complex coastal processes along the Pilbara coast
(Semeniuk 1993).
Another study proposed a strategic framework for monitoring inter-annual changes
in  weather  processes  and  their  impact  on  the morphology  of  coastal  plains
(Finlayson et al. 2009). The role of banks, shoals and other such coastal structures in
reducing  wave  energy  along  sandy  beaches  in  southern  parts  of  WA  was  also
assessed (Travers et al. 2010). The role of limestone reef formations at the Yanchep
beach and Lagoon on the Perth Metropolitan coast was also evaluated in relation to
their influence in attenuating the force of waves and current created by strong and
persistent cycles of sea breeze (Gallop et al. 2011).
There has not been, however, much research carried out on natural disasters using
the framework of environmental economics. This is a long-standing discipline that
has evolved a great deal, both theoretically and empirically, over the last several
decades  in  its  approach  to  analysing  environmental  problems  (Pearce  2002). By
drawing on principles outlined under the paradigm of environmental economics, this
thesis  aims  to  extend  current  understanding  on  the  coastal  disaster-environment-
economic nexus, by providing a fresh perspective on underlying drivers of risk. The
following section will describe some key concepts and terms from environmental-34-
economics used for this purpose.
2.4. Key concepts in environmental economics
Under optimal  conditions,  the price of any goods  or services,  including  those
derived from the environment, provide a signal on its total value to individuals in an
economy. A market failure occurs, however, when the ‘true’ economic value of an
environmental good or service is not reflected in its market price, even though it
may possess a high non-monetary value. Failures in the market can be on the part of
buyers or  sellers and  can  create  a situation of economic  inefficiency,  where
resources of production, such as labour, land and materials are not allocated in the
most optimal manner, resulting in a loss of aggregate social welfare (Bator 1958,
Harris 2006, Krugman & Wells 2006, Hanley et al. 2007, Ledyard 2008).
To illustrate the means by which a market failure occurs, it is necessary to consider
some basic concepts under the theory of environmental economics, including the
terms ‘marginal costs’ and ‘marginal benefits’. The term ‘marginal’ refers to a small
change, starting from some baseline level (Hanley et al. 2007). In the production of
any  good  or service,  the  most  efficient  economic  outcome  is  considered  to  be
achieved at the point where marginal costs equal marginal benefits as is illustrated in
Figure 2-2. The  upward  sloping  line,  which  is  the  marginal  cost  curve  (MC),
represents the costs associated with the production of any good. It is defined as the
change in total cost when the quantity produced changes by one unit (Hanley et al.
2007). As depicted in Figure 2-2, the marginal cost curve is positively sloped to
show that the costs of production increase with a greater quantity of production of-35-
any good.
The  downward  sloping  line  in Figure 2-2 represents  the  marginal  benefit  (MB)
curve.  It  is  defined  as  the  change  in  total  benefits  when  the  quantity  produced
changes by one unit (Hanley et al. 2007).
Figure 2-2 Marginal cost and marginal benefit curves under perfect competition
Source: Hanley et al. (2007).
As  with  the  marginal cost  curve,  the  marginal  benefit  curve  can  be  represented
mathematically as:
MB              = TB/ TQ
where:
TB = change in total benefits gained from production; and
TQ = change in total quantity of production.-36-
In  a  perfectly  competitive  market,  the  point  at  which  these  curves  intersect
(MC=MB) is a situation of equilibrium. At this point, the optimal price is P* and the
quantity of goods sold is X*. In economic theory, the notion of perfect competition
is meant to serve as a benchmark against which to measure real-life and imperfectly
competitive markets (Hanley et al. 2007).
A number of factors can affect the marginal cost curve under real world situations.
Some of these are market failures, and an ‘externality’ is one such example. An
externality exists when a person makes a choice that affects other people which is
not accounted for in the market price, and is based on the theory of ‘external effects’
from the work of Pigou (1920). As a result of an externality, social costs may be
either greater or less than private costs (Figure 2-3). A negative externality is created
when the marginal social cost of production is greater than the private cost, and this
situation is represented by point B.
Figure 2-3 Marginal cost and marginal benefit curves with an externality
Source: Hanley et al. (2007).-37-
When  there  is  a  negative  externality,  in  an  unrestrained  market,  the  quantity  of
goods produced (X) is more than it would be if private and social marginal costs
were equal. The unit price (P) of would also be lower. By increasing the price to P*,
and lowering the quantity produced to X*, an economic instrument can be used to
bridge the gap between the private costs and social costs. Through this process, the
entities causing harm to the environment will bear the associated costs and damages
suffered by the rest of society (Hanley et al. 2007).
In addition to externalities, there are other types of market failure that can also create
a divergence in private and social costs. For example, open-access resources which
are common property, in the absence of restrictions can result in greater use than if
users pay for it, leading to the well-known ‘tragedy of the commons’. The notion of
market failure in common property is based on the theory that any natural resource
had some optimal rate of use (Hanley et al. 2007). Public goods are another type of
market  failure, which can  result in situations  where the benefits gained  from
resources are not remunerated (Harris 2006, Hanley et al. 2007).
Environmental policy approaches
To correct a market failure, the government can intervene directly in the economic
process through some form of environmental policy. A policy can be defined as ‘a
set of instructions from policy makers to policy implementers that spell out both
goals and means for achieving these goals’ (Rist 1995, p. xviii) and also a ‘course of
action  or  inaction  chosen  by  public  authorities  to  address  a  given  problem  or-38-
interrelated set of problems’ (Pal 1992, p.2). Environmental policy can take various
forms  and  operate  across  a  broad  spectrum  of  approaches.  In  theory,  policy
instruments  are generally  grouped  under  three  main  categories  (Lorentson  1988,
Dovers 2005) (Table 2-8). Legislation or command-and-control instruments are the
most  common  types  of  environmental  policies  used,  and  pertain  to  regulation
dealing  with  ‘permission,  prohibition,  standard  setting  and  enforcement’
(Harrington & Morgenstern 2004).
Table 2-8 Spectrum of environmental policy approaches
Type of policy Approaches and assumptions in creating
environmentally responsible behaviour
Legislation and regulations
e.g.  Environment protection and biodiversity act 1999
Sea installations permits 1987
Enforcement of regulation is based on the
assumption that people are self-interested and
have to be forced into acting in a responsible way
Economic incentive-based instruments
e.g. Water market charges
Environmental performance bonds for mining
Monetary incentives are based on the assumption
that people are self-interested and mainly
interested in monetary rewards
Information & education-based strategies
e.g. National Landcare awards
Australian sustainable schools initiative
Based on the assumption that education and
knowledge can direct people into acting for the
public good
Source: Thomas (2007).
The second set of approaches comprise of economic incentives, whose primary goal
is  to  correct  market  failures  and  reflect  the  ‘true’  prices  of  environmental
commodities. Economic strategies, in their purest form, can be distinguished from
regulatory  approaches, in  that  they  aim  to  operate  freely,  with  minimum
specification  of  what  must  be  achieved,  or  what  must  be  done  to  achieve  it.
Regulation on the other hand, explicitly specifies what must be done and how it
must be done. There are, however, various strategies that lie in-between, comprising
of various mixes of regulation and free market operation.-39-
Environmental economists have long argued that environmental policy should be
based more firmly on the use of market-based mechanisms, such as environmental
taxes and tradable permits which, for example, integrate the environmental costs of
pollution clearly into the economy (Pearce & Barbier, 2000). Their central argument
is  that  ‘traditional’,  standards-based  ‘command-and-control’  regulation  is
economically inefficient because it imposes uniform obligations on various entities,
regardless of their ability to control environmentally damaging practices. This can
appreciably  increase  compliance  costs  and create industry  resistance  to  future
environmental regulation of any description. Economists also consider regulatory
approaches  to  be  environmentally  inefficient, where  for  example,  in  the  case  of
pollution, polluters have few incentives to reduce emissions beyond standards set by
government. Market-based mechanisms, on the other hand, can create a constant
price pressure for improvement (Pearce & Barbier, 2000).
Bates  (2001,  p.7)  considers  legislative  approaches  as  comprising  of  a  “complex
regulatory web that is uncertain in its application and inefficient in its approach”.
The  Commonwealth  of  Australia (2001)  and  United  Nations  Environmental
Programme (UNEP) (2002 p.22) find that ‘despite an explosion of a number of legal
instruments, many key aspects of environmental health continue to decline’ around
the world.
The third type of environmental policy instrument is the social approach, usually
based on advocacy,  generally created through education and persuasion (Hollick
1984, Bridgman & Davis 1998). Generally considered to be non-coercive forms of
action, tools such as awards, public information, product labelling, public ‘right to-40-
know’ and environmental agreements are used to inform and persuade people to
pursue  more  environmentally  sustainable  behaviour  (Thomas  2007). Robinson
(2001)  notes,  however,  that  moral  suasion  approaches  are  less  effective  than
economic incentive based approaches.
Environmental policy-makers recognise that decision making is influenced, not only
by a wide variety of natural phenomena, but also behavioural forces (Costanza &
Folke 1997, Goulder & Kennedy 1997). Therefore, policy must not only focus on
governance of natural resources, but the entities involved. It must recognise that the
unsustainable use of resources is then layered by various complexities inherent in
their interactions (Costanza 1989, Pearce & Atkinson 1993, Limburg et al. 2002,
Ekins et al. 2003, Daly & Farley 2004, Erickson & Gowdy 2005). Any approach
must take into consideration differences in the political, legislative, administrative,
regulatory  and  judicial  context of  the  area, and  the  more  successful  approaches
comprise of a mix of various policy instruments (Thomas 2007).
Welfare theory and role of government
This thesis also draws on some important principles described under welfare theory,
especially in relation to policy approaches in addressing coastal disaster risk. This is
a branch of economics that provides a framework for the analysis and management
of public policy. Its primary aim is to define economic strategies that can enable
society to move closer to an optimal level of wellbeing. Since it was first proposed,
this framework has been used to evaluate various kinds of public policy over the last-41-
50 years, such as health care, telecommunications and public infrastructure (Just et
al. 2004, Aakre et al. 2010). Welfare theory proposes that the best outcome can be
achieved  by  the  economy  working  freely,  without  government  intervention  (the
laissez-faire approach), provided that the conditions of a free market economy are
met.  Others  argue  that  the  government  must  intervene  to  redistribute  resources
among the various entities for the best economic outcomes, and this is known as the
public interest approach. The received wisdom among most economists is that the
government allows the economy to function freely, and intervenes only to provide
market enhancement functions, or correct market failures.
2.5. Conclusions
Australia’s  historical  experience  of  major  natural  disasters  has  resulted  in  a
significant evolution of disaster policy, from its early focus on response, to more
long-term actions to reduce community vulnerability. Under the umbrella of climate
change, coastal disaster risk has been brought to the forefront of current disaster
policy and catalysed a great deal of work, not only in relation to sea-level rise, but
also prompted investigation of other risks, such as inundation created by storms and
cyclones. While there has been some work on the economics of natural disaster risk,
there appears to be no research in Australia that has explicitly focused on the nexus
of coastal disaster risk, economics and the environment.
Internationally, economic aspects of coastal disaster risk have mainly used the lens
of ecological economics to analyse linkages between  environmental degradation,
planning and vulnerability. Environmental economics, a longstanding sub-discipline,-42-
used to provide a deeper understanding into the economic roots of environmental
failures, does not, however, appear to have been extended to the area of coastal
disaster risk. The aim of this thesis is to advance knowledge in this area. It uses the
framework of environmental economics to bridge the knowledge gap in this area,
particularly with regard to understanding market failures in risk-prone coastal land
created by property developers and buyers on the one hand, and government failures
on the other. The next chapter provides a background on Exmouth, the case study
site which will lead  into  a discussion  of  these  failures  in  the  local  context that
undermine  the  resilience  of  this  cyclone-prone  town  located  in  north-western
Australia.-43-
Chapter 3: Background on the case study site: Exmouth town
3.1. Geography
Exmouth town is located near the tip of the Northwest Cape (21º 56’S and 114º 08’)
E,  within  the  Gascoyne  region  of  Western  Australia at. The  Gascoyne  region
stretches along 600 km of Indian Ocean coast, and there are several world renowned
natural  features  in  the  area,  including  the Shark  Bay  and  Ningaloo  Reef  World
Heritage sites and Cape Range National Park. Carnarvon and Exmouth are the major
centres in the area, with Coral Bay forming a tourism settlement (Figure 3-1).
Exmouth town is the principal settlement on the Northwest Cape and the largest
service centre between Carnarvon and Karratha. The Shire of Exmouth encompasses
an area of 6,261 km
2 (Shire of Exmouth 2012).  Exmouth is considered the ‘tourist
gateway’  to  the  Ningaloo  Marine  Park,  located  to  the  west  of  the  town.  The
Exmouth-Minilya road is the primary access route to the Northwest coastal highway
which links the town to the state capital of Perth, 1,270 km to the south and Darwin,
3,366 km to the northeast.
Prominent geographical features in the vicinity of the townsite are Exmouth Gulf
and Cape Range. The range is bordered by the Indian Ocean, a narrow continental
shelf and the Ningaloo Reef to the west, with a gentle alluvial plain sloping seaward
towards the Exmouth Gulf. Cape Range reaches around 314 m in elevation, and is-44-
traversed by various creeks which drain down to low-lying areas, including parts of
the townsite, that can flood during high rainfall events (Van de Graaf & Denmand
1977).
Figure 3-1 Gascoyne region of WA, indicating the location of the Shire of Exmouth
Source: Western Australian Government, Department of Regional Development and Lands (2010).
Older  parts  of  the  townsite  are  located  away  from  the  coastline,  while recent
developments, such as the Exmouth marina, in the south, are located adjacent to the-45-
beach (Figure 3-2). A naval base is located to the north and the Learmonth airport is
located 40 km to the south. Adjacent to the marina is land allocated for future urban
development (Shire of Exmouth 2011).
Figure 3-2 Exmouth townsite with annotations showing areas mentioned in the text
Source: Created from Google maps (2011).
The  Town  beach  is  characterised  by  a  sandy  shore,  with  an  intermittent  beach,
beachridge and dunes between an alluvial plain and shore platform (Le Provost &
Chalmer 1986, Short & Woodroffe 2009). The coastal dunes are generally 8-10 m in
height and extend along the shoreline both north and south of the Town beach. In the-46-
marina area, the foredune is around 1-3 m in height, and the secondary dune, around
8-10 m, slopes towards a low floodplain covered by grass. Several of the dunes have
four-wheel and trail bike tracks and horse trails, especially in the areas north of the
boat harbour.
The Exmouth marina is located in a floodplain depression to the east of Murat Road
behind the coastal dunes (Figure 3-3). This area receives surface drainage from Cape
Range  via  two  streams. Prior  to  the  construction  of  the  marina,  excess  water
percolated  into  the  groundwater.  It  also flows out through  natural  break  outs
(Western Australian Government, DoW & Sinclair SKM 2007).
Figure 3-3 Annotated aerial image depicting the geographical layout of the Exmouth townsite
including the recently constructed marina
Source: Beckley (2007).-47-
3.2. Climate
Exmouth has a semi-arid climate, with very hot summers (October to April), with an
average  maximum  temperature  of  36.8°C  in  January. Average  minimum
temperatures range from 24.6° C in February to 14.1°C in August. Rainfall is highly
variable, with the annual average about 300 mm. The heaviest rainfall in Exmouth is
usually experienced from February to March, associated with thunderstorms, and
cyclonic low-pressure systems from the northwest. These contribute to around 40-
60% of the total annual rainfall (Australian Government, BoM 2011a).
Cyclones
A tropical cyclone (also called a tropical revolving storm, hurricane or typhoon) is
created as a result of an atmospheric low-pressure system (Garrison 2009). Areas of
northern Australia between the longitudes of 105˚E and 165˚E are considered as the
tropical cyclone region of the country (Lourensz 1981, Chan 1985, Holland 1984).
Figure 3-4 depicts the tracks taken by tropical cyclones over the period 1908-2005.
The Broome-Exmouth region falls within this area and is considered to be the most
cyclone-prone of Australia’s coastline (Australian Government, BoM 2012a).
Generally, a cyclone can be expected in Exmouth every second or third year on
average, typically between November and April, but the interval between cyclones
can vary as climatic patterns take on multi-decadal cycles. Severe cyclone events,
with  wind  speeds  in  excess  of 90  km/hour,  occur  every  three  to  five  years
(Australian Government, BoM 2012a).-48-
Figure 3-4 Tropical cyclone tracks in Australia (1908-2005)
Source: Australian Government, BoM (2011b).
The most destructive phenomenon associated with a cyclone that makes landfall, is
storm surge, which is an abnormally raised mound of seawater up to several metres
higher than the normal tide created due to the winds of a tropical cyclone (Ahrens
2008). Under normal conditions, the tidal cycle is semi-diurnal, with the daily range
of spring tides around 1.8 m and the neap tides around 0.6m.
Tide levels increase significantly during tropical cyclones when there is storm-surge
as a result of the combination of low atmospheric pressure and strong winds that
push a massive wall of water onshore with them (Beer 1997). Wave action on top of
the storm tide can raise the water level even further, producing a battering effect on
vulnerable  infrastructure  located  along  the  cyclonic  pathway.  Flooding  can  be
experienced as far as 40 km inland from the coastline. The worst possible scenario
arises when a severe cyclone crosses a coastline with a gently sloping seabed at, or
close to, high tide (Ahrens 2008).-49-
Estimates of storm-surge heights experienced in northwest Australia are presented in
Table 3-1. Prior to cyclone Vance, which affected Exmouth and Onslow in 1999,
available  data  indicates  that  100-year  Average  Recurrence Interval
2 storm-surge
levels ranged from 1.5 to 2.4 m in height. There is, however, anecdotal evidence to
suggest that water levels have exceeded 6 m in height on two occasions since 1945
(Steedman 1986).
One  of  the  most  severe  cyclones  to  hit  Exmouth  was  the  category  five  cyclone
Vance,  in  March  1999.  Vance  was  one  of  the  most  powerful  cyclones  in  the
recorded history of Australia, with a wind speed as high as 267 km/hr, creating a
damaging storm-surge of 3.6 m at Exmouth and 5 m at Onslow. A total of 207 mm
of rainfall was also recorded (Australian Government, BoM 1999).
Table 3-1 Storm-surge height estimates for the Gascoyne region, NW Australia
Location 100-year ARI
storm-surge
(m)
Basis References
Carnarvon 1.7 Computer modelling
estimates based on
long-term tidal records
Wallace and Boreham (1990)
Denham 2.3 Wallace and Boreham (1990)
Coral Bay 2.0 Computer modelling
estimates based on
long-term tidal records
Steedman (1989)
Exmouth 2.4 Steedman (1990)
Exmouth 3.6 Tidal records from
cyclone Vance, March
1999
Australian Government, BoM (1999)
Onslow 5 Australian Government, BoM (1999)
Cyclone Vance caused extensive flooding behind the coastal dune system at the
Town beach, and this was compounded by heavy rainfall draining from Cape Range
towards the south of the townsite. More than 10% of the buildings of the town
2 The Average Recurrence Interval (ARI) is a statistical measurement of the interval of time
between cyclones of a certain intensity or size. For example, a 100 year ARI pertains to a 1
in 100 chance of an event occurring in any given year (Bedient et al. 2001).-50-
suffered wind damage, there was extensive beach erosion and damage to the Boat
Harbour, several vessels, roads and other public infrastructure. The storm surge and
waves associated with the passage of cyclone Vance also eroded the 1-3m high fore-
dunes  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Exmouth  Boat  Harbour.  Immediately  north  of  the
harbour,  a  considerable  amount  of  coral  rubble  and  other  debris  was  deposited
(Australian Government, BoM 1999).
Climate  change  and  associated impacts  on weather  patterns  may  also  influence
cyclone-risk  in northern  parts  of  Australia. While  there  is  no  clear  scientific
consensus on whether there is a relationship between climate change and increased
frequency and severity of cyclones (Sugi et al. 2002, Emanuel 2005, Webster et al.
2005, Holland & Webster 2007, Chan 2007, Elsner et al. 2008, Saunders & Lea
2008,  Vecchi  et  al.  2008,  Knutson  2011),  predictions  are  that  there  could  be  a
substantial  increase  in  more  intense  events  around  the  world,  over  the  century
(Knutson et al. 2010).
In  Australia,  research  and  modelling  studies  indicate that  various  parts  of  the
coastline will be prone to more intense and frequent events in the future (Walsh &
Ryan 2000, Walsh et al. 2004, Church et al. 2006). Cyclones may also make landfall
at more southerly locations (McInnes et al. 2007). Findings by the Antarctic Climate
& Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre (ACE CRC) (2008) indicate that even
modest increases in sea levels due to climate change may result in a disproportionate
increase  in  the  occurrence of  extreme  sea  level  events,  such  as  cyclonic storm-
surges. For example, a sea level rise of 0.5 m, can cause inundation events that occur
every hundred years to two or three times annually in the future (Figure 3-5).-51-
Figure 3-5 The multiplying effect of a sea level rise of 0.5 m on extreme sea-level events in
locations around Australia
Source: ACE CRC (2008).
Inundation as a result of cyclonic events is not the only source of risk. More than 40
tsunamis have affected Australia since 1788, and the 2004 Indian Ocean and 2006
Java  tsunamis  caused  maritime  flooding  in  north-western  Australia  (Dominey-
Howes 2007, Dall’Osso & Dominey-Howes 2010). Parts of WA may be affected by
tsunamis as a result of  earthquakes occurring in the subduction zone which lies
offshore  Indonesia,  to  the  northwest  of  Australia  (Australian  Government,
Geoscience 2005). Northwestern Australia, including Exmouth, is expected to face
the most severe impacts (Western Australian Government, Planning Commission
2006).
3.3. Social and demographic attributes
The Exmouth townsite was originally developed in the 1960s as a support base for
the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications station, located 6 km north of the town.-52-
This was originally a US naval station, but since 1992 this station has been operated
at  lower  intensity by  the Commonwealth Department  of  Defence  (Australian
Government, Department  of  Sustainability,  Environment,  Water,  Population  &
Communities, n.d.).
Exmouth is a typical example of a small, remote coastal hamlet located adjacent to a
protected natural area (Gurran et al. 2005). Such areas are considered to have a high
potential of amenity driven population change as a result of their attractiveness to
‘Sea Changers’ and  tourists  (Gurran  et  al. 2005). Migration  into  such  areas  is
primarily as a result of the pull factor exerted by coastal amenity, gained from the
remoteness of the location and easy access to the ocean (Gurran et al. 2005).
The population of the Exmouth townsite represents approximately 80% of the total
population of the Shire of Exmouth. As of the end of 2009, the resident population
at Exmouth was around 2,400, having grown by around 8% since 2005 (Table 3-2).
Numbers swell to around 6,000 during the winter season because of the tourists who
visit during this period (Shire of Exmouth 2012).
Table 3-2 Population at Exmouth by males, females and total person from 2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Males 1,222 1,216 1,241 1,275 1,321
Females 1,019 998 1,033 1,061 1,103
Persons total 2,241 2,214 2,274 2,336 2,424
Source: ABS (2010).
Exmouth’s economy is based on its natural resources. Tourism is the main industry,
and the town acts as a gateway to the Ningaloo Reef, that stretches for more than
250  km along  the  west coast.  Other  industries  include offshore  oil  and gas,-53-
limestone mining, fisheries, and aquaculture. Pastoralism, mainly for sheep, is also
carried out on 100-year government land leases (‘stations’). The major employers at
Exmouth are the Department of Defence, the WA Department of Environment and
Conservation,  the  Shire  of  Exmouth,  Kailis  Fisheries  and  Pearl  Farm,  Exmouth
Hospital, Boeing and various tourism operators (Shire of Exmouth 2008).
Exmouth also serves as a support base for major offshore oil and gas fields including
Vincent, Van  Gogh, Macedon,  Pyrenes,  Novara,  Enfield,  Coniston,  Lavarda  and
Skiddaw  (Western  Australian  Government,  Department  of  Mines  and  Petroleum
2011).The Apache logistics base is also based in the town, providing day to day
operations for the Van Gogh field development. There is also a proposal to develop
extensive  salt  pans along the  east  side of Exmouth Gulf (Western  Australian
Government, EPA 2008a).
3.4. Town planning and development
Planning  for  the  growth  and  development  of  Exmouth  is  undertaken  within  the
context of state, regional and local planning policy. Table 3-3 depicts the evolution
of these over the period 1992 to the present.-54-
Table 3-3 State, regional and local planning applicable to Exmouth (1992-present)
Policy Year Government agency
Exmouth coastal strategy 1992 WA Department of Planning
(DoP)
Gascoyne coast regional strategy 1996 WA DoP
Exmouth-Learmonth structure plan 1998 WA DoP
Coastal zone management policy for WA 2001 WA DoP
State sustainability strategy 2003
WA Department of
Environment and
Conservation
Statement of planning policy nos. 2 and 2.6: Environment and natural
resources policy and state coastal planning policy 2003 WA DoP
Statement of planning policy no. 3: Urban growth and settlement 2003 WA DoP
Statement of planning policy no. 6.3: Ningaloo coast 2003 WA DoP
Exmouth marina village outline development plan 2003 Landcorp
Ningaloo coast regional strategy: Carnarvon to Exmouth 2004 WA DoP
Exmouth townsite structure plan 2004 WA DoP and Shire of
Exmouth
Town planning scheme no. 3 2006 WA DoP & Shire of
Exmouth
Statement of planning policy no. 3.4: Natural hazards and disasters 2006 WA DoP
Exmouth townsite structure plan 2011 WA DoP and Shire of
Exmouth
Sources:  Western  Australian  Government,  Department  of  Environment  and  Conservation  (2003),  Western
Australian Government, Planning Commission, Department of Planning (1992, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2003b,c,d,e,
2004,  2006), Western  Australian  Government,  Planning Commission,  Department  of  Planning  &  Urban
Development (1992), Western Australian Government, Planning Commission, Department of Planning & Urban
Development  (1996,  1998,  2001,  2003b,c,d,e,f,  2004a,b,  2006), Western  Australian  Government,  Planning
Commission, Department of Planning and Shire of Exmouth (2004, 2006, 2011).
Exmouth Townsite Structure Plan
To  provide  an  overarching  framework  for  future  local  structure  planning,
subdivision  and  development  within the  Exmouth  townsite,  the  Department  of
Planning and the Shire of Exmouth have prepared a townsite structure plan as of
June 2011. It builds on the previous strategic planning directions provided by the
1998 and 2004 town plans (Table 3-3). It is intended to address broad land-use and
infrastructure matters adopting a 25  year planning horizon, with major revisions
ideally taking place at five year intervals.
The Exmouth Structure Plan is underpinned by the sustainability principles outlined-55-
in the State Sustainability Strategy (2003), which seeks to ensure that sustainability
is incorporated into decisions for the future of WA at all levels of government. The
structure plan is also guided by the State Coastal Planning Policy (2003), Urban
Growth and Settlement Policy (2003), and the State Policy on Natural Hazards and
Disasters (2006).
Town planning at Exmouth also considers regional coastal policy as detailed in the
Exmouth-Learmonth  (Northwest  Cape) Structure  Plan (1998).  A  key  item  of
relevance is the recommendation to limit expansion of the rural residential area in
the southern portion of the townsite.
To date, development within the townsite has generally taken place based on an
evidence  of  past  flooding  events,  with  the  exception  of the hydraulic  modelling
(Western Australian Government, DoW & SKM 2007) undertaken to support the
development of the Exmouth marina. Development of the townsite is restricted to
the  north  by  the federal Department  of  Defence  land,  to  the  west  due  to
topographical and geological constraints, and to the east by the Exmouth Gulf.
Over the last three decades, the Shire has managed flood impacts in the townsite by
limiting development to areas of higher elevation, away from the coastal shoreline
and creeks. In the last ten years, however, there appears to have been a shift in
policy. The main focus of growth is now in the south with the establishment of new
residential  developments  in  low-lying  areas  (Western  Australian  Government,
Planning Commission & Shire of Exmouth 2004). This is especially so with the
construction of the Exmouth marina village which has been taking place over the-56-
last few years.
Study on flood-risk at Exmouth
As a result of two major flood events at the townsite, caused by tropical cyclone
Vance in March 1999, and a significant winter rain event in June 2002, the Shire of
Exmouth  commissioned  a  study of  flooding of  the  town  area. Hydrological  and
hydraulic modelling of the townsite was carried out to determine impacts of the
marina  construction  on  natural  drainage  in  the  area  (Western Australian
Government, DoW & SKM 2007). According to the study, prior to development,
land  in  the  marina  area  functioned  as  a  natural  flood  detention  area,  receiving
surface drainage from Cape Range via two streams extending several kilometres
inland (Figure 3-6).
This storage area was very large with a capacity to hold almost the entire volume of
a 100-year ARI flood event (Western Australian Government, DoW & SKM 2007).
Detention of the floodwaters behind the coastal dunes lessened the discharge rates
into the ocean. Excess water percolated underground or flowed out to the ocean
through the natural breakouts in the dunes. The largest breakout for the flood-water
that  ponded  behind  the  coastal  dunes  to  the  ocean  was  through  the  northern
breakout, which is located north of the golf course, opening through the coastal
dunes.  In the south, flood waters  reached the  ocean through a natural break-out
immediately north of the marina. It is known to have opened naturally during the
2002 flood, and is being kept open by the Shire Council by regular sand extraction-57-
(Western Australian Government, DoW & SKM 2007).
Figure 3-6 Exmouth townsite map depicting sites of previous (pre-2000) and recent (post-2000)
development and flooding pathways areas subject to flooding in the north and south
Source: Modified from Google maps (2011).
The flood study at Exmouth, did not, however, explore scenarios on the extent of
storm-surge  under  various  cyclone  intensities (Western  Australian  Government,
DoW & SKM 2007). Effects to the town as a result of more frequent and intense
cyclones on top of an elevated base sea-level in the context of climate change, were
also not investigated. Like other towns in regional Australia, the local council has
based planning decisions under the assumption of a stable sea-level and historical
weather patterns. This fails to take cognizance of increased levels of coastal risk that-58-
may be expected over the next 50 years.
This study identified areas at risk of 100-year ARI flooding, and provided a menu of
mitigation options to better cope with potential extreme events. Recommendations
for non-structural mitigation options include land-use planning, building standards,
emergency response planning, and the monitoring of stream-flow and rainfall data.
Land-use planning requires that ‘floodway’ and ‘flood fringe’ areas are defined in
town  structure  plans,  while  future  building applications  are required to  set  a
minimum floor level elevated by 0.5 m for adequate 100-year ARI flood protection.
Structural options deal with extending and upgrading floodway levees and bunds
and the construction of bridges and culverts in the areas where floodways cross
major  transport  routes.  However,  this  modelling  study  does  not  appear  to  have
adequately considered cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk in the townsite.
The  flood  study only  focused  on  the  linkage  between  physical  elements  during
flooding, such as elevation, land-forms and drainage pathways between the land and
the sea (Western Australian Government, DoW & SKM 2007). Disaster-mitigating
functions of the natural environment have not received sufficient consideration. The
dune system, coastal vegetation and the flood detention area behind the dunes can,
however, play an important role in reducing cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk in
the  town.  Dunes  function  as  a  natural  buffer  against  the  wind  and  waves
(Mascarenhas & Jayakumar 2008). Flood detention areas act like a sponge to absorb
excess inundation and floodwaters. Coastal vegetation, in turn, prevents erosion of
the dunes and compaction of the soil in the flood detention area, thereby maintaining
its porosity (Badola & Hussain 2005, Danielson et al. 2005, UNEP 2009).-59-
WA State Coastal Policy
The WA State  Coastal  Planning  Policy  provides  important  guidelines  in  setting
strategies and plans for the development along the coast of WA and aims to:
Safeguard  and  enhance  areas  of environmental  significance  on  the  coast
including the marine environment; ensure use and development on or adjacent
to  the  coast  is  compatible  with  its  future  sustainable  use  for  conservation,
recreation and tourism in appropriate areas; and take into account the potential
for  impacts  from  changes  in  climate  and  weather  on  human  activities  and
cultural heritage including coastal and urban communities, natural systems and
water  resources. (Western Australian  Government, Planning Commission
2003c, p.2063)
The Coastal Development Setback Guidelines for Physical Processes is outlined in
the WA  State  Coastal  Planning  Policy. The  aim  of this is  to  allow for natural
physical coastal processes to occur and provide a setback which serves as a buffer
between the shoreline and the where infrastructure is located (Western Australian
Government,  Planning  Commission 2003c). This  will  allow  for  natural  erosion,
extreme maritime events such as storms, and recreational activities and public access
to the beach. According to current policy, any type of development along a sandy
beach must be set back by a minimum distance of approximately 100 m from the
Horizontal  Setback  Datum  (HSD) (Western  Australian  Government,  Planning
Commission 2003) and the means by which this is calculated is presented in Table
3-4.
Over the last couple of years, a review of the State Coastal Planning Policy has been
underway. Notice has been given to amend the setback in order to accommodate
sea-level  rise  to  account  for  the  IPCC  AR4  (2007)  and  Church  et  al.  (2008a)
predictions  that sea  level  will  increase  by  0.9  m  by  2110  (Western  Australian-60-
Government, Planning Commission 2010). Based on this, the minimum setback for
sandy coasts in the south of WA will increase from 100 m to at least 150 m.
Table 3-4 WA Coastal development setback guidelines for sandy beaches: current and planned
revisions
Description of component
Minimum distance  (m)
Current Proposed
Acute erosion calculated using SBEACH model from severe storms (S1) 40 40
Historic trend of erosion/accretion based on existing records (minimum) (S2) 20 20
Component for sea-level rise based on latest IPCC predictions (S3) 38 90
Setback minimum from the HSD (S1+ S2+S3) ~100 ~150
Source: Western Australian Government, Planning Commission (2003c, 2010).
The distance allowed for acute erosion is also under review, and may consider more
severe storms experienced in northern regions such as cyclone Vance. It is proposed
that cyclone impacts are to be treated as severe storm events, under S1 rather than a
coastal type as it is under the current policy. Furthermore, the impact of cyclonic
events, particularly erosion, will be used for the calculation of S1, and not a line of
maximum  potential  storm  surge  inundation (Western Australian  Government,
Planning Commission 2010). The  notice  of  intended  policy  change  could  have
profound implications on coastal development in north-western Australia.
3.5. Residential property
This section provides information on properties sold in Exmouth over the last three
decades, based on primary data obtained from Landgate over the period 1988-2010.
There have been a total of 1,988 property sales. During this period, the mean sales
price was AU$ 228,470, with a minimum price of AU$ 22,562 and maximum of
AU$ 4,621,032 (2009 prices). Most transactions were for properties with houses.-61-
These are usually single storey and functional buildings, generally “suburban” and
unremarkable in appearance, with no unique characteristics. Over the period 1988-
2010, most properties sold in Exmouth were located within the residential (86%)
and  mixed  (11%)  land-use  zones,  while  the  remaining  3%  were  located  in
commercial, farming or industrial areas (Figure 3-7 I).
Figure 3-7 Land-use, property-class, roof and wall material of properties sold in Exmouth over
the period 1988-2010 derived from data obtained from Landgate (n=1,988)
The  types  of  houses  sold  included  strata houses,  flats,  villas,  townhouses  and
duplexes  (Figure 3-7 II).  Most  properties  had  walls  and  roofs  made  of  asbestos
(Figure 3-7 III & IV). This was a widely used construction material in Australia
until 1982, when it was banned due to its impact on human health. Given the fire
and water resistance of asbestos, it might have been considered a suitable material to
use in Exmouth, given its propensity to cyclones. A cross-tabulation of wall material
versus year built revealed that 86% of houses constructed with asbestos were built
prior to 1972. Interesting to note, that even following legislation banning asbestos-62-
from use in construction as of 1982, 73 houses used this as the construction material
over the period 1983-1995. Since then, however, cement block, steel or timber frame
or other materials have been used for walls, and iron and tiles for roofs.
The lot size of most properties sold was generally around 900-1,000 m
2 (Figure 3-8
I).  More properties  were  sold  in  the  winter (54%)  as  compared  to  the  summer
months (46%) (Figure 3-8 II). This is to be expected, because winter is the tourist
season in Exmouth, when the mild and pleasant weather attracts visitors. Within the
winter season there were more sales in July, August and September.
Figure 3-8 Land area (m
2) and month of sale of properties sold in Exmouth over the period
1988-2010 derived from data obtained from Landgate (n=1,988)
Exmouth marina
Since  its  inception  in  the  1960s,  there  has  been  significant  development  of  the
Exmouth townsite. The marina, located in the south of the town has been the focal
point of development in the last decade (Figure 3-3). The marina was constructed to
provide residential real-estate that is high in coastal amenity value, including easy
access to the beach and waterfront access via canals for recreational boats and yachts-63-
(Bowman Bishaw Gorham1997). It was also constructed with a view to increase the
vitality  and  economic growth  potential  in  the  town,  especially  by  attracting
residential property buyers from the oil and gas companies in the vicinity (Western
Australian  Government,  Planning  Commission  &  Shire  of  Exmouth  2011).  The
marina  has  a  lengthy  history  from  its  early  conceptualization  to  its  recent
construction. A summary of the history of the marina, since its inception in the early
1980s to its recent construction is provided in Table 3-5.
The marina consists of an inner boat harbour, resort, residential area and canals. The
boat  harbour  has  provision  for  16  commercial  boat  moorings  and  40  pens  for
recreational  yachts  and  power  boats.  The  resort  area  allows  for  tourist  and
commercial facilities. The residential area comprises of 431 lots, of which 91 are
waterside (canal) lots, 21 are dunal lots, and 381 are dry land lots. The average area
of a canal lot is 800 m
2, and a dry lot is between 570–870 m
2 in size. Site contouring
allows  for a view  of  either the  canals  or  Cape  Range  (Bowman  Bishaw
Gorham1997).
Water front properties, with a two-storey, four bedroom house were being offered at
around AU$ 1 million in 2011 (Ray White 2011). Properties in the marina village
are not more than 1-2 m above the mean sea level and are very close to the coastline.
In  the  process  of  construction,  the  natural  flood  detention  area  was  compacted,
resulting  in  the  loss  of  its  natural  flood/inundation  protective  function  (Western
Australian Government, DoW & SKM 2007). To compensate, structural engineering
measures, such as drainage channels have been constructed. However, the capability
of these to substitute for the loss of natural ecosystem functions in a major cyclonic-64-
event is yet to be demonstrated.
Table 3-5 History of the construction of the Exmouth marina
Early
1980s
Request from the fishing industry to build a boating facility at Badjirrajirra Creek south of the
townsite. Department of Marine and Harbours prepared a proposal with a design for this boating
facility, but this was rejected on the basis that it would not generate significant income and not
provide sufficient protection to boats from coastal processes
1986 An expression of interest and Public Environmental Review was presented by Skywest Holdings
but this was rejected on the basis that the location of the marina was too close to the wastewater
treatment plant. The fishing industry continued to lobby for a facility. Other developers
approached Marine and Harbours with a view to constructing a similar facility
1987 The Minister for Transport carried out an assessment of the economic viability of a marina in the
Exmouth Gulf area. This assessment recommended a go-ahead with this development, which
was to be created as a multi-user facility, utilizing existing infrastructure
1992 The project received environmental approval on the basis that it would provide an economic
boost to the township. It was to be called the Coral Coast Marina project, consisting of a marina
and resort near town beach. The economic downturn following this however resulted in state
government concerns over the cost of the project. The withdrawal of the US Navy from the
communications base further reduced the demand for housing. Interested developers withdrew
from the project
1994-
1996
With the release of a draft Exmouth Coastal Strategy by the Department of Planning, a resolution
was taken by the WA cabinet in 1994 for a strategic planning study for the coastal area between
Exmouth and Carnarvon
The deputy Premier and Minister for Regional Development in 1995 submitted a Cabinet Minute
proposing the construction of the marina. The construction was to comprise of an outer boat
harbor, and an associated resort that would provide a mix of tourist and residential development
near the town beaches
In 1995, James Christou and Partners Architects acting on behalf of LandCorp prepared a
concept plan for the marina, and cabinet established the Exmouth Development Steering
Committee to oversee the development of the project. A further report on the land-based
component of the project was requested
The Gascoyne Coast Regional Strategy (1996) recommended the construction of the marina to
support a range of uses, including commercial and recreational fishing, charter and tourist boat
operations, and support for mining and oil and gas exploration.
1997-
1998
Construction of the outer boat harbour commenced in 1996, and was officially launched in
September 1997 by the Premier. The development contractor for this project at the time was
Axiom, and this contract was terminated in 1998.
A revised concept plan for the development was prepared by Taylor Burrell in October 1998.
The Exmouth-Learmonth (North West Cape) Structure Plan, was released acknowledging the
marina project as one of the strategic areas to accommodate future residential growth and tourist
accommodation. This further required that marina was to be constructed in accordance with state
agreements. In October 1998, the Shire of Exmouth issued an in principle approval for the
project.
1999 The Shire of Exmouth gazetted the Town Planning Scheme No. 3, which incorporated a Marina
Zone in the area proposed by the developer. Some revisions of the plan were required, pertaining
to the realignment of the northern canal fingers to allow a better flushing, and providing a more
direct main access road between the existing town and the existing boat harbour. Taylor Burrell
provided the Shire with the revised proposal incorporating these changes in July 1999
Source: Landcorp (1997).-65-
WA Natural Hazards and Disaster Policy
Town planning at Exmouth is also subject to the State Planning Policy No. 3.4 on
Natural  Hazards  and  Disasters  (Western  Australian  Government,  Planning
Commission 2006). This policy pertains to the planning and development of land
that  may be  affected  by  natural  disasters  and  hazards  in  risk-prone  locations,
covering risks from cyclones and storm-surges, bushfires, landslides, earthquakes
and  tsunamis.  The  provisions  under  this  policy  apply  to  the  preparation  and
assessment  by  the WA Planning Commission’s regional  planning  schemes  and
strategies;  local  planning  strategies;  town  planning  schemes  and  amendments  to
town planning schemes; structure plans and outline development plans; and other
development applications.
For cyclone-prone areas such as Exmouth, this policy states that:
Where storm surge studies have been undertaken and show that inundation
may occur, new permanent buildings should be constructed to take account of
the effects of storm surge (including wind and wave set-up). In areas where
storm surge studies have not been undertaken, but evidence is available to
demonstrate vulnerability to inundation, any development proposals should be
supported by studies that demonstrate inundation will not occur. (Western
Australian Government, Planning Commission 2006, p.1535)
In relation to flood and cyclonic storm-surge inundation hazards, this policy states
that land-use planning in hazardous areas must not allow any new developments to
obstruct  floodways,  while  allowing  for those on  floodplains  that  do  not  cause
adverse impacts. All buildings in the 100-year ARI area must be elevated above the-66-
associated flood event
3. Adequate drainage infrastructure is required in areas subject
to storm-related flash flooding, and areas where floodwaters flow fast and deep must
be delineated.
3.6. Coastal property, disaster risk and market failure at Exmouth
Around Australia, coastal areas have reported  high population growth rates,  and
estimates  are  that  the  non-metro  coastal  population increased  cumulatively  by
11.6%, as compared to the 9% for the whole of Australia over 2004 to 2009. WA
was the state with the highest growth of 3.7%, followed by Queensland increasing
by 3.1%, and Victoria by 2.4% over the period 2004-2009 (ABS 2010). Even higher
rates of population growth are predicted for coastal regional centers of WA over
2010 to 2030, with that in Pilbara (Karratha and Port Hedland) increasing by 52%,
Kimberley  by  42%;  and  the  Geraldton  and  Gascoyne  (including  Exmouth)
increasing by 22% (Deloitte Access Economics 2011). Population in coastal areas
of Australia are projected to grow by 94% by 2050, raising the current population in
these areas from 6.8 million to 13.2 million (NSCT 2011).
The presence of major oil and gas industries in the Exmouth area, in addition to the
possible growth from amenity migration has many potential environmental, social
and  economic  implications.  Local  councils  are  under  pressure  to  meet  the
3 According to the Australian Building Codes Board (2012), the finished floor level of habitable rooms must be
above the Flood Hazard Level, unless otherwise specified by the authority having jurisdiction. The Flood Hazard
Level represents the height of the flood level associated with a defined flood event relative to a specified datum
(Defined Flood Level) plus the height above the lowest possible entry point during flooding or large waves
(freeboard). The footing system of a structure must provide the required support to prevent flotation, collapse or
significant permanent movement resulting from the flood actions.-67-
infrastructure and service requirements of these growing populations, especially in
small and scattered locations around the state. Councils are constrained by funding,
which, in turn, creates pressure to develop residential areas to increase revenue that
can be obtained from council rate payments (Berwick 2007).
Disaster management practitioners face a unique challenge in remote communities
such Exmouth, as there are several contributory factors that increase vulnerability,
including  location  in  a  hazardous  region,  and  a  small  population  that  will  only
support a limited range and level of services and facilities. Food and building costs
are significantly higher compared to urban or larger regional centres, and housing
shortage and limited basic infrastructure generally results in a lower standard of
living.  Local  government  faces the  dilemma  of  additional  demands  for risk
management, and local communities are constrained in their capacity to successfully
mitigate against disaster-risk.
Coastal land in its original, undeveloped form has innate features of resilience that
factor in as intrinsic economic values that that go beyond its value as real-estate
alone. In a coastal area that is prone to cyclonic risk, as at Exmouth, these include
topographical features, such as the direction the shoreline faces, the presence of
coastal  sand-dunes  and  flood  detention  areas,  and coastal vegetation  forming  a
barrier against storm-surge flowing further inland (UNEP 2009, UNISDR 2009).
While these values are usually not able to be calculated in monetary terms, they do
translate into tangible benefits that people gain. Climate change and increased risk
along the coast adds a further dimension to these values in the form of safety from
cyclonic storm-surge inundation.-68-
Development of coastal real-estate can change these disaster-mitigating attributes.
The terrain is altered and land compacted to make it more suitable for construction.
Compaction of the land to improve it for construction can result in flood detention
areas losing their infiltration capacity, so that flood waters are no longer able to be
absorbed into the ground. Water ways and vegetation are altered to improve the
aesthetic attributes of the land. These improvements are reflected in the price of
developed land, in proportion to the changes that have been made. Value is then
added when a house is constructed on this land. Essentially, all these changes are
reflected in the price differential of the developed land as against a comparable area
of undeveloped land.
Just as the improvements of coastal development factor into increasing the price of
land, the harmful effects imposed on the land must similarly factor into reducing the
price  of  land.  If,  for  instance  the  loss  of  safety  from  natural  hazards  is  not
incorporated as a cost in land development, then in economic terms, it remains as
what is called a negative externality. This is the case with the Exmouth marina
development, where the town faces increased cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk
in  previously  unaffected  areas  (Western  Australian Government,  DoW  &  SKM
2007).
Chapter two discussed the concept of market failure, which is one of the dominant
themes in environmental economics. There are various potential consequences of the
market failure at Exmouth in relation to the development of the marina. Canals have
been built to replace the natural flood retentive functions and physical buffering
provided  by  the  dunes.  In  the  case  of  a  major  cyclonic storm-surge inundation,-69-
additional resources will be needed for evacuation and emergency rescue. Long-term
reconstruction of not just private property, but also public infrastructure such as
roads and power lines, also has to be factored in. There is also potential flood risk to
other parts of the town as a result of the construction across natural flood drainage
pathways for the marina development. All of these factor in as costs to the rest of
society, resulting in a situation of economic inefficiency. Market failures will exist
when  the  price  of  coastal  land  does  not  provide  an  incentive  to  curtail  loss  of
disaster-mitigating environmental functions.
Risk  is also created  by  users  of  coastal  land,  i.e.  property  owners  of  newly
developed land, not paying the ‘real’ price for this land, and not taking into account
diminished coastal resilience resulting from their actions. This externality is passed
on as a societal cost, where the damages of cyclonic storm-surge inundation are
essentially  borne  by  the  local  government,  who also  pay for  flood-mitigating
structures  (Western  Australian  Government, DoW  &  SKM 2007).  Post-cyclone
costs resulting from this externality include costs of evacuation and compensation
payments to affected households. Although these costs may be relatively low in a
small town such as Exmouth, they can be very high for large coastal settlements,
such as Queensland that were affected by flooding and storm-surge inundation such
as those in early 2011.
Another market failure can result from asymmetry of information, when property
developers are more informed about the risks associated with coastal land compared
to property buyers. This can create an imbalance of power in transactions, where if
buyers were fully aware of their exposure, they might not have been willing to meet-70-
the developer’s price on the property or even purchase the property.
Since cyclone Vance in 1999, Exmouth has not experienced a major cyclone event.
Gissing  et  al.  (2010)  discussing  flood  risk, in  general, in  Australia,  including
cyclonic  storm-surge  risk,  have  pointed  out  the  dangers  of  complacency  about
potential risks in areas where there have not been recent extreme events. The lack of
recent risk management experience may lead to complacency with regard to coastal
risk  mitigation. The  challenge  is, therefore, to  ensure  that town-planning  and
development continues to be risk-resilient.
Crucial function of the coastal ecosystem has been lost at Exmouth as a result of the
construction of the marina. Infilling for construction has resulted in a loss of the
natural flood detention function in the area behind the dunes (Western Australian
Government,  DoW  &  SKM  2007).  The  natural  drainage  lines  whereby  inland
flooding and cyclonic storm-surge inundation can flow back into the ocean have
been reconfigured and older parts of the townsite have been subject to increased risk
(Western  Australian Government,  DoW  &  SKM  2007). The  extent  of  this
vulnerability to cyclonic storm-surge inundation is evident in the next chapter.-71-
Chapter 4: Coastal policy and planning implications of cyclonic
storm-surge risk at Exmouth
4.1. Introduction
The  national  assessment  on ‘Risks  of  climate  change  on  the  coast  of Australia’
(Australian Government, DCCEE 2009d) emphasised the importance of pragmatic
planning approaches  that  accommodate  sea-level  change  and  associated  extreme
coastal risks, while keeping in balance social and economic tradeoffs. Similarly,
these goals are laid out in the WA State Coastal Planning Policy No. 2.6 which
states that:
Local and regional planning strategies, structure plans, schemes, subdivisions,
strata  subdivision  and  development  applications,  as  well  as  other  planning
decisions  and  instruments  relating  to  the  coast  should  ensure  that  new
buildings and foreshore infrastructure on the coast are positioned to avoid risk
of damage from coastal processes  and, where  possible, avoid the need for
physical structures to protect development from potential damage caused by
physical processes on the coast. (Western Australian Government, Planning
Commission 2003c, p.2066)
A major focus of this pertains to the guidelines for coastal setbacks that aim to
protect development from ‘coastal processes by: absorbing the impact of a severe
storm sequence; allowing for shoreline movement; allowing for global sea level rise;
and allowing for the fluctuation of natural coastal processes’ (Western Australian
Government,  Planning  Commission 2003c, p.2068). Recognising  new  scientific
knowledge on changing sea-level and associated coastal hazards, this WA policy is
under  revision. Assessments  providing  information  on  the  vulnerability  of  local-72-
communities and on-site consequences of planning policy applications have been
highlighted  as  important  actions  to  inform  review  of  broader  regional  and  state
policy  (Australian  Government, DCCEE 2009a). Western Australian  coastal
resilience  is  undermined,  however,  due  to  lack  of  state  funding  of  vulnerability
assessments  and  inadequate  planning  for  future  adaptation  to  climate  change
(Harvey et al. 2011).
Using Exmouth as a case study, this chapter seeks to answer the question: “How
appropriate  are current  development  policies  and  practices  for  the  reduction  of
coastal risks?” This study was carried out through a cyclonic storm-surge scenario
analysis at Exmouth, using a Geographical Information System (GIS). The three
main objectives of this chapter were to:
1. Develop scenarios of coastal cyclonic storm-surge inundation under various
storm-surge heights;
2. Determine the risks to private property and public infrastructure; and
3. Evaluate how this relates to current WA policy and planning guidelines.
4.2. Approaches to assess coastal vulnerability
At an international level, there are various approaches to assess risk of sea-level rise
and its impacts on the coast. Under the International Geosphere-Biosphere Project
(IGBP), a significant amount of research has been carried out on linkages between
anthropogenic impacts and coastal risk (Crossland et al. 2005). Various countries-73-
have also used the IPCC Common Methodology (IPCC 1992, Carter et al. 1994) for
this  purpose. Examples  of  other  sea  level  rise  vulnerability  assessment  methods
include the  Dynamic  Interactive  Vulnerability  Assessment  (DIVA),  Simulator  of
climate change risks and adaptation initiatives (SimCLIM), Synthesis and Upscaling
of  Sea-level  Rise  Vulnerability  Assessment  Studies  (SURVAS),  Community
Vulnerability  Assessment  Tool  (CVAT), and the  Climate  Framework  for
Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) (Abuodha & Woodroffe 2006).
The importance of information and tools, such as cyclonic storm-surge inundation
modelling, for private and public decision-makers at local and regional levels in
Australia  has  been  highlighted  (Australian  Government DCCEE 2009a).  In  this
context, coastal analysts have been considering the possibilities of greater variability
in the patterns of rainfall and runoff, changes to the wave climate, and the frequency
intensity and duration of storms and tropical cyclones. Various government agencies
such as the federal Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency and House
of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change, Water, Environment
and  the  Arts  (HORSCCCWEA) have  identified coastal  areas  of  greatest  threat
around the country as the first step in planning actions for the mitigation of risk (e.g.
Australian Government, DCEEE 2009d, HORSCCCWEA 2009, OzCoasts 2011).
The DCCEE (2009a) has produced several maps using a ‘bucket fill’ approach as
part of a national research initiative, culminating in the report ‘Climate change risks
to Australia’s coast’. These maps provided initial estimates of coastal inundation as
a result of sea level rise in various parts of Australia. The ‘bucket fill’ approach does
not take into consideration erosion, changes to tidal flows in coastal waterways,-74-
coastal  defence  structures,  risk  of  storm-surge,  influence  of  wind  and  waves,  or
catchment  flooding  from extreme  rainfall  events. Despite  the  limitations  of  this
methodology, the maps were developed to provide initial guidance for governments,
business  and  communities, increasing  awareness and providing  a  foundation  for
more detailed assessments (Harvey et al. 2011).
Under the Smartline Project, a series of initial sea level rise maps at national level
have  also  been  developed to  illustrate  the  potential  impacts  of  climate  change
(Australian Government, Geoscience 2011). It consolidated numerous maps around
the country to provide a national-scale map in a single nationally-consistent format
and classification. The Smartline comprises of a single GIS buffer, extending 500 m
inland and 500 m offshore of the high water mark, around the entire coastline of
Australia.  It  details  coastal  landform,  or  geomorphology,  and  is  tagged  with
information on the topography of the coast (planform, elevation and shape), and also
the structural constituents of the landform (e.g. coral, sand, mud, laterite boulders) in
the area.
The areas covered under these assessments have focused on the southern parts of
Australia, where most of the population is concentrated. These include the WA coast
from Perth to Mandurah, Sydney, Hunter and Central Coast (NSW), Adelaide (SA),
Melbourne (VIC), and in South East Queensland (including Brisbane and the Gold
Coast) (OzCoasts 2011). Three sea-level rise scenarios of 0.5m, 0.8m, and 1.1m,
relevant for the period to 2100 were used, based on high-resolution digital elevation
data. Recent observations are, that sea-level rise has been occurring nearer to the
upper bound levels of the IPCC projections. There is a possibility that levels greater-75-
than 0.5–1.0 m up to 1.5 m can occur (Rahmstorf et al. 2007, Church et al. 2008b,
Domingues et al. 2008).
Work has also been carried out at state and local level, including the Wollongong
area (NSW) (Abuodha & Woodroffe 2006) and at Collaroy and Narrabeen Beach in
Sydney  (Hennecke  et  al.  2004).  In  WA,  assessments  have  been  carried  out  for
Bunbury Mandurah, Cottesloe, Scarborough, Murchison, and Port Hedland (Hubert
& McInnes 1999, Western Australian Government, Planning Commission 2006).
Vulnerability  assessments  have  focused  primarily  on  highly  dense  urban  coastal
areas.  There  is  a  gap  in  knowledge  on increased  coastal  risk  in regional  areas,
particularly in cyclone-prone areas of WA, such as Exmouth (Western Australian
Government, Planning Commission 2006).
4.3. Methods
This study used a GIS to carry out a scenario analysis of coastal inundation due to
cyclonic storm-surge. The method used was based on the underlying principle that
the elevation, distance from the coastline, and connectivity to the sea are the primary
criteria upon which an area may be inundated as a result of cyclonic storm-surge,
following the process described in Martin (1993). Idrisi© and ArcMap© software
was used for the GIS scenario analysis.
Hydrology models use advanced algorithms to ascertain drainage and inundation,
taking into consideration factors such as slope, direction of slope, flow velocity and
stream energy. The scenario analysis used in this study does not use these advanced-76-
concepts, but instead determines inundation based on elevation and connectivity of
the land to the sea (i.e. ‘bucket fill’). The overall goal of this thesis is to carry out an
assessment  of  vulnerability  of Exmouth  for  the  application of  coastal  disaster
economics which does not require an estimation of vulnerable areas at a high degree
of detail, but rather an overall classification of high risk areas requiring management
intervention.
Data
The analysis required three main inputs, namely, a Digital Elevation Model (DEM),
cadastral  boundaries  and  aerial  photography.  These  inputs  were  processed  into
compatible layers for use in the scenario analysis.
A DEM represents the terrain using an array of data points containing information
on elevation for a number of ground positions, where points are spaced at regular
intervals to create a grid (Miller & La Flamme 1958). Topographic data can be used
in the GIS to model the behaviour of water on the surface of the earth, including
flooding potential and impacts. The DEMs available for Australia at the time this
study  commenced are  presented  in Table 4-1. CSIRO  (2009)  has subsequently
developed a DEM for Australia with a 90 m spatial resolution derived from SRTM
data, but this was not available when this study commenced. The SRTM DEM was
chosen  for  this  study  as  this  was  at  the  best  available  resolution,  and  could  be
downloaded  free  of  charge from  the  Consultative  Group  on  International
Agricultural  Research - Consortium  for  Spatial  Information  (CGIAR-CSI)-77-
GeoPortal.
Table 4-1 Digital Elevation Models available for Australian coastal regions
Digital elevation models (DEMs) Spatial
resolution (m)
GEODATA DEM 250
D8 Flow Direction Grid DEM, 2008 250
Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission (SRTM) DEM 90
The area covering the Exmouth townsite was extracted from this tile. Key steps in
processing this  into  an  image  compatible  for  storm-surge  scenario  analysis  are
presented in Figure 4-1.
Figure 4-1 Main steps in processing carried out on the SRTM DEM to obtain the Exmouth
townsite DEM in Idrisi GIS software
All elevations are in metres (referenced to the WGS84/EGM96 Geoid). The SRTM
mission specification of the absolute accuracy of the DEM is 16 m. Various studies
such as Rabus et al. (2003), Sun et al. (2003), Bourgine and Baghdadi (2005), and
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Rodriguez et al. (2005) have found this error to be less, often in the range of 6 m,
especially in areas under low vegetation.
Aerial photographs are a typical data set used in remote sensing to measure various
attributes of the land and environmental conditions at high resolution (Innes & Koch
1998) and can provide an important management tool for researchers and planners.
The scenario analysis in this study used digital scans at 1270 dpi of aerial photos in
‘geotiff’ format,  obtained from  Landgate,  WA. Each  frame  of  photography
overlapped the frames on each side by 60%. This meant that for simple coverage of
a site, only every second frame was needed. Imagery from 2007 was the most recent
available, as aerial photography for Exmouth is obtained only once every ten years.
Table 4-2 details the technical information for the aerial photographs used in the
study.
Table 4-2 Technical  description  of  aerial  photography  obtained  from  Landgate  for  the
Exmouth townsite
Job/Project Film Runs Date Lens Scale Notes
00722 WA5800C 12A/5198 &
13/5175
25 August
2007
152.98 mm 1: 100,000 Map ref.:
1754.
Exmouth
Onslow SPF
50-05, GDA
94 datum
A cadastral map is a comprehensive register of the precise location and bounds of all
types of existing property in an area. It includes details of the ownership, tenure,
geographical coordinates, the dimensions, and the area of individual parcels of land.
Town  planners  and  administrators  use  a cadastre  as  a  means  of  defining  the
dimensions and location of land parcels in legal documentation.-79-
The cadastral boundaries map of the Northwest Cape was obtained from the Spatial
Information Branch of the Operations Division of the WA Department for Planning.
The  cadastral  map  was  obtained  as  a  Shapefile  (polylines),  where  the  type  of
geometry was provided in line format. The Geographic Coordinate System for this
file was the GCS_GDA_1994. Using ArcMap©, the polyline format was converted
to polygons to assign attribute values to land parcels. The cadasters for the Exmouth
townsite were retained and others removed. The data was cleaned to remove any
duplicates.
Storm-surge scenarios
Storm-surge  scenarios  of  1-10  m  heights  were simulated  and  isolated  from  the
DEM. To ascertain areas at risk under various scenarios of flooding, the RECLASS
module in Idrisi© was used. Ten images were created which depicted land areas that
would be flooded for flood heights of 1-10m. These scenarios were considered on
the basis that they included the worst case scenarios of storm surge bearing in mind
the increased sea-level and storminess as a result of climate change effects (Walsh &
Ryan 2000, Walsh et al. 2004, Church et al. 2006, ACE CRC 2008). According to
the Bruun Rule (Bruun 1962), erosion of sandy beaches occur as a result of an
increase in sea-level. Increased storminess will further exacerbate shoreline retreat.
Image processing
The elevation data (DEM) were used to assess which low-lying areas proximal to-80-
the coastline in the town were at risk of cyclonic storm-surge inundation. When
elevation  data  of  the  study  location  were entered  into  the  GIS,  the  topographic
location  of  each  point  relative  to  the  shoreline  was  determined  in  terms  of
inundation potential. The output obtained therefore comprised of a new grid for the
entire study area. The conceptual basis of the image processing that was carried out
in this analysis is presented in Figure 4-2.
Figure 4-2 Conceptual diagram of image processing carried out in the GIS for the storm-surge
scenario analysis at Exmouth
Figure 4-3 presents the stepwise process followed to carry out the analysis. In the
first step, a reclassification of the Exmouth townsite DEM raster image was carried
out. Reclassification  of  an  image comprises  of  the reconfiguration  of  the  layer
through the assignation of new values on a cell by cell basis (Lo & Yeung 2007).
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Figure 4-3 Stepwise process of software-specific modules used in Idrisi and ArcMap to establish
spatial extent of storm-surge scenarios at Exmouth-82-
The pixel or grid cell values in each layer were combined using Boolean operators to
produce a new value in the composite layer. In Idrisi, these layers are treated as
arithmetical variables, which allow complex algebraic calculations. In the area of
interest, all elevation values in the original DEM were reclassified into only two
attributes of interest. Those cell values with an elevation above zero were replaced
with a value of one to represent land. All those with a zero value were classified as
ocean. The resulting image was a Boolean layer, also called a logical layer, because
it shows only those areas that meet the specified condition (1= true, above zero and
therefore land), and those that do not (0 = false, not land).
Ten Boolean layers were produced to depict potential storm-surge scenarios, with
water levels ranging from 1-10 m. The Boolean constraints ranged from elevation
>1 m-land and therefore true = 1, and <1 m = ocean, and therefore 0 and so on until
they reached storm-surge heights of 10 m. Using each of the ten Boolean images
depicting land under various storm-surge scenarios as the input images, an equation-
based  simple  modelling  analysis  was  carried  out  in  the  GIS  to  isolate  all  land
affected under each scenario. The images were then corrected in the GIS to include
only areas that were connected to the ocean. Low-lying inland areas not connected
to the ocean were not included in the final images. Using height to depict risk is
preferable  compared  to  using  distance  to  the  coast  as  it  relates  to  potential
inundation as a result of cyclonic storm surge.
The third step involved an uncertainty analysis of the spatial data using the Root
Mean Square Error (RMSE) of the SRTM DEM. The RMSE is mathematically the
spatial  equivalent  of  standard  deviation,  and  it  provides  a  measure  of  deviation-83-
between the digitised locations and the known point locations (Kellndorfer et al.
2004). For the SRTM DEM, various estimates of the vertical accuracy of the SRTM
DEM have been provided, and these ranging from 5-16 m (Rabus et al. 2003, Smith
&  Sandwell  2003, Gonçalves &  Fernandes  2005).  Using  an RMSE  of  6  m, the
probability of each pixel being flooded under each flooding scenario was assessed.
The fourth step involved the incorporation of an image depicting the WA Coastal
Setback  minimum  (100  m),  as  described  under  the  WA  State  Coastal  Planning
Policy for  Southwest  Australia (Western Australian  Government, Planning
Commission 2003c) (see Chapter three). The 100 m extent of shoreline retreat was
created  through  application  of  a  buffer by  the  reclassifying a  polygon  100 m
landward from the shoreline. In a GIS, a buffer is defined as a ‘zone with a specified
width surrounding a spatial feature’ (Lo & Yeung 2007, p.216). This layer was
combined with the 5 m storm-surge scenario to produce the final polygons depicting
cyclonic storm-surge inundation. It was then overlaid with aerial photography to
illustrate the potential short-comings of the 2003 planning policy.
4.4. Results
This  section  provides  the  findings  of  the  scenarios  in  terms  of  the  impacts  of
cyclonic storm-surge inundation in Exmouth. The key risks to built infrastructure,
with a particular focus on residential buildings, public infrastructure, commerce and
industries in the study site are also presented. Taking into consideration the possible
DEM error, this model obtained spatial outputs with 70% probability of land being
inundated under the various inundation scenarios. Spatial outputs obtained from the-84-
scenario analysis in GIS, showed that inundation as a result of cyclonic storm-surge
could have significant impacts on the various planned land-uses in the townsite.
Digital elevation model of Exmouth
Figure 4-4 presents the DEM for the Exmouth townsite. The gradation of colour
from blue to green to yellow, orange and red represents increasing elevation. The
black background depicts the ocean.
Figure 4-4 Digital  Elevation  Model  (DEM)  of  Exmouth  with  elevation  in  metres  above  the
Mean Sea Level (MSL) based on the SRTM-85-
As can be seen from the figure, much of the townsite is between 2-10 m in elevation.
The older part of the town, located in the north, is away from the shoreline, at
between 4-10m in elevation. Newer areas, in the south, including where the marina
is, are between 2-4 m in height. This indicates that if Exmouth is affected by an
event  similar  to  cyclone  Yasi that  affected north  Queensland in  early  2011,
generating storm-surge of 5 m (Australian Government, BoM 2011c), much of the
south of the townsite would be completely inundated.
Storm-surge  scenarios Figure 4-5 depicts  the  results  of  the  storm-surge  scenario
analysis  and  indicates  that  for  storm-surge  heights  of  between  1-3  m,  there  is
generally little effect on infrastructure and homes in the townsite. For a cyclone
Vance-like surge of about 4 m, however, several areas of the southern part of the
town are at risk. At a height of 5 m, most of the marina properties will be inundated.
Beyond 5 m, the scenarios show that most of the townsite will be inundated.
Land-uses affected under various cyclonic storm-surge inundation scenarios
According to the land-uses categorised under the Exmouth Townsite Structure Plan
of  2011  (Western  Australian  Government,  Planning  Commission  &  Shire  of
Exmouth  2011),  the  main  areas  affected  will  be  those  allocated  for  the  marina,
Special Residential and Long-term Future Urban and Tourism (Figure 4-6). Areas
classified as Current Residential, which comprise the areas built at the inception of
the townsite, face the least risk.-86-
Figure 4-5 Results of scenario analysis of potential cyclonic inundation at Exmouth for storm-surge heights of 1-10m. Red indicates inundated areas.-87-
Figure 4-6 Land-uses affected under storm-surge scenarios 1-8 m at Exmouth
Areas  categorised  as  Existing  Residential  land-uses in  the  2011  Structure  Plan
comprise of lots located generally north of Nimitz Street through to Skipjack Circle
in the northern part of the townsite, and the subdivided residential component of the
Exmouth  marina  village  (Figure 4-7). Existing  residential  areas  north  of  Nimitz
Street through to Skipjack Circle in the northern corner of the townsite will not be
affected, as these areas will come under risk only with water levels of 10m.
The  marina  and  boat  harbour  precinct  are  located  in  the  south  of  the  Exmouth
townsite. This area originally functioned as the main floodwater storage area, owing
to its very low elevation and proximity to the shoreline. Cyclone Vance-like storm
surge would cause complete inundation in this area.
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Figure 4-7 Exmouth Townsite Structure Plan, 2011
Source: Shire of Exmouth (2011).-89-
Existing Residential areas at risk are those adjacent to the canals in the marina and
can be categorised as high-risk for water-levels 5 m and above. It is important to
note, however, that because this analysis was based on the SRTM DEM created
prior to the recent earthworks carried out during the construction of the marina,
further analysis could be necessary to verify this. Areas along the length of the
Conservation and Foreshore Reserve and the Golf Course are also at risk of storm-
surge levels of 3 m in height, which can affect those areas demarcated for tourism,
especially within 0-200 m from the shoreline.
Public Purpose areas demarcated in the 2011 Structure Plan include existing land
uses on larger land holdings that fulfil community needs. These are the Exmouth
primary and high school, Exmouth Hospital, cemetery on Warne Street, and the
proposed waste water treatment plant on Commonwealth land north of the town
boundary. Inundation of the waste water treatment plant will, however, experienced
with a 3 m storm-surge in its current location. At the intersection of Reed and Welch
Streets, allowance has been made for expansion of the shire depot and an emergency
services facility.
The location of the shire depot and emergency services facility in the Welch Street
area  provides  the  greatest  cause  for  concern  of  all  the  Public  Purpose  land
allocations. At water-levels of > 6 m, this area can be subject to cyclonic storm-
surge inundation.  Even  if  the  flood  does  not  reach  the  actual  location  of  these
services, it can cause flooding of Reed Street and Murat Road, which will cut off
access to other areas. This is of particular concern, if emergency services are to be
coordinated from this point. The analysis has revealed that other public service areas-90-
in the townsite are not at risk of inundation.
Land identified as Foreshore Reserve in the Structure Plan is intended to conserve
the town’s coastal dune formation abutting the Exmouth Gulf. Foreshore Reserve
land can be flooded by water levels > 2 m. Areas demarcated as Conservation areas
north of Preston Street can be subject to partial inundation for cyclonic storm-surge
levels of 6 m and above.
The Service Commercial/Service Industry area is bounded by Murat Road, Nimitz,
Reid and Welch Streets, and historically functioned as the town’s Light Industrial
area. Land allocated to these uses was found to be vulnerable to storm-surge levels
of 7 m. At lower water levels, while this area will not be affected by cyclonic storm-
surge inundation, it will be cut off from road access, to the north and south of the
townsite. The Welch Street Light Industrial area, located west of Warne Street is not
under risk of inundation. However, access roads leading to and away from the area,
such as the area where Welch Street and Murat Road intersect can be flooded by
water-levels of >7 m. Areas east of Murat Road in the north of the townsite will be
mainly affected by water-levels of >5m.
Areas categorised under the category of Mixed Use, include sites that have high
exposure, demand landmark architecture, have frontage to Murat Road, and are in
the  vicinity  of  activity  nodes  such  as the  Visitor  Centre  and  Exmouth  marina.
Mixed-use  land, allocated  at  the  corner  of  Warne  Street  and  Murat  Road, is  at
greatest risk of inundation from water levels > 7 m. Water levels of 8 m and above
will extend inundation to the land located north of Truscott Crescent.-91-
Areas  demarcated  as Proposed  Urban  areas, are  those that  will  accommodate
residential  growth  in  the  future.  These include  residential  infill  areas  within  or
adjacent to the existing residential areas and larger parcels of land west of Murat
Road.  Three  residential  infill  areas  have  been  defined  for  this  purpose:  (1)
Learmonth Street south; (2) Lot 300 King Place; and (3) Nimitz Street south. Areas
at greatest risk of inundation are those opposite the marina, west of Murat Road.
Storm-surge-levels of >5 m will cause inundation in this area.
The  town-centre  of  Exmouth,  framed  by  Murat  Road,  Maidstone  Crescent  and
Kennedy Street, accommodates commercial and retail activity. The existing town-
centre,  is  a  low-risk  area with minor  flooding at  the  intersections  of  Maidstone
Crescent with Murat Road under a 10 m water-level scenario. Restricted Rural land-
uses, located east of Murat Road, opposite the Preston Street area are at risk of >8 m
inundation.
Town  Planning, cyclonic  storm-surge inundation  risk and WA Coastal  Setback
Guidelines
The 5 m inundation scenario was compared to a setback of 100 m (normal setback
on a sandy coast located 30º south), as used in the Coastal State Planning Policy 2.6
(Western Australian Government, Planning Commission 2003c) (Figure 4-8). A 100
m setback area in the north of the townsite provides sufficient protection for up to a
3  m  storm-surge.  The coastal dunes in  this area can also  function  as  a  natural
physical barrier against extreme waves. A 100 m coastal setback is not sufficient,
however, to protect the town against a storm-surge > 3 m.-92-
Figure 4-8 Comparison of the inundation by a storm-surge scenario of 5 m with the normal
coastal development setback minimum (100 m) which is used in southern WA
In the south of the townsite, the exemption clause for marinas in the WA coastal
setback policy (Western Australian Government, Planning Commission 2003c) has
resulted in land for residential and commercial developments being located close to
the  shoreline.  With  no  buffer  to  protect  these  areas  against  risk  of  inundation,
cyclonic storm-surge at heights of 2 m and above will affect the area. Furthermore,
recent development on the shoreline does not allow for the inward migration of
natural  coastal  habitats  and  ecosystems resulting  from changes  to  the  current
shoreline due to sea-level rise and associated erosion.-93-
4.5. Discussion
Storm-surge scenarios at Exmouth
The spatial analysis found that areas developed in the last ten years, and located in
the south of the town are at risk of cyclonic storm-surge inundation. Areas in the
north, developed during earlier periods, are comparably less at risk. Tourist land-
use, especially that adjacent to the Golf Course, is also vulnerable to inundation
from a Vance-like cyclone.
Areas  identified  as  highly  vulnerable  to  inundation  in  this  GIS,  corroborate  the
findings of the hydraulic modelling study of 2007 (Western Australian Government,
DoW & SKM 2007), and are those to the north-west, west, and south-west of the
Exmouth marina. There were, however, some differences. In the industrial area, for
instance, the extent of flooding in Welch Street and northwards to Pelias Way is
greater than  indicated  by the hydraulic study. Areas  in  the  southern  part  of
Maidstone  Crescent, diverging  towards  the  west-most  boundary  of  Learmonth
Street, also  displayed a  greater  degree  of  flooding.  These  differences may  be
explained in part, by the fact that the hydraulic study only considered rainfall run-off
from the Cape Range area.
Methods and data
There  are  limitations  to  the  approach  used  in  this  assessment.  Hydrological
processes that include factors such as slope, current and wind were not taken into-94-
consideration. Furthermore, this model assumes a relatively smooth terrain, where
flooding uses a ‘bucket fill’ approach. Owing to the horizontal resolution of the
DEM, of 90 m, there may be over or underestimates of the elevation of certain areas.
Some land  in  the  marina has  been  filled  in,  and  canals  constructed  since  the
preparation of the SRTM DEM used, and therefore there may be some differences in
cyclonic  storm-surge inundation  patterns. This  study  depended  on  the  Digital
Elevation  Model  obtained  from  the  SRTM,  whose  spatial  resolution  limited  the
analysis.  For  coastal  managers  in  regional  areas  within  WA  and  other  parts  of
Australia,  DEMs  at finer  scale  are  essential  for  local  governments  and  research
groups working on regional coastal vulnerability.
This study demonstrates how initial assessments based on limited, low-cost, and low
resolution spatial data can be used by local government agencies and researchers to
carry out initial assessments of coastal vulnerability in their jurisdictions. Assessing
a setback can be an expensive exercise (Linham & Nicholls 2010). Work has to be
done to assess the extent of the foreshore, data has to be provided on erosion and
water-levels, and the evolution of the shoreline over time has to be modelled. Then,
there  are  additional  costs  of  incorporating  setbacks  into  planning  policies  and
enforcing these. While there are significant expertise and sophisticated modelling
techniques  available  for  this  purpose,  costs  of  carrying  out  assessments  can  be
prohibitively expensive. The approach used can also be used to inform more detailed
and fine scale hydraulic and numerical modelling research, especially for identifying
potential high risk and sensitive areas. Findings, such as those obtained from this
study,  can  also  be  used  by  local  government  as  the  starting  point  to  create-95-
community  awareness,  discussion  and  engagement  to  support  more  informed
development decisions in the town-planning in the context of medium to long-term
impacts of coastal change in regional Australia (Harvey et al. 2011).
DEM data can be subject to various errors in the process of their creation. One such
error is an unexplained high or low value, commonly called ‘peaks’ and ‘pits’, that
do not actually denote the surface features that the DEM is meant to represent. This
can be a problem especially for relatively flatter areas such as floodplains (Falorni et
al. 2005).
Implications for the current review of the WA Coastal Setback Guidelines
Chapter three described the WA Coastal Setback Guidelines applicable to coastal
development at Exmouth. To recapitulate, calculation of the horizontal distance of
the coastal setback, under the WA guidelines must consider three aspects. S1 is the
distance to accommodate acute erosion as a result of a severe storm, S2 accounts for
chronic erosion based on historical trends, and S3 represents the distance for sea-
level rise over 100 years for sandy beaches such as Exmouth. These guidelines are
currently under  revision (Western  Australian  Government,  Planning  Commission
2010). For cyclone-prone areas, S1 (acute erosion) will be calculated based on a
cyclone instead of a severe storm and S3 will be increased from 0.38 m to 0.9 m to
reflect more recent IPCC sea-level rise estimates (IPCC 2007).
Findings of this study have several implications on setback revisions when planning
for cyclone-prone areas such as Exmouth in the north of WA. The value for S1 will-96-
need to consider the most severe category of a cyclone (i.e. Vance). However, as a
result of climate change, there are predictions of more severe cyclone-events (Walsh
& Ryan 2000, Walsh et al. 2004, Church et al. 2006, ACE CRC 2008). The Bruun
Rule on erosion associated with sea-level rise also applies for storm-surge, and will
result in a more erosion taking place, and therefore more of the shoreline could be
inundated. This raises the question as to whether the use of a lateral setback line to
demarcate foreshore reserves, especially in northern coastal areas of Australia is the
best option. Elevation-based, floating and hybrid setbacks are possible alternatives
for consideration (Linham & Nicholls 2010).
Elevation-based setbacks are generally used for beaches prone to coastal inundation
(Linham & Nicholls 2010). A 5 m contour-based setback is used, for example, in
England, in  areas  susceptible  to  tidal  inundation  (Bridge  & Salman  2000).  The
vertical distance above the highest tide mark is used as the base reference point. An
advantage of elevation setbacks is their use of the natural topography of the land.
This makes them more effective than artificial barriers, such as sea walls, which
change the pattern of flow of storm-waves, thereby increasing their height, and also
the extent of inundation (Linham & Nicholls 2010). Ecosystem services and natural
hydrological processes are also benefited because these setbacks follow the natural
topography  of  the  land,  unlike  lateral  setbacks, which  can  bisect  these  natural
features (Bridge & Salman 2000, Linham & Nicholls 2010). By allowing the natural
processes of erosion and accretion to occur, they maintain the natural appearance of
the coastline (Fenster 2005).
Variable  setbacks  are  considered  to  have  greater  relevance  in  areas  of  varying-97-
geomorphology  (Klee  1999,  Bridge  &  Salman  2000). The  WA  Coastal  Setback
Guidelines have provision for the use of variable setbacks in cyclone prone areas
(Western Australian Government, Planning Commission 2003c). These guidelines
require  a  case-by-case  assessment  and  the  question  is,  whether  this  is  actually
implemented,  and  if  planners  simply  try  and  meet  the  100  m  minimum  out  of
convenience.  Correct application  of  variable  setbacks  allows for  the  dynamic
evolution of the shoreline, and this has been successfully used in several states in the
US (Fenster 2005). However, the reference points of variable setbacks have to be
reassessed periodically in response to changing sea-levels  (Healy  & Dean 2000,
Fenster 2005).
Coastal policy in WA should also revisit the exemption of a setback for marina
developments, particularly in cyclone-prone regions. The study found that because
of this exemption, residential land in the marina is at risk. It may be the case that the
development of real-estate in a marina is a way around restrictions, meeting the
desire for homes to be located as close to the beach as possible. Therefore, it is of
great  concern  that  this exemption,  especially  in  growing  regional  towns  like
Exmouth, will foster the development of infrastructure in high-risk areas.
Ecosystem functions, disaster risk and setback guidelines
Apart from setbacks, there are other means of achieving coastal resilience that must
be considered. Experiences from the 2004 Asian tsunami and other coastal disasters
have  shown  the  important  functions  that  physical  buffering  function  of  natural
coastal  features,  such  as  sand-dunes,  coastal  forests  and  coral  reefs  play  in  risk-98-
mitigation (PEDRR 2010).
Current guidelines under the WA Natural Hazards and Disasters policy (SPP3.4)
(Western Australian  Government, Planning Commission 2006) require  that
developments do not obstruct floodways, and floor levels of buildings are elevated
above a 100-year ARI flood event. Further, landscape, seascape, visual amenity,
indigenous and cultural heritage, public access, and public recreation needs are the
basis of the current identification and delineation of coastal foreshore reserves in
WA. The WA Natural Hazards Policy and the delineation of the foreshore reserve
must also take into consideration the disaster-mitigating values of natural coastal
ecosystems.
Current planning assumes that the coastal dune system that lies within this area is
expendable. A sea level to rise by 1 m could cause 100 m of erosion of the land,
resulting in much of the dune area becoming the town beach. The squeeze between
the  infrastructure  and  the  shoreline  will  prevent  the  inward  migration  of  natural
coastal ecosystems, thereby compromising their adaptability to climate change. In
reconsidering building standards, lessons from other parts of the world subject to
similar conditions can also be considered. For example on the island of Nevis, in the
Caribbean, where the 3 m contour is > 90 m from the high water mark, development
is limited to small individual buildings without foundations, such as wooden beach
bars (Cambers 1998).-99-
4.6. Conclusions
Coastal planning at Exmouth influences the purchase of property in areas at high
risk of cyclonic storm-surge inundation. The results of the scenario analysis carried
out in a GIS, and previous flood-modelling of the town have shown how greater risk
has been created through the construction of the marina. This has resulted in the loss
of crucial disaster-mitigating ecosystem functions, and increased risk to previously
unaffected areas of the town. This is a matter of concern, especially with future
development focused primarily on the south of the town close to the shoreline, in
areas  at  2-6  m  in  elevation. This  finding  highlights  the  need  to  plan  for  the
complexities  and  diverse  interests  on  the  coastal  zone  through  the  lens  of
vulnerability to future risk.
The inadequacy of setback guidelines, as provided under the 2003 WA state coastal
planning policy, to account for risk of cyclonic storm-surge, in similar towns in
cyclone-prone areas of the north of WA, is a key driver of risk. Identification of the
underlying causes of risk because of economic and social triggers is a crucial aspect
of  sustainable  coastal  management. Addressing  this  requires  that  the proposed
revision of the setback guidelines takes into consideration, sea-level rise, cyclonic
storm-surge,  and  associated  erosion.  An  alternate  option  to  the  lateral  setbacks
currently in use in Australia are elevation setbacks, such as the 5 m contour line used
in the UK, or variable setbacks, as used in the US, which account for the natural
topography and geomorphology of the land.
Using the case of Exmouth, this chapter has shown how government policy failure
can exacerbate coastal disaster risk. Albeit, local councils in remote northern parts of-100-
WA  are  financially  constrained,  developments  such  as  the  Exmouth marina can
revitalise the economy of the town and provide additional rate revenue to the shire.
Injudicious  development  in  high-risk  areas  can  be  the  source  of  increased
vulnerability. Such government policy failures can also result in market failures on
the part of coastal property buyers in risk-prone areas and this is investigated in the
next chapter.-101-
Chapter 5: Hedonic price analysis for properties in relation to
cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk at Exmouth
5.1. Introduction
This chapter addresses the question of whether buyers factored cyclonic storm-surge
inundation and flood risk into the prices they paid for residential property at Exmouth.
Decisions  by  purchasers  with  regard  to  potential  risk  are  evaluated  through  the
hedonic price model (HPM) which examines how the purchasers discount the value of
property based on degree of risk exposure to storm-surge inundation and flooding
caused by cyclonic rainfall. Management and policy implications are then discussed
in relation to current and future plans for the town, and recent hazard zoning by the
shire council.
5.2. Theoretical background on the Hedonic Price Model
An important role of economists is to advise policy-makers about the economically
efficient  allocation  of  resources,  and  where  appropriate,  to  carry  out  cost-benefit
analyses of proposed policies. While direct benefits gained from the environment such
as land, food and fibre can be easily determined from their market price, the value of
some of the services provided by the  environment is not easily determined. Such
commodities are considered to possess ‘non-market values’ and common examples of
these include clean air, open space and wildlife habitat. Impacts of natural resource-102-
management  on  both  market  and  non-market  commodities  are  important  when
considering economically efficient resource management strategies.
Non-market  valuation  techniques  have  been  developed  by  economists  to  quantify
values and accommodate them in social cost-benefit analyses. Two major techniques,
namely  stated  preference  and  revealed  preference, are  used  and  have  been
summarised in Table 5-1. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages and
each may be more suitable to the valuation of certain kinds of environmental services
than  the  other.  Stated  preference  techniques  are  useful,  for  instance,  in  eliciting
information  on  ‘technically  divisible  sets  of  attributes  of  an  environmental  good’
(Holmes  &  Adamowicz  2003,  p.171), and  preference  for  multiple  states  of  the
environment is required for policy decisions.
Table 5-1 Synopsis of the two main non-market valuation techniques used to value intangible
environmental goods and services
Non-market Valuation Techniques
Stated Preference Revealed Preference
Key principle People are asked about their willingness to
pay for a particular good, service or amenity
Assess related goods to ascertain the
demand for environmental goods, services
or amenities
Advantages Can be used to elicit non-use values for
changes in environmental quality that have
not yet occurred
Avoids potential biases arising from
developing hypothetical markets
Disadvantages Hypothetical bias where scenario is not taken
seriously or people do not state their true
willingness to pay
Can only assess use-value as these
techniques utilise data from actual market
transactions and can only be used
retrospectively to assess past events
Source: Champ et al. (2003).
The major disadvantage associated with this method is that it does not really involve
monetary transactions, and what people may say they are willing to pay for something
may not be necessarily true. This disadvantage can be exacerbated in the application-103-
of this method to the highly varying perceptions and individual biases associated in
relation  to  natural  hazard  risk.  The  large  body  of  literature  that  exists  on  the
evaluation of environmental risk has therefore used the HPM, which is a revealed
preference technique, where the indirect assessment of risk perception through actual
market transactions is considered more suitable.
Economic  literature  that  describes  the HPM  considers  that  goods  and  services
transacted in the market represent a compound of commodities that embody the total
utility value that people are willing to pay for (Rosen 1974). This is based on the
assumption that people value the characteristics of the commodity  rather than the
commodity  itself.  In  the  case  of  a  house,  this  can  consist  of  a  bundle  of  several
characteristics  that  include  the  structure  (e.g.,  lot  size,  number  of bedrooms),  the
neighbourhood (e.g., distance to schools, average commute time), the environment
(e.g., proximity to recreational areas, degree of air pollution), and risk factors (e.g.,
proximity to hazardous sites, location in flood zone or areas prone to cyclonic storm-
surge).
Early use of the HPM dates back to Waugh (1928) who tested methods to adjust the
price of various vegetables based on their quality. This work was expanded upon to
develop  a  better  understanding  of  the  characteristics  of  the  goods  that  were  most
important to consumers by Houthakker (1952), Stigler (1961), and Becker (1965).
They  all advocated the  usefulness and efficacy  of this method in determining the
value of various non-market commodities. Rosen (1974) provided the first formal
theoretical  presentation  of  the  HPM  through  an  empirical  demonstration  of  this
concept.  Detailed  reviews  of  the  HPM  can  be  found  in  Palmquist (1991, 2003),-104-
Malpezzi (2003), Taylor (2003), and Sirmans et al. (2005).
The  economic  theory  underlying  HPM  requires  specification  of  the  relationship
between the price of the commodity and the characteristics it possesses (Rosen 1974).
The point of sale is considered as a ‘description of competitive equilibrium in a plane
of several dimensions on which both buyers and sellers locate’, where ‘any location
on the plane is described by a vector of coordinates’ (Rosen 1974 p.34) such that:
z = f (z1, z2,…., zn)
where:
z = commodities in the class described by the numerical value of z, and
zi= the amount of the i
thcharacteristic contained in each commodity.
There are various products available with different sets or bundles of characteristics,
and these differences are reflected in the variation in prices of these products such
that:
p(z) = p (z1, z2,…., zn)
where:
p(z)  = The price at each point on the plane guiding the producer and consumer
choices regarding the packages of characteristics bought and sold.
The above  equation is  described  as  the  point  at  which  equilibrium  prices  are
determined under the conditions where consumers and producers make choices to-105-
transact the good, resulting in the perfect match of supply and demand. Here, the
market clearing price p(z) is determined by ‘the distributions of consumer tastes and
producer costs’’ (Rosen 1974 p.35).
Applying Rosen’s HPM specification to property sales prices this relationship can be
expressed through the following equation.
where:
P = sales price of a house;
= structural and property characteristics of the house;
= neighbourhood characteristics;
= locational characteristics;
Є = residual error;
∝ = intercept; and
, , = are the coefficients of the structural and property characteristics,
neighbourhood characteristics and locational characteristics, respectively.
The fundamental goal of the HPM is to derive the contribution of each characteristic
(i.e. Si, Nj or LK) to the sales price. This is done by obtaining the partial derivatives of
each attribute. Termed as the Marginal Implicit Price, the partial derivative of P with
respect to that characteristic, is the additional amount any individual has to pay to
purchase a property with a higher level of that characteristic ceteris paribus (all other
things being equal). This is classically defined as the process by which the ‘observed-106-
prices  of  differentiated  products  and  the  specific  amounts  of  characteristics
associated with them’ Rosen (1974 p.34) are obtained.
The mathematical expression of this is such that the:
Marginal implicit price              = P/ Zn
such that Zn can represent the structural and property attributes (Hi), neighbourhood
(Nj) and locational (LK) characteristics of that property. To analyse marginal effects,
the variables in this equation are converted to log format.
An advantage of the HPM, as compared to other non-market valuation techniques, is
the relatively small data requirements, and information on property attributes, which
make it possible to derive unbiased estimates of the marginal implicit price of each
housing attribute (Taylor 2003). The HPM uses the Ordinary Least Squares multiple
regression technique to carry out this process.
A second stage of the HPM, although not carried out in this study, takes the marginal
implicit prices acquired in the first stage, and attempts to derive the actual demand
functions for each characteristic of the good. This second stage is often omitted owing
to the complexity of the analysis, the requirement of more data that are often more
difficult to obtain, and the possibility of bias in the original implicit prices of the first
stage (Malpezzi 2003, Taylor 2003).
The first application of the HPM to environmental quality was carried out by the
Division of Air Pollution in the US Public Health Service to assess the costs of air-107-
pollution in St Louis (Ridker & Henning 1967). Since then, the HPM has been applied
to  nearly  every  kind  of  environmental  problem, and  used  as  evidence  to  support
public policy decisions. Examples of these studies, such as ocean views, access to
green areas, proximity to hazardous waste, and aircraft noise are presented in Table
5-2.
Table 5-2 Examples of the application of the HPM to various types of environmental attributes
Environmental
amenity
Locations References
River view, ocean view, or green area view Geneva, Switzerland
Auckland, New Zealand
Hong Kong
Oregon, USA
Wisconsin, USA
Maine, USA
Baranzani & Shaerer (2007)
Samarasinghe and Sharp (2010)
Jim and Chen (2009)
Mooney and Eisgruber (2001)
Provencher et al. (2008)
Bohlen and Lewis (2009)
Access to green areas Jinan City, China
Guangzhou, China
Castellon, Spain
Netherlands
Ontario, Canada
Texas, USA
Virginia, USA
North Carolina, USA
Maryland, USA
Massachusetts USA
Maryland, USA
Arizona, USA
Washington DC, USA
Kong et al. (2007)
Jim and Chen (2007)
Morancho (2003)
Rouwendal & Straaten (2008)
Hunt et al. (2005)
Asabere and Huffman (2007)
Poudyal et al. (2007)
Mansfield et al. (2005)
Poudyal et al. (2009)
Neumann et al. (2009)
Geoghegan (2002)
Bark et al. (2009)
Kopits et al. (2007)
Climatic comfort East Germany Rehdanz and Maddison (2004)
Stigma related to houses in proximity to
hazardous waste sites/landfills or leakage of
hazardous chemicals
Texas, USA
Massachusetts, USA
Wisconsin, USA
Ohio, USA
West Virginia, USA
McClusky and Rausser (1999)
Kiel and Zabel (2001)
Kaufman and Cloutier (2006)
Hite et al. (2000)
Dunn (1986)
Nuisance due to aircraft noise Amsterdam,
Netherlands
North Carolina, USA
Dekkers and van der Straaten
(2009)
Pope (2008)
Changes to water quality from pollution Maryland, USA Poor et al. (2007)
While the HPM is most often associated with housing, it can be applied to other
markets as well. Examples of such applications include, factors affecting the price of-108-
prescription  drugs  (Cockburn  &  Anis  1998,  Danzon  &  Chao  2000),  the  price  of
Picasso  paintings  (Czujack  1997),  classical  music  (Harchaoui  &  Hamdad  2000),
dowries for brides in South Asia (Rao 1993), the choices of herbicides (Beach &
Carlson  1993),  and  clothes  made  of  organically  grown  cotton  (Nimon  &  Beghin
1999).
HPM disaster-risk applications
The HPM has also been used to assess how house prices are discounted, owing to risk
of various kinds of natural disasters, ranging from floods, earthquakes, hurricanes,
fire, and volcanic eruptions to wind and erosion (Beron et al. 1997, Loomis 2004,
Onder et al. 2004, Nakagawa et al. 2007, 2009, Keskin 2008, Naoi et al. 2009, Stetler
et al. 2010). The underlying theory of this is that, just like positive environmental
features, such  as  a  scenic  view  can  create  an  increase  in  property  prices,  an
environmental  disamenity
4,  such  as  greater  exposure  to  a  natural  hazard  can  be
reflected through diminished prices. Location of a property in a cyclone-prone area,
flood hazard zone, or along an earthquake fault line, can influence an individual’s
perception of possible future threat to life and property, and this may be reflected in
the price he or she is willing to pay at the time of purchase.
If the property market functions perfectly, the individual would be fully cognizant of
the risks, and the future damage costs involved will be capitalised into the property
value (Foster 1976). For example, a property located within a 100-year ARI flood
4The Oxford Dictionary (2012) defines the word disamenity as ‘the unpleasant quality or
character of something’.-109-
zone may cost less than one located in an area that is outside the hazard zone, ceteris
paribus. This difference in price would be equal to the cost of the insurance premium
(covering the total cost of rebuilding the home, and the contents lost in the flood), and
will also account for intangibles, such as inconvenience, the emotional toll, and loss
of  sentimental  items.  This  implies  that  if  a  HPM  analysis  results  in  statistically
insignificant proxies used to represent flood risk, this may be as a result of various
market failures, such as imperfect information, monopolistic markets changing the
forces of supply and demand, or a ‘tragedy of the commons’ situation, where risk is
viewed as a public good. Examples of the application of the HPM to assess the loss of
amenity  created  by  natural  disaster  risk are  presented  in Table 5-3. For  example,
Nakagawa et  al. (2007,  2009)  and  Naoi et  al. (2009)  use  the  HPM  to  assess
earthquake risk in Tokyo and other parts of Japan. Location of the property, within or
out of the danger zone is the most widely used proxy for risk in the HPM.
Table 5-3 Examples of the proxies for risk used in HPM in earthquake and wildfire-prone areas
Variables used as proxies for risk Location References
Earthquake risk indices used for ranking degree of risk
from one (safest) to five (riskiest). This takes into
consideration potential damage to buildings and human
injuries resulting from initial shocks and consequent fires
Tokyo, Japan Nakagawa et al. (2007,
2009)
Occurrence probability of earthquakes based on a seismic
hazard map. The map denotes hazard risk based on
probability of ground motions above or below a
demarcated intensity
Various parts of
Japan
Naoi et al. (2009)
Soil-type and distance to earthquake fault lines Istanbul, Turkey Onder et al. (2004)
Earthquake risk from predictions by the Japanese
International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Various parts of
Japan
Keskin (2008)
Risk index denoting degree of susceptibility to ground
shaking, soil type and location in the fault zone
Loma Prieta, USA Beron et al. (1997)
Whether the property was sold before, or after a major
wildfire
Colarado, USA Loomis (2004)
Proximity to, and view of wildfire burned areas Montana, USA Stetler et al. (2010)
Previous HPM applications on flooding mainly compare prices of house or property-110-
located in a high-risk flood zone, with prices of houses or properties located outside
these zones. Such studies have involved the use of dichotomous variables as proxies
to indicate risk. MacDonald et al. (1987) and MacDonald et al. (1990) used a very low
lying area in Monroe, Louisiana, which was subject to frequent flooding, Speyrer and
Ragas (1991) used sites in New Orleans where three major rainfall events had caused
major flooding, and USACE (1998) carried out a study in Abilene, Texas where a
number of destructive floods had occurred. Dei Tutu and Bin (2002) studied areas in
Pitt County, North Carolina that were subject to severe flooding owing to the impact
of hurricane Floyd along the Tar River, and Bin and Kruse (2006) and Bin et al.
(2008), researched Carteret County in North Carolina, an area that had been recently
assaulted by a relatively active hurricane season (Table 5-4).
These  studies  include  flooding  due  to  both  riverine  and  coastal  sources,  and
researchers have assumed that property owners are aware of the risks of flooding.
This cognizance is based on recent experience and participation of that community in
the US National Flood Insurance Program. These researchers did not need to control
for the positive amenity gained from living proximal to rivers.
Other studies have combined location in a floodplain with the occurrence of an event
that raised the awareness of risk among property-buyers. These events include a major
flood/hurricane event, the implementation of government legislation on flood zoning,
mandatory risk disclosure to prospective buyers, new land development controls and
mandatory flood insurance requirements.-111-
Table 5-4 Examples of studies and risk proxies used in HPM to represent flood risk
Variables used as risk
proxies
Locations Flood source References
River Coast
Location in a 100 year or
500 year flood-risk zone
New Jersey, USA
Louisiana, USA
Louisiana, USA
Wisconsin, USA
Louisiana, USA
Alabama, USA
Virginia, USA
Texas, USA
North Carolina, USA
North Carolina, USA
North Carolina, USA
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Zimmerman (1979)
MacDonald et al. (1987)
Shilling et al. (1989)
Donnelly (1982)
MacDonald et al. (1990)
Bialaszewski and Newsome (1990)
Shabman and Stephenson (1996)
USACE (1998)
Dei Tutu and Bin (2002)
Bin and Kruse (2006)
Bin et al. (2008)
Location in a 100-year or
500-year flood risk zone
combined with the
occurrence of a major event
Galt, Canada
Texas, USA
Wisconsin, USA
North Dakota & Minnesota, USA
North Carolina, USA
Florida, USA
Florida, USA
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Babcock and Mitchell (1980)
Skantz and Strickland (1987)
Bartosovo et al. (1999)
Fridgen and Shultz (2003)
Bin & Polasky (2004)
Hallstrom and Smith (2005)
Morgan (2007)
Location in a flood zone and
disclosure of whether the
property was in a hazard
zone and if the purchase of
insurance required
Louisiana, USA
Texas, USA
Florida, USA
California, USA
Texas, USA
North Shore, New Zealand
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Speyrer & Ragas (1991)
Griffith (1994)
Harrison et al. (2001)
Troy and Romm (2004)
Pope (2006)
Samarasinge and Sharp (2010)
Insurance premium Texas and Louisiana, USA
Virginia, USA
x
x
x Shilling et al. (1989)
Thunberg & Shabman (1991)
Elevation Several counties in the USA
Tokai, Japan
New Orleans, USA
x
x
x
Kriesel and Friedman (2002)
Zhai et al. (2006)
McKenzie and Levendis (2010)
Structural protection and
development regulations
Several states in the USA
Texas, USA
x
x
x Holoway and Burby (1990)
Damianos and Shabman (1979)
5.3. Property at Exmouth
The spatial distribution of housing sales in Exmouth during the study period (1988-
2010) shows that most of the property transactions were in the town-centre and in the
marina village (Figure 5-1). Land around the marina was released for development
only since 2001.-112-
Figure 5-1 Map of Exmouth depicting cadastral boundaries of properties sold over 1988- 2010.
Red dots indicate properties sold.
Source: Derived from the cadastral map of the Northwest Cape obtained from the Western Australian Government,
Department of Planning (n.d.)
There are also plans for future residential development to the south of the marina and,-113-
as can be seen by the cadastral blocks in Figure 5-1, these areas are also very close to
the beach. The Shire of Exmouth has to focus on town expansion to the south of the
existing townsite because of the location of the Naval Base immediately north of the
town, Cape Range to the west and the Exmouth Gulf to the  east. The pattern of
housing development is, however, similar to other areas of WA, where there is an
outward, instead of upward spread in town expansion, and few considerations are
made  for  high-rise  buildings  or  apartments  away  from  the  riskier  location  on  the
shoreline (Weller 2009).
Figure 5-2 presents the number of sales, total sales value and average sales prices of
properties at Exmouth over 1988-2010. Between 1988 and 1992, the number and total
value of sales did not follow any particular trend. The spike in average sales price to
AU$ 250,000 in 1990 is attributed to a high value property on the market, in the town-
centre.
The anomalous peak in number and total sales value in 1993 was because a number of
housing units came on the market after the termination of a  management agreement
of  the  Naval  Communication Station  between  the  US  and  Australian  Navy.  As  a
result, the workforce managing the station dropped from about 600 to 150 personnel
(Shire of Exmouth 2012). Examination of the average sales value in 1993, however,
revealed no marked increase. Over 1994 to 2000, there were around 50-75 property
transactions each year, amounting to an annual total of AU$ 10–15 million.-114-
Figure 5-2 Annual  number  of  sales,  total  dollar  value  of  sales  and  average  sales  price  of
residential properties Exmouth (1988 - 2010) (2009 AU$ value)
A huge expansion, not only in sales volume, but also in recorded annual total annual
sales value, as a result of the property boom in Western Australia was evident during
2003-2007 (Figure 5-2). The increase in average sales value during this period is
concomitant with high value marina properties coming on the market. With the advent
of the global financial crisis in 2007, property sales numbers and total annual sales-115-
dropped. Interestingly, the trend in residential sales showed a slight decline in the
number of sales around 2000 to 2002, which may have been as a result of the extreme
damage caused by cyclone Vance in 1999.
5.4. Methods
The  HPM  generally  uses  an  ordinary  least  squares  regression  (Taylor  2003).
Essentially  the  HPM  comprises  of  the  regression  of  the property  price  against
dwelling, amenity and risk-related variables. Raw data was processed through a series
of steps before carrying out the final analysis.
Data and variables
The  data  used  in  this  study  came from  three  different  sources:    the  WA  Valuer-
General (Landgate) for property transactions and property characteristics, the GIS for
locational and cyclonic storm-surge inundation information (Chapter four), and the
Shire of Exmouth for flood information. The original data set obtained from Landgate
consisted  of  1,993 transactions  of  individually owned  residential  properties  in
Exmouth, over the period 1988-2010.
Four records were removed from the dataset, because they contained information on
sales price that were not credible, or not applicable to this study. The 1,989 selected
transactions had complete location descriptors for the site, and the transaction closed
between January 1988 and December 2010. Using the inflation rates provided in the
Reserve Bank of Australia’s Inflation Calculator (Reserve Bank of Australia 2011b)-116-
the property sales prices were adjusted to 2009 prices. Four cases were classified as
shed  or  shop  property  class,  but  these  were  retained  in  the  data  set following
clarification from Landgate that, in addition to conducting business there, the owners
were also living in these premises.
As can be seen in Table 5-5, a quarter of the population was at a different address in
the previous year and over half were at a different address five years ago (ABS 2011).
With the dataset spanning 22 years, with 1,984 transactions, this posed significant
practical difficulties in obtaining socio-economic information on purchases of each
property, at each point in time and for each transaction. Even if the data was available,
it is not expected that there would be a large impact on the HPM.
The dwelling-specific characteristics included in the original data set, reflect the type,
size,  condition,  and  amenities  associated  with  each  property.  The  following
information  was  included:  year  built,  lot  size  (m
2),  and  number  of  bedrooms,
bathrooms,  family  rooms,  dining  rooms,  games  rooms,  lounges,  studies,  kitchens,
pools, carports and garages. Information on the number of carports and garages were
separate variables and were collapsed into one, as they represented a similar attribute.
It was expected that an increase in lot size would create a positive increase in sales
price because more property area is preferred to less. Similarly, a larger number of
bedrooms, bathrooms, and carports and garages should command a higher sale price.
The variable ‘year built’ was transformed into a continuous variable, depicting the age
of the property. It was also expected that older houses would have a lower price than
others, ceteris paribus, because of physical deterioration, wear and tear, functional
obsolescence  and  external  depreciation.  Important to  note  here, however,  that-117-
cyclone-proof houses, built during the inception of the town, would deteriorate at a
much slower rate because of the robustness of their structure.
Wall  and  roof  material related  variables,  which  were in  categorical  form  in  the
original dataset, were converted to dichotomous variables. It was expected that the
presence of asbestos in the roof or wall would result in a negative impact on property
price because  of  the  associated  health  impacts.  It  was  not  possible  to  predict  the
coefficient sign of any of the other types of roof or wall material, but in comparison to
asbestos they were expected to be positive.
The original dataset also contained the property classification of each lot sold during
the study period. As these were also categorical variables, they were converted to
dichotomous form for use in the regression analysis. It was expected that having a
built  structure  would  have  a  greater  impact  on  sales  price, than  if  the  property
consisted only of vacant land. It was also anticipated that variables depicting property
classes such as villas, houses and duplex units would be positive.
Information  on  the  land-use  in  the  study  area  was  also  contained  in  the  original
dataset, namely, residential, commercial, industrial, farming, and mixed. There were
also 17 zones defined for the study area, and these consisted of sub-categories of land-
use.  These  predetermined  land-uses  and  zones  lend  themselves  to  the  creation  of
neighbourhood variables, which can be used in the HPM, and were represented in the
form  of  dichotomous  variables.  It  was  expected  that  properties  located  in  the
residential  and  mixed-use  zones  would  have  a  positive  sign,  and  those  in  the
commercial and industrial areas would be signed negatively. This is because houses-118-
located in commercial or business areas, may be subject to noise, busy roads, traffic
and pollution that would reduce the amenity value of the property. On the other hand,
it  was  possible  that  location  in  the  town  centre  zone  or  tourist  zone  might  also
increase property value, because of greater access to urban amenities.
Information on distance to urban amenities was not included in the original data set
but was derived for each address using the Walk Score website (Walk Score 2010).
The Walk Score was included as a variable, as a measure of how accessible (in terms
of distance) a property is to an urban amenity. The automatic calculator on the website
calculates  a  score, using an  algorithm  that  measures  walking  distances  from  each
address to various nearby amenities. The straight-line distances of each of the sold
properties from the nearest restaurant, coffee shop, grocery store, bookshop, pub and
entertainment venue were determined. It was expected that any increase in distance,
from any of the urban amenities would result in a negative effect on the sales price
(e.g. Samarasinghe & Sharp 2010).
Risk variables
Proxies used in the HPM equation were in two forms: that representing risk exposure,
based  on  location  of  property, and  those  representing  risk awareness  (Table 5-5).
Variables that denote degree of exposure to risk are based on previous studies using a
similar concept, including Bin and Kruse (2006), Bin et al. 2008, Bialaszewski and
Newsome  (1990), Dei  Tutu  and Bin  (2002),  Donnelly  (1982), MacDonald  et  al.
(1987, 1990), Shilling et al. (1989), Shabman and Stephenson (1996), USACE (1998)-119-
and Zimmerman (1979). These studies used dichotomous variables for risk, where the
value of one denotes that a property is located in a risk-prone area, and zero if it is
not.
Table 5-5 Variables used to denote risk exposure and risk awareness in the HPM, and the
number of transacted properties for Exmouth, 1988-2010
Variables
No. of
transactions
Inundated by a 4 m storm surge 44
Located in100-year ARI floodplain 180
Post-cyclone Vance
Six months 52
One year 93
Two years 150
Interaction variables
100-year ARI * sold six months after Vance 4
100-year ARI * sold one year after Vance 6
100-year ARI * sold two years after Vance 11
This study used information from the scenario analysis of Chapter four, where the
centroids of the transacted properties were overlaid with the storm-surge risk areas, to
derive variables denoting areas at risk of storm-surge heights of 4 m. The coefficients
of  this variable, measured  the  price  difference  between  properties  in  the  cyclonic
storm-surge-prone area and other areas. The working hypothesis was that if a property
was located in an area of risk of cyclonic storm-surge inundation, it would have a
lower  price  than  those  located  outside  the  risk  zone, ceteris  paribus.  The  price
differential would therefore provide the discount value on the price of risk in this area.
Storm-surge  inundation  from  cyclonic  activity  was  not  the  only  variable  used  to
represent  risk  exposure.  In  2007,  the  Shire  of  Exmouth  commissioned  a  study  to
determine areas under risk of heavy rainfall events, and hazard maps representing 25--120-
year,  50-year,  100-year  and  500-year ARI flood  events  were  obtained (Western
Australian Government, DoW & SKM 2007). The 100-year ARI map was overlaid
with the transacted properties at Exmouth, as with the storm-surge scenario, to derive
flood risk exposure (Figure 5-3).
I. North of marina II. South of marina
Figure 5-3 Flood hazard map of Exmouth depicting areas subject to 100-year ARI risk. Areas in
red depict those at risk of a peak flood depth of 2.5 – 5.0 m
Source: Shire of Exmouth (2011).
Location of a property in an area at risk of a 100 year ARI flood was expected to have
a negative effect on the price of the property.  The coefficients of these variables
provided a measure of the price difference, between properties in the flood-prone area
and  other  areas.  The  hypothesis  used  in  statistical  testing  was  that  sale  prices  of
properties  located  within  the‘100-year  ARI’  area  would  be  discounted  for  risk  in
comparison to those located outside the area.-121-
Previous studies have also used variables that represented risk-awareness in the HPM.
Babcock and Mitchell (1980), Skantz and Strickland (1987), Bartosovo et al. (1999),
Fridgen and Shultz (1999), Bin and Polasky (2004), Hallstrom and Smith (2005), and
Morgan (2007) examined the effect on house prices, before and after a major flood
event. A dichotomous variable representing whether the sale of property at Exmouth
was before or after the occurrence of cyclone Vance in 1999 was derived.
The implementation of a risk management action, such as the public disclosure of
high-risk areas to proxy risk awareness in the HPM has also been used (e.g. Speyrer &
Ragas 1991, Griffith 1994, Harrison et al. 2001, Troy & Romm 2004, Pope 2006,
Samarasinghe  &  Sharp  2010). In this  study, a  dichotomous  variable  was  used  to
denote location in a 100-year ARI risk zone. It is important to mention here, that
information  on properties  subject  to 100-year  ARI  risk, as  determined under  a
hydraulic  study for  the  townsite (Western Australian Government,  DoW  &  SKM
2007), was made publicly available only in 2008. As with other variables, a negative
coefficient was anticipated for properties located in a 100-year ARI zone, because it
was expected that increased awareness would result in buyers paying lower prices in
these areas.
Empirical specification of the HPM equation
The standard method to fit HPM to data is through ordinary least squares regression
(Taylor 2003). In this method, a regression line is derived to fit the observations as
best as possible, and to simultaneously minimise the difference between the observed-122-
and predicted values, in other words, to minimise the value of the residuals on the
regression line. The best fitting regression line is obtained through the minimisation of
the residual sum of squares.
Other methods for carrying out this process include, the general least squares method
which  minimises  the  absolute  values  of  the  residuals,  Bayesian  methods, and  the
maximum  likelihood  estimator  which  chooses  the  slopes  most  likely  to  have
generated the random sample of observations in the model under study. By providing
unbiased and efficient estimates of the intercept and coefficients, the ordinary least
squares  method  is  considered to  be the  most  uncomplicated  application  for  many
econometric models, including the HPM (Taylor 2003).
It is important to note here that regression is not the only method that has been used to
assess the effect of various environmental attributes on house prices.  Zimmerman
(1979), Babcock and Mitchell (1980) and Muckleston (1983) have used t-tests and
Kolmorgorow-Smirnov tests to determine flood-risk effects on house prices. These
tests are limited, however, in their inability to adjust for the other characteristics that
simultaneously affect prices.
Appropriate specification of the functional form has a great influence on the results of
the regression analysis (Linneman 1980, Mendelsohn 1987). While there are several
potential forms that can be used in various modelling contexts (Garrod & Willis 1999)
(Table 5-6), there is little guidance in econometric theory on the most appropriate
form and it is considered best to choose a form that best describes the data, rather than
relying on set theoretical prescriptions (Bender et al. 1980, Halvorsen & Pollakowaski-123-
1981, Milon et al. 1984).
Table 5-6 Restrictive functional forms used in the HPM
Equation Coefficient interpretation Comments
Linear
P = α + βX
Straightforward  interpretation Less useful than the non-linear forms
owing to the differences in the way
individuals trade-off between various
characteristics of a commodity
(Linneman 1980)
Semi-log
lnP = α + βX
Coefficient β*100 gives the percentage in Y
(%∆Y) due to one unit change in X (∆X),
except if X is a dichotomous variable. In that
case, the percentage change in Y (%∆Y) is
given by (e
β-1)*100 (Kennedy 2003)
Minimizes the influence of
heteroscedasticity
5 Easy to interpret.
Log-log
lnP = α + βlnX
β represents the %∆Y given a 1% change in
X (%∆X), which represents the elasticity of Y
with respect to X
Minimises the influence of
heteroscedasticity
Source: Taylor (2003).
Previous studies have commonly experimented with the linear, semi-log (log-linear),
and  log-log  methods.  A  detailed  discussion  of  these  functional  forms  in  hedonic
equations is elaborated in Blackley et al. (1984). Linear, semi-log and log-log hedonic
price  models  were  fitted  to  the  Exmouth  data.  Use  of  natural  logarithmic
specifications  for  the  nondichotomous  variables  in  hedonic  analysis,  is  meant  to
capture the effects of diminishing marginal returns, or non-linear relationships, as the
values of these variables increase (Taylor 2003).
Research on flood risk has generally used semi-log and log-log forms (e.g. Shultz &
Fridgen 2001, Bin & Polasky 2004, Bin & Kruse 2006, Morgan 2007, Samarasinghe
& Sharp 2010). Some studies have also used the Box-Cox transformation, which is a
5 A collection of random variables is heteroscedastic when the variances of the error terms of
a regression are not constant over different sample observations. This poses a problem when
estimating  the  parameters  in  the  regression  model  because  the  least  squares  estimation
procedure places more weight on observations that have large errors and variances (Gujarati
2006).-124-
flexible form unlike the above, facilitating several different transformations with the
one  model  (Freeman &  Pflug 2003).  The  complexities in  interpreting  coefficients
resulting  from  a  Box-Cox transformation  (Hite  et  al.  2000,  Malpezzi  2003),  and
misleading results produced from the lack of continuity of  many variables in the
regression equation (Cassel & Mendelsohn 1985) have resulted in the popularity of
use of restrictive functional forms.
Choosing the appropriate set of independent variables to use in an HPM analysis is an
important consideration, as this can have a major effect on the regression results.
HPM  literature  indicates that  there  are  many  characteristics  that  are  consistently
shown to be significant, although the availability of this information can differ from
one site to another. Variables used in this study were driven by the data sets available,
but remain consistent with those in other studies of similar nature. Prior to fitting the
independent variables into the regression and carrying out tests for suitability, items in
the  original  dataset  were  first  assessed  and  converted  into  forms  most suitable  to
include in the regression equation.
There  is  no  prescribed  form  in  economic  theory  on  which  variables  should  be
included in a hedonic regression. However, following standard statistical norms for
the specification of a regression equation (Field 2009), bivariate correlations between
property sales price and other variables in the dataset were investigated. Those found
to be correlated significantly with sales price (p<0.01 and 0.05) and were selected for
inclusion in the HPM equation.
Transformation of the sales price, and other nondichotomous variables was performed-125-
to  facilitate  this.  All  dwelling  size-related variables  were  first  tested  in  a  linear
specification, and  then  converted  to  natural  log  form  for  the  log-log  analysis.
Similarly, the  natural  logarithmic transformation  of  distance  to  urban  amenities
variables was also carried out following previous studies, such as Iwata et al. (2000)
and Mahan et al. (2000), who have shown that the log transformation of the distance-
related variables, fits the model better than a simple linear functional form. Quadratic
forms were also tested, but found to reduce the explanatory power of the model, and
were subsequently rejected.
To determine if the variables were independent, the Pearson’s r, which measures the
strength and direction of the relationship between two variables, was used. The results
of  the  test  carried  out for  the  variables  used  in  the  HPM  showed  no  correlation
between the variables (Appendix 1).
Correction for auto-correlation
Under unbiased conditions, linear regression is useful for exploring the relationship of
an independent variable that marks the passage of time on a dependent variable; that
is,  when  there  is  an  obvious  downward,  or  upward,  trend  in  the  data  over  time.
However, if the trend of the dependent variable over time is not linear, then this
relationship will not be captured. This arises as a result of autocorrelation, defined as
‘correlation between members of observations ordered in time (as in time series data)
or space (as in cross-sectional data)’ (Kendall & Buckland 1971, p.8). When HPM
uses property sales over multiple years, especially when annual sales in a market are-126-
sparse, the additional effect of time must be captured as part of the equation (Taylor
2003). Using several years of data may affect the stability of the HPM, where the
method of ordinary least squares regression violates the Gauss-Markov condition of
being the best linear unbiased estimator (Gujarati 2006).
Temporal autocorrelation results from effects in one point in time being carried over
to the next period. In dealing with annual time series data, involving the regression of
property prices on various amenities, if there is an event affecting prices in one year,
there is no reason to believe that this effect will be carried over to the next year. In
other words, if prices are lower in this year, it will not necessarily be lower next year.
With properties, business cycles and interest rates may create autocorrelation.
Adjusting the sales price using the Consumer Price Index for general inflation in the
market is considered an appropriate method for correcting for autocorrelation (Taylor
2003). However, the property market in Exmouth in the 2000s was in a state of flux,
with a higher than usual variance in prices. In such situations, the use of the CPI to
capture the turbulence in the local market is not considered appropriate (Taylor 2003).
Another method considered appropriate to correct for autocorrelation, in the presence
of  general  inflationary  trends  in  the  market, is  through  the  use  of  a  series  of
dichotomous variables in the HPM, to control for each year in which the property was
sold (Taylor 2003).
Previous  HPM  research  using  multiple  years of  data,  such  as  Donnelly  (1982),
Bartosova et al. (1999), Bin and Kruse (2006), Morgan (2007), and Bin et al. (2008)
on  flood  risk  have  followed  this  approach,  where  dichotomous  variables  were-127-
specified for each year of the data. Following these, the HPM study for Exmouth
corrected for time-effects over the study period, using dichotomous variables for time.
The data were also tested for possible effects of month and quarter of sale, however,
they were found to be insignificant (at 0.01 and 0.05 levels).
Consideration also has to be given to the existence of spatial autocorrelation in HPM
analyses.  This  is  a  common  problem  in  spatial  data,  where  there  can exist  a
relationship among variables that are located in close proximity to each other (Anselin
1988). A test on spatial autocorrelation was not carried out in this thesis as the town
covers a relatively small geographical area. Important to note here is that in the last
few decades, there has been an increasing use of spatial econometrics (e.g. Anselin
2006, Anselin et al. 2006, Anselin & Le Gallo 2006, Anselin et al. 2008, LeSage &
Pace 2009, Anselin 2010).
Specification of the final HPM equation
A linear regression analysis was carried on the variables identified in the bivariate
analysis  between  sales  price.  Specific  variables  that  would  be  most  suitable  for
inclusion in the final HPM were determined by examining the level of significance
between sales price and each variable and the collinearity statistics.
5.5. Results
The analysis of the 1,989 properties sold at Exmouth during the period 1988 to 2010
revealed that the average lot size was 885 m
2, the average age of a house was 33 years-128-
and had 2.7 bedrooms and 1.2 bathrooms, a dining room, kitchen and lounge.
Bivariate correlation and specification of the HPM
Table 5-7 presents the variables found to be significant at 0.01 and 0.05 level in
bivariate  correlations carried out between  sales  price  and various  property
characteristics.
Table 5-7 Results of the bivariate correlation between sales price and variables representing
property characteristics for properties sold in Exmouth (1988-2010)
Pearson correlation
Has a family room 0.174**
Has a dining room 0.146**
No. of bathrooms 0.115**
Has a games room 0.107**
No. of bedrooms 0.096**
Has a study 0.094**
Lot size (m
2) 0.302**
Area of house (m
2) 0.088**
Property age (years) -0.150**
Distance to grocery store (km) 0.121**
Wall material
Steel frame 0.211**
Iron 0.153**
Asbestos -0.151**
Fibro 0.123**
Brick 0.095**
Concrete 0.065**
Property class
Single unit -0.172**
Villa 0.104**
Duplex 0.099**
House 0.073**
Flat 0.057*
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)-129-
Among the variables describing the kinds of the rooms in the house, the presence of a
family room had the highest correlation with sales price. The presence of a dining
room, games room and the number of bathrooms and bedrooms also had a positive
impact on price. The area of the entire lot had a greater correlation with sales price, as
compared to consideration of only the floor area of the house.
As  expected,  property  age  had  a  negative  correlation  with  sales  price.  A  further
investigation found that houses built during the period 1985-1990, had a negative
correlation  with  price,  but  those  built  after  2000  were  positively  correlated.  The
further away a property was from shops, as described in terms of distance to the
nearest grocery store, the higher the price. If the wall of a house was made of steel
frame, iron, fibro, brick or concrete material, there was a positive impact on sales
price.
As  expected,  property  age  had  a  negative  correlation  with  sales  price.  A  further
investigation found that houses built during the period 1985-1990, had a negative
correlation  with  price,  but  those  built  after  2000  were  positively  correlated.  The
further away a property was from shops, as described in terms of distance to the
nearest grocery store, the higher the price. If the wall of a house was made of steel
frame, iron, fibro, brick or concrete material, there was a positive impact on sales
price.
As expected, houses with asbestos had a lower property value. Single units sold at
lower rates than other types of houses. A bivariate correlation also found that single
units were more likely to have asbestos wall materials, and have fewer bathrooms-130-
than other property classes, which may explain this relationship. Villas, duplex units,
full houses, and flats sold at a higher rate compared to other property classes.
There was no correlation between sales price, and the number of kitchens, presence of
a lounge or pool, if it had a brick-clad, brick-veneered, cement block, or timber frame
wall  material,  and  was  a  triplex,  transportable,  or  townhouse. Also,  there  was no
relationship between sales price and type of roof material.
Based on these results, the final HPM equation used for Exmouth is given in the
following equation.
Property Sale Price = ∝ 0+ βISI (structural characteristics) +
βJNJ (neighbourhood characteristics) +
βKRK (risk characteristics) + Є
where:
Structural characteristics (SI) = lot size (m
2), age of house (years), presence of
a family room, property classification (flat, villa, house, single unit, duplex
unit), wall material (iron, steel frame, brick, fibro, asbestos);
Neighbourhood  characteristics (NJ) = distance  to  the  nearest  grocery  shop
(km);
Risk characteristics (RK) = 4 m cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk, 100-year
ARI flooding, sale of property within six months, one year and two years after
cyclone Vance, and interaction effects between location in the 100-year ARI
areas and sale after cyclone Vance;
Є = residual error;-131-
∝ 0= intercept; and
βI, βJ, βK = coefficients of the structural characteristics, neighbourhood and
risk characteristics, respectively.
4 m cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk
The first HPM analysis used the variables specified for the structural characteristics
(SI) and neighbourhood characteristics (NJ) as described in the above equation. The
risk characteristic (RK), tested was 4 m cyclonic storm-surge risk during the study
period. There were 44 property sales transactions within this risk area. The summary
statistics  for  this  HPM  are presented in  Table  5-8. Linear,  semi-log  and  log-log
functional forms were significant at a 0.01 level.
Table 5-8 Overall model summary: Results of the linear, semi-log and log-log regression for 4
m storm-surge risk and its impact on property prices at Exmouth (1988-2010)
Summary statistic Linear Semi-log Log-log
R-square 0.83 0.83 0.84
Durbin-Watson (Dw)
a 2.12 1.92 1.94
F-test 90.50 199.80 208.40
Significance (p-value) 0.00
** 0.00
** 0.00
**
a For N=1,989 & 15 variables, 1.91 < Dw < 1.94 at a significance level of  0.05
**Indicates significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
The R-square value, which indicates how well the model fits the data, found that the
linear and semi-log functional forms explained 83% of the variation in sales price.
The log-log form was considered the most suitable form, where it explained 84% of
the total variation. To test for the presence of auto-correlation, the Durbin-Watson
(Dw) statistic was used. Correction for auto-correlation has been achieved if the Dw
statistic is within a given range, which is determined on the basis of the total number-132-
of transactions in the sample (N) and the number of variables used in the regression
equation (Gujarati 2006). The Dw for this analysis was within estimated range for the
semi-log  functional  form, and  on  the  upper-bound  level  in  the  log-log  form  at  a
significance level of 0.05 (Table 5-8). The Dw value located above the upper bound
level for the linear form suggests the presence of positive autocorrelation.
Table 5-9, which provides the coefficient values and their level of significance for the
HPM,  shows  that  the  variable  representing  risk  of  4  m  cyclonic  storm-surge  was
positive and significant at a 0.01 level. The finding of this model indicates that buyers
paid higher prices for properties located in risk-prone locations as compared to other
areas, and buyers did not discount for risk as expected.
Table 5-9 Coefficients and their significance in the model: Results of the linear, semi-log and log-
log regression for 4 m storm-surge risk and its impact on the property prices over 1988-2010 at
Exmouth
Variables Coefficients (β) & level of significance
Linear Semi-log Log-log
(Constant) 26,241 10.55** 9.28**
Classified as a flat 284,093** 0.73** 0.69**
Classified as a villa 136,158** 0.70** 0.72**
Classified as a house 109,898** 0.75** 0.74**
Classified as a duplex unit 107,905** 0.78** 0.68**
At risk of  4 m storm-surge 83,241** 0.42** 0.35**
Wall made of iron 64,191* 0.01** 0.01
Has a family room 45,447** 0.17** 0.18**
Wall made of steel frame 41,172 -0.05 -0.04
Classified as a single unit 38,252** 0.28** 0.75**
Wall made of brick 29,790 0.04 0.06
Wall made of fibro 17,626 -0.10 -0.10
Lot size (m
2) 12** 0.00** 0.23**
Property age (years) -614* 0.00 -0.06**
Distance to nearest grocery (km) -27,530** -0.02 -0.25**
Wall made of asbestos -32,177** -0.21** -0.22**
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)-133-
An examination of the data, found that of the 44 properties sold in the 4 m storm-
surge risk zone, 98% of these transactions were within the last 10 years (>2000). Of
these, 52% and 36% were located in the marina, and recreational open space zones,
respectively, and these were located at a distance of 130 m to 700 m from the original
shoreline of Exmouth Gulf.
Given that the semi-log functional form presented with the most appropriate Durbin-
Watson statistics, the rest of the discussion in this section pertains to the results under
this model. As can be seen in Table 5-9, duplex units are higher priced compared to
other property classes. If the property was a villa, house, flat or single unit, it resulted
in an increase in price at a 0.01 level. Variables depicting iron walls had a positive
coefficient at a 0.01 level, indicating preference for such houses. Variables denoting
steel frame and brick walls have positive coefficients, whereas a negative impact was
indicated for houses with fibro walls. However, they were not significant at 0.01 and
0.05 levels, suggesting a lower priority, in this regard, among buyers. The variable for
asbestos walls, however, resulted in lower property prices, and the significance of this
coefficient at 0.01 level indicates that buyers took this into serious consideration.
Surprisingly, lot size and property age appeared to have no effect on price in the semi-
log function, although the findings showed increase in price if there was a family
room in the house. The coefficients of these in the linear and log-log forms show a
decrease in price for age of property. Contrary to the findings of the bivariate model,
the further away a property was from the shopping area, as represented by the variable
indicating distance to a grocery store, the lower price indicated that property owners
have greater preference for properties that have more access to urban amenities. This-134-
result was considered to be representative of the most accurate finding, as multivariate
regression models are considered to provide the best results, as compared to bivariate
methods (Gujarati 2006).
Regression was also carried out to assess the effect of 6 m and 10 m cyclonic storm-
surge, and results indicated that there was no effect.
Effect of cyclone Vance
As with the previous analysis, the HPM used the variables specified in equation 5.5.
Three separate regressions were run to test if there was any effect on property prices
within 6-months,  one-year  and  two-years  after  cyclone Vance  respectively (RK).
Cumulatively,  there  were  52  sales  transactions 6-months  after  cyclone  Vance, 93
within a year after, and 150 sales in the two years following the event. The summary
statistics for the HPM 6-months post-Vance are presented in Table 5-10.
Table 5-10 Overall model summary: Results of the linear, semi-log and log-log regression for
properties  sold within six  months after  cyclone  Vance  and  its  impact  on  property  prices  at
Exmouth
Summary statistic Linear Semi-log Log-log
R square 0.68 0.82 0.83
Durbin-Watson (Dw)
a 2.10 1.93 1.92
F-test 89.24 193.82 203.77
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00
a For N=1,989 & 15 variables, 1.91 < Dw < 1.94 at a significance level of  0.05
**Indicates significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
The  log-log  model  showed  the  highest  R-square  value,  where  the  variables  used
accounted for 83% of the variation in house prices, and given that its Dw was within
the required range, this was considered the most appropriate functional form. The-135-
value of the coefficients and their degree of significance are presented in Table 5-11.
The variable indicating if a property was sold within six months after Vance was not
significant. This showed that there was no effect on sales prices if a property was sold
within this period. Other variables depict similar coefficients as those in the previous
model.
Table 5-11 Coefficients and their significance in the model: Results of the linear, semi-log and
log-log regression for properties sold within six months after cyclone Vance and its impact on
property prices at Exmouth
Variables Coefficients (β) & level of significance
Linear Semi-log Log-log
(Constant) 38,411 10.61 9.31**
Classified as a flat 271,787** 0.67** 0.64**
Classified as a villa 120,304** 0.62** 0.65**
Classified as a house 100,895** 0.71** 0.70**
Duplex unit 98,124** 0.73** 0.64**
Has an iron wall 65,647* 0.02 0.02
Has a family room 44,937** 0.16** 0.18**
Wall made of steel frame 43,771 -0.04 -0.03
Wall made of brick 28,578 0.03 0.06
Classified as a single unit 27,926 0.23** 0.72**
Wall made of fibro 18,553 -0.10 -0.09
Sold within 6 months after Vance 13,887 0.06 0.06
Lot size (m
2) 12** 0.00** 0.23**
Age of house at sale (years) -736* 0.00* -0.07
Distance to nearest grocery (km) -30,235** -0.04 -0.27**
Has an asbestos wall -31,723** -0.21** -0.22**
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)
An HPM was also carried out to determine if there was any effect on properties sold
within one year and two years after Vance. These results are presented in Tables 5-12
to 5-15. Results again indicate that there was no effect.-136-
Table 5-12 Overall model summary: Results of the linear, semi-log and log-log regression for
properties sold within one year after cyclone Vance and its impact on sales prices at Exmouth
Descriptive statistics Linear Semi-log Log-log
R square 0.68 0.83 0.84
Durbin-Watson (Dw)
a 2.10 1.93 1.92
F-test 194.27 203.88 203.88
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00
a For N=1,989 & 15 variables, 1.91 < Dw < 1.94 at a significance level of 0.05
**Indicates significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
Table 5-13 Coefficients and their significance in the model: Results of the linear, semi-log and
log-log regression for properties sold within one year after cyclone Vance and its impact on sales
prices at Exmouth
Variables Coefficients (β) & level of significance
Linear Semi-log Log-log
(Constant) 38,404 9.32 9.32
Classified as a flat 271,990** 0.70** 0.70**
Classified as a villa 120,777** 0.64** 0.64**
Classified as a house 101,103** 0.64** 0.64**
Classified as a duplex unit 98,810** 0.18** 0.18**
Wall made of iron 65,805* 0.23** 0.23**
Has a family room 44,676** -0.27** -0.27**
Wall made of steel frame 43,266 -0.04 -0.04
Wall made of brick material 28,553 0.06 0.06
Classified as a single unit 27,900* 0.72** 0.72**
Wall made of fibro 18,576* -0.09 -0.09
Sold within one year after Vance 15,181 0.08 0.08
Lot size (m
2) 12** -0.22** -0.22**
Age of house at sale (years) -739* -0.07** -0.07**
Distance to nearest grocery (km) -30,529** 0.65** 0.65**
Wall made of asbestos -31,639** 0.02 0.02
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)-137-
Table 5-14 Overall model summary: Results of the linear, semi-log and log-log regression for
properties sold within two years after cyclone Vance and its impact on sales prices at Exmouth
Summary statistics Linear Semi-log Log-log
R square 0.69 0.83 0.84
Durbin-Watson (Dw)
a 2.10 1.93 1.92
F-test 89.22 193.88 203.73
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00
a For N=1,989 & 15 variables, 1.91 < Dw < 1.94 at a significance level of  0.05
**Indicates significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
Table 5-15 Coefficients and their significance in the model: Results of the linear, semi-log and
log-log regression for properties sold within two years after cyclone Vance and its impact on sales
prices at Exmouth
Variables Coefficients (β) & level of significance
Linear Semi-log Log-log
(Constant) 38,383 10.61** 9.31**
Villa-type property 271,880** 0.67** 0.64**
Distance to nearest grocery (km) 120,225** 0.62** 0.65**
Flat 100,943** 0.71** 0.70**
House 98,464** 0.73** 0.64**
Wall made of asbestos 65,588* 0.02 0.02
Duplex unit 44,986** 0.17** 0.18**
Wall made of steel frame 43,780 -0.04 -0.03
Wall made of brick 28,070 0.03 0.06
Single unit 27,977* 0.23** 0.72**
Wall made of fibro 18,570 -0.10 -0.09
Sold within two years after
Vance 8,103 0.08 0.05
Wall made of iron 12** 0.00** 0.23**
Age of house at sale (years) -741** 0.00* -0.07**
Has a family room -30,364** -0.04 -0.27**
Lot size (m
2) -31,576** -0.21** -0.22**
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)
Effect of 100-year ARI flooding
The risk characteristic (RK) tested under this HPM was the location of a property
within a 100-year ARI zone. There were 180 property sales transactions in the 100--138-
year ARI area during the study period (Table 5-5). The results of the HPM testing for
the  effect  of  100-year  flooding  are presented  in  Tables  5-16 and 5-17.  Summary
statistics indicate that the log-log is the best functional form, with an R square-value
of 0.84. The coefficient for 100-year ARI  risk in Table 5-17 was not  significant,
indicating that this does not have an effect on sales price.
Table 5-16 Overall model summary: Results of the linear, semi-log and log-log regression for
100-year ARI flooding risk and its impact on property prices at Exmouth
Summary statistics Linear Semi-log Log-log
R square 0.69 0.83 0.84
Durbin-Watson (Dw)
a 2.11 1.92 1.92
F-test 89.40 193.85 203.71
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00
a For N=1,989 & 15 variables, 1.91 < Dw < 1.94 at a significance level of  0.05
**Indicates significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
Table 5-17 Coefficients and their significance in the model: Results of the linear, semi-log and
log-log regression for 100-year ARI flood-risk and its impact on property prices at Exmouth
Variables Coefficients (β) & level of significance
Linear Semi-log Log-log
(Constant) 32,614** 10.6** 9.3**
Is classified as a flat 273,917** 0.67** 0.64**
Wall made of iron 123,541** 0.62** 0.66**
Is classified as a villa 104,197** 0.71** 0.70**
Is classified as a house 96,611** 0.73** 0.64**
Is classified as a single unit 63,850** 0.01 0.02
Is at risk of 100-year ARI flood 40,305** -0.05 -0.04
Has a wall made of brick 27,029** 0.03 0.06
Has a wall made of fibro 20,621** 0.04 0.02
Age of house at time of sale (years) 18,908** 0.21** 0.71**
Has a wall made of steel frame 17,386** -0.10 -0.09
Has a family room 12** 0.00** 0.23**
Distance to nearest grocery (km) -791** 0.00** -0.07**
Wall made of asbestos -28,399** -0.03 -0.26**
Lot size (m
2) -32,502** -0.21 -0.22**
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)-139-
Interaction of cyclone Vance-effect with 100-year ARI risk
Finally, HPM analyses were carried out to determine the possibility of interaction
effects. As with the other models, the structural characteristics (SI) and neighbourhood
characteristics (NJ) used were those given in equation 5.5. Three separate regressions
were carried out to represent the three risk characteristics (RK), which comprised of
the interaction effect between location in a 100-year ARI zone and the property being
sold  within  6 months,  a  year  or  two  years  following  cyclone  Vance  respectively.
There were 4, 6 and 11 transactions that were located in the 100-year zone and sold
within 6 months, one year and two years of Vance, respectively.
Results of the HPM testing these interaction effects are presented in Tables 5-18 to 5-
23. The summary statistics indicate that the overall models are robust. The positive
significance of the coefficient in the semi-log and log-log HPMs, imply, that even for
properties located in the 100-year floodplain, the experience of cyclone Vance did not
resulted in a discount on property prices.
Table 5-18 Overall model summary: Results of the linear, semi-log and log-log regression for the
interaction between properties sold within six-months after cyclone Vance with location in the
100-year ARI flood risk and its impact on property prices at Exmouth
Summary statistics Linear Semi-log Log-log
R square 0.63 0.82 0.83
Durbin-Watson (Dw)
q 2.10 1.91 1.92
F-test 73.76 188.59 195.02
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00
a For N=1,989 & 15 variables, 1.91 < Dw < 1.94 at a significance level of  0.05
**Indicates significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)-140-
Table 5-19 Coefficients and their significance in the model: Results of the linear, semi-log and
log-log regression for the interaction between properties sold within six-months after cyclone
Vance with location in the 100-year ARI flood risk and its impact on property prices at Exmouth
Variables Coefficients (β) & level of significance
Linear Semi-log Log-log
(Constant) 47,251 10.62** 9.34**
Classified as a flat 264,682** 0.67** 0.62*
Classified as a villa 114,641* 0.62** 0.64**
Classified as a house 92,047* 0.71** 0.68**
Classified a duplex unit 80,057** 0.67** 0.6**
Has a family room 44,285** 0.16** 0.18**
Lot size (m
2) 12** 0.00** 0.23**
Wall made of asbestos -32,564** -0.22** -0.22**
Wall made of iron 69,481* 0.02 0.02
Distance to nearest grocery store (km) -28,524** -0.03 -0.25**
Classified as a single unit 19,280** 0.23** 0.69**
Wall made of brick 26,448 0.03 0.06
Six months after Vance * 100-year
ARI 78,660 0.51** 0.45**
Wall made of fibro 20,567 -0.10 -0.09
Age of house at sale (years) -758** 0.00* -0.07**
Wall made of steel frame 40,813 -0.06 -0.04
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)
Table 5-20 Overall model summary: Results of the linear, semi-log and log-log regression for the
interaction between properties sold within one year after cyclone Vance with location in the 100-
year ARI flood risk and its impact on property prices at Exmouth:
Summary statistics Linear Semi-log Log-log
R square 0.63 0.82 0.82
Durbin-Watson (Dw)
a 2.10 1.93 1.94
F-test 73.75 188.28 194.85
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00
a For N=1,989 & 15 variables, 1.91 < Dw < 1.94 at a significance level of  0.05
**Indicates significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)-141-
Table 5-21 Results of the linear, semi-log and log-log regression for the interaction between
properties sold within one year after cyclone Vance with location in the 100-year ARI flood risk
and its impact on property prices at Exmouth: Coefficients and their significance in the model
Variables Coefficients (β) & level of significance
Linear Semi-log Log-log
(Constant) 47,379 10.62** 9.34**
Classified as a flat 264,770** 0.67** 0.62*
Classified as a villa 114,593* 0.62** 0.64**
Classified as a house 92,203** 0.71** 0.68**
Classified a duplex unit 80,923** 0.67** 0.60**
Has a family room 44,315** 0.16** 0.18**
Lot size (m
2) 12** 0.00** 0.23**
Wall made of asbestos -32,516** -0.22** -0.22**
Wall made of iron 69,391* 0.02 0.02
Distance to nearest grocery store (km) -28,563** -0.03 -0.25**
Classified as a single unit 19,039 0.23** 0.69**
Wall made of brick 26,370 0.03 0.06
One year after Vance * 100-year ARI 61,900 0.36** 0.34**
Wall made of fibro 20,398 -0.10 -0.09
Age of house at sale (years) -765* 0.00* -0.07**
Wall made of steel frame 40,744 -0.06 -0.04
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)
Table 5-22 Overall model summary: Results of the linear, semi-log and log-log regression for the
interaction between properties sold within two years after cyclone Vance with location in the 100-
year ARI flood risk and its impact on property prices at Exmouth
Summary statistics Linear Semi-log Log-log
R square 0.63 0.82 0.82
Durbin-Watson (Dw)
a 2.10 1.92 1.93
F-test 73.75 187.89 194.56
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00
a For N=1,989 & 15 variables, 1.91 < Dw < 1.94 at a significance level of  0.05
**Indicates significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)-142-
Table 5-23 Coefficients and their significance in the model: Results of the linear, semi-log and
log-log  regression  for  the  interaction  between  properties  sold  within  two  years  after cyclone
Vance with location in the 100-year ARI flood risk and its impact on property prices at Exmouth
Variables Coefficients (β) & level of significance
Linear Semi-log Log-log
(Constant) 47,609 10.62** 9.33**
Classified as a flat 264,852** 0.67** 0.63*
Classified as a villa 114,546* 0.62** 0.64**
Classified as a house 92,442** 0.71** 0.69**
Classified a duplex unit 81,650** 0.68** 0.61**
Has a family room 44,349** 0.16** 0.18**
Lot size (m
2) 12** 0.00** 0.23**
Wall made of asbestos -32,518** -0.22** -0.22**
Wall made of iron 69,216* 0.02 0.02
Distance to nearest grocery store (km) -28,563** -0.03 -0.25**
Classified as a single unit 18,622 0.23** 0.69**
Wall made of brick 26,236 0.03 0.06
Two years after Vance * 100-year
ARI 48,454 0.22* 0.22*
Wall made of fibro 20,136 -0.10 -0.09
Age of house at sale (years) -774* 0.00* -0.07**
Wall made of steel frame 40,542 -0.06 -0.04
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)
Summary of overall findings
The previous sections have discussed the findings of the various regression analyses
for property sales from 1988 to 2010 in Exmouth, and these are summarized in Table
5-24. Eight risk variables were tested representing cyclonic storm-surge inundation
and flood risk in the townsite. It was expected that they would have a negative impact
on property price. Findings indicated, however, that this was not the case. Prices were,
in fact, much higher in areas prone to cyclonic storm-surge (4 m) and 100-year ARI
flood risk. The devastation caused by category five cyclone Vance, which damaged
buildings and major public infrastructure in the town, had no effect on price. Even the-143-
prices of properties located in 100-year ARI areas, that experienced flooding due to
cyclone Vance, were not discounted for risk.
Table 5-24 Summary of the coefficients and their level of significance for the risk variables
under the HPM analyses carried out for Exmouth (1988-2010)
Variables
No. of
transactions
Coefficients values & level of
significance
Linear Semi-log Log-log
Inundated by a 4 m storm surge 44 83,241** 0.42** 0.35**
Located in a 100-year ARI floodplain 180 40,305** -0.05 -0.04
Post-cyclone Vance
Six months 52 13,887 0.06 0.06
One year 93 15,181 0.08 0.08
Two years 150 8,103 0.08 0.05
Interaction variables
100-year ARI * sold six months after Vance 4 78,660 0.51** 0.45**
100-year ARI * sold one year after Vance 6 61,900 0.36** 0.34**
100-year ARI * sold two years after Vance 11 48,454 0.22* 0.22*
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)
5.6. Discussion
The effect of coastal risk on property sales prices was examined through an HPM
from three angles: location in areas prone to 4 m storm-surge flooding, location in the
100-year  floodplain,  and the experience  of  category  five  cyclone  Vance  in  1999.
Overall, the study found that buyers did not factor risk into their property purchasing
decisions.-144-
Model specifications and study limitations
The dataset consisted of 1,989 property transactions. While this might not seem a
huge number, the construction of the marina village and the release of government
land to LandCorp housing and commercial development, implies that the demand and
supply  for residential  property in  this  town  will  only  grow  in  the  next  couple  of
decades. Similar trends can be anticipated for other coastal towns in north-western
Australia, as a result of the resources boom, ‘Sea Change’ and growth in tourism in
the area. It must be noted, however, that the application of the model to other towns
and large  regional  or  city  centres  may  require  alternative  specification,  and  the
incorporation of additional variables to better represent those contexts.
A limitation of HPM studies is that, by their very nature of using indirect means to
investigate economic decision-making, it fails to take into consideration factors such
as risk tolerance. It is possible that people who purchase property in a cyclone-prone
area such as Exmouth have innate psychological traits for higher risk tolerance, and
this would translate into how they conduct their property transactions. Any anxiety
about the cost of a possible disaster might be rationalised in terms of the availability
of government relief, and the ‘gambling’ psychology of ‘this won’t happen to me’
(Kunreuther 2006).  This short-coming can, however, be addressed through surveys or
interviews  of  property  buyers,  which  could  provide  additional  information  on  the
awareness and subjective perception of risk among different groups of individuals.
A further source of complexity derives from the nature of cyclonic storm-surge risk in
HPM. Unlike earthquake risk for instance, where risk proxies can be derived from the-145-
location  in  relation  to  the  fault  line,  or  flood-risk,  which  can  be  derived  from
hydrological  and  topographic  modelling,  the  actual pathways of  cyclones  are  less
predictable (Ahrens 2008). Deriving a proxy for cyclone risk for use in the HPM is
much less straightforward. Various factors have to be taken into account, including
wind  direction,  atmospheric  pressure,  oceanographic  factors,  elevation,  shoreline
direction, currents, direction of waves, and geomorphic features of the coastline.
Future HPM analyses in coastal areas in other comparable parts of Australia need to
factor these in, and choose variables that help unravel the influences of these many
interacting  factors.  In  constructing  these  variables  however,  the  analyst  must
remember that endogenous factors such as psychological perceptions and tradeoffs
between risk and positive amenities may be highly subjective between individuals.
HPM analysis is also limited in that it does not take into consideration external factors
governing their decisions, for instance where the demand for properties may exceed
supply, and possible land development monopolies that can have an artificial impact
on prices. Again, case studies and survey data combined with such Hedonic studies
may provide a more cohesive analysis.
The variables chosen for the regression analysis were dictated largely by the data
sources  available.  Accessibility,  location  and public  services,  crime  rates,  school
quality,  racial  composition,  home  density,  property  tax  advantages,  council  rates
charges, income levels did not need to be included because the town of Exmouth is a
small,  comparable  neighbourhood,  with  a  relatively  homogeneous  study  area  and
demographic composition. Furthermore, as noted in section 5.4, owing to the 22-year
span with 1,984 transactions, a practical difficulty encountered with this study was-146-
obtaining  socio-economic  information about  purchasers for  each  property,  at  each
point in time and for each transaction.
The data used in this study are readily available for most other areas in Australia.
However, a  challenge  in  carrying  out cyclonic storm-surge inundation  and flood-
hazard HPM analysis  in  Australia,  is  that  there  has  been  sparse  research  is  the
sourcing and testing of risk unlike, for example, in the US where a large number of
such  analyses  have  been  carried  out. Further,  while  information  on  the  dwelling
characteristics was easily obtainable, other information such as mortgages were not
available. The specification of such variables may improve the explanatory power of
HPM analyses.
Results of the other variables used in the HPM analyses carried out in this study were
as expected. Examination of literature on HPM showed that other authors had also
chosen to include these characteristics in flood/storm-surge analysis (e.g. Fridgen &
Shultz 2003, Troy & Romm 2004, Bin & Kruse 2006, Pope 2006, Samarasinge &
Sharp 2010).
Coastal amenity
Properties located in the 4 m storm-surge prone areas had higher property values than
others. Further investigation indicated that this was as a result of the positive effect
created by greater access to coastal amenity. In such a context, decisions to purchase
property  focus  on  positive  coastal  amenity,  outweighing  concern  about  cyclonic
storm-surge inundation and flood risk. Other research has found similar effects. In an-147-
HPM  carried  out  by the  Sydney  Coastal  Councils  (2011), lots located  on  the
beachfront along the Collaroy-Narrabeen area in New South Wales were found to be
40% more valuable. On average, buyers pay in excess of one million dollars for such
properties. Properties with access to the ocean and beach view, near Noosa Heads in
Queensland were also found to be more valuable (Pearson et al. 2002). The Heinz
Centre (2000) in the US found that coastal properties were between 4% and 8% more
valuable than comparable property inland.
Bin et al. (2008), in an HPM assessing flood hazards in the coastal housing market of
Carteret  County,  North  Carolina, incorporated two additional  variables to
disaggregate  risk  from amenity. A  dichotomous  variable  was  used  to  represent
properties located in the first row along the beachfront, which was a proxy for water-
frontage and access. The other represented the Euclidean distance from the centroid of
each property to the coastline. In their sample, the average distance was less than
1,609 m.
Carteret County is a metropolitan area, with a population of almost 60,000 people,
spreading out over a much greater extent, unlike Exmouth, which is a much smaller
and more remote community. In the US study, the authors were able to disaggregate
risk from amenity because the sample included properties that did not have access to
coastal amenity. It was not possible to follow a similar procedure for Exmouth as
location on the front row along the beach could not be used as a variable. Even though
properties at risk were further away from the coastline, they were situated along the
canals built for the marina. These canals not only provided the amenity  of being
located to a waterfront, but also direct access  to the ocean as  a result of boating-148-
facilities provided for each property. Further, all of the properties subject to cyclonic
storm-surge in Exmouth are located within 700 m from the shoreline. The definition
of risk in the HPM for Exmouth, focused only on cyclonic storm-surge inundation.
This is tied in with being located within a certain distance of the coastline, which is
different to the study carried out in North Carolina which also included flood risk.
Since all of the properties at risk of a 4 m surge are located in the marina village, there
are  other  associated  benefits  that could  have been confounding  the  analysis. The
houses  are  more  modern,  and  the  surrounding  area  is  landscaped, to  provide an
aesthetically  pleasing  environment.  Other  areas  in  the  town  are  comparably  less
attractive.
A survey of local risk perceptions in the US found that the presence of shoreline
armouring,  seawalls,  and  other  structural  devices  created  a  sense  of  safety  from
coastal risk, to the extent that it suppressed the need to purchase  flood insurance
(Kriesel & Landry 2004). This is another element which may also explain the findings
of  this  study. At  Exmouth,  the  flood  drainage  channels established  in  the  marina
village  were  built  to  direct excess  flooding into  the ocean.  However,  since  their
establishment, there has not been an opportunity to test the ability of these channels to
mitigate  flooding  in  the  townsite.  The  presence  of  these  may  be  instrumental  in
creating a perception of safety among those purchasing property in this area.
The results of the HPM for 100-year floodplain provide an indication as to whether
buyers factor risk at all into their property prices. This does not represent threat of
cyclonic storm-surge, but flooding due to rainfall. These properties are distributed in-149-
other areas of the town, not only the marina, and therefore include those that do not
have access to the same coastal and aesthetic amenities.
Cyclone Vance effect
HPM analyses carried out to assess prices following cyclone Vance, and the increased
awareness  and  concern about  potential  danger,  found  no  effect.  This  finding  is
different to that of Hallstrom and Smith (2005), who found a decrease in property
prices in Lee County, Florida, following hurricane Andrew in 1992, even in areas that
were not affected. This may be because property owners in Lee County, and other
parts of the US, living in risk-prone areas, are compelled to pay higher insurance
premiums  following  such  major  events.  This  might not,  however, be the  case  in
Exmouth, and other similar regional towns in northern Australia. This can, on the one
hand, imply lower sensitivity to potential risk among buyers at Exmouth. On the other
hand, and more importantly, it indicates the importance of the absence of a monetary
signal of risk, and its translation into economic behaviour.
Analyses carried out to assess the interaction effect of properties sold after cyclone
Vance, with located in 100-year ARI areas, found an increase, rather than a decrease
in sales price at a 0.05 significance level. This is similar to findings by Skantz and
Strickland (1987), for Houston Texas, who found that the experience of a major event
did not affect prices even for properties located in flood prone areas. They attributed
this to the availability of subsidized insurance, where owners did not have to factor in
the full cost of risk into their purchase decisions. This was corroborated with their-150-
finding that a sharp increase in insurance premiums a year later, however, resulted in
a drop in property prices. Babcock and Mitchell (1980) also reported a similar finding
for Ontario in Canada, where the experience of a major event did not affect prices,
even for those located in the floodplain. A similar finding was reported by Bartosova
et al. (1999) for Wisconsin in the US.
Other studies in the US, by Fridgen & Shultz (1999), Bin & Polasky (2004), and
Morgan (2007), who also used HPM to investigate the major event versus 100-year
floodplain  interaction  effect,  found different  results  to  that of  Exmouth.  This  is
attributed to the requirement, by law, for these properties to obtain insurance. Fridgen
and Shultz (1999) found as much as an 81% discount in house value resulted from the
monetary  signal  created  by  higher  insurance  premiums. There  is no  compulsory
insurance requirement for Exmouth, or other parts of northern WA, however. The
absence of a monetary signal via insurance to create awareness of risk in Exmouth
could therefore be another reason buyers failed to factor risk into the prices they paid
for coastal property. It also suggests that knowledge and awareness of risk alone, may
be insufficient to change economic behaviour.
Another reason why buyers have not discounted for risk-prone property in Exmouth
could be the expectation of compensation from the government. This can create an
internal psychological rationalization in the minds of buyers. As was demonstrated
with the relief provided through a nation-wide levy to property-owners affected by the
Queensland flooding and cyclone earlier this year (Australian Government, Treasury
2011a), the problem lies in an imbalance between social and private costs. While
property owners enjoy the amenity gained from living so close to the coast, they do-151-
not  bear  the  full  cost  of  their  decisions,  either  through  insurance,  or  paying  for
damages following a major event. This creates an inequitable situation, where the rest
of society, who do not partake in these benefits, is forced to fund emergency, response
and long-term rehabilitation costs.
An HPM analysis of the interaction between risk of 4 m storm-surge and the Vance
effect was not carried out, because at the time of cyclone, the construction of the
marina  had  not  yet  commenced. With  findings  that  buyers  did  not  discount  for
property prices even directly following the event, it was not expected that there would
be any effect for at-risk properties in the marina area, which came on the market two
years after the event, by which time memories of the event had faded.
Policy implications
With the positive amenity of coastal living and sea-change overriding any perception
of  threats,  and  the  failure  of  the  market  to  price  the  expected  losses,  coastal
development  proximal  to  the  shore  can  only  be  expected  to  grow. Chapter  two
provides more detailed background on a market failure, and how this can happen in
the case of coastal property. Essentially, a market fails when private costs and benefits
are not aligned to social costs and benefits.
The preferred  policy  option in  locales  such  as  Exmouth  in  northern  Australia  is,
therefore to internalise the social costs of disasters into the private calculations of
property owners and developers. This can be done in various ways where, for example
the local government can implement land-use control measures. Implementing and-152-
enforcing this may require various economic instruments to encourage developers and
local  communities  to  behave  more  in  accordance  with  federal  and  state  controls.
Determination  of  areas  subject  to cyclonic  storm-surge inundation  and  zoning  by
degree  of  risk  is  an  essential  part  of  the  implementation  of  land-use  controls.
Monetary obligations to incorporate the threat of flood-risk may be the only way that
more judicious land-use controls are enforced.
This in turn leads to various other policy implications. It has been over ten years since
cyclone Vance (1999), and over time the memories of such catastrophic events fade,
and other priorities take precedence. Several of the marina properties have come on
the market in the last few years, and buyers may not be aware of the extent of risk
they are exposed to. Marina property sales are targeted at employees of major oil and
gas companies working in the area (Ray White 2010).  It is possible that the nature of
such industries may attract people from capital cities of Australia, who are not aware
of the extent of cyclonic and other coastal risk of properties developed in towns such
as  Exmouth.  While  Exmouth  is  generally  well-known  as  a  cyclone-prone  area,
additional information must be provided to buyers on the specific risk to which their
property is exposed.
Another management pathway associated with cyclonic storm-surge inundation and
flooding risk is the designation of high-risk areas through mapping, and making this
information publicly available to future property buyers in the area. The basis of this
management  action  is, that  if  people  are  aware  of  risk,  they  will  translate  this
knowledge  into  action,  by  paying  lower  prices  for  properties  located  in  high-risk
zones. The rationale is that the lower price reflects the potential costs of damage they-153-
may bear in the future. Alternatively, they may undertake risk mitigation measures to
minimize potential damages.
The  mandatory  disclosure  of  risk  of  sea-level rise  at  the  point  of  sale  is  being
considered under the current revision of the WA State Coastal Policy (Panizza 2011
6).
This  is  in  light  of  the  likelihood  of  coastal  inundation  risk from  sea  level  rise
increasing, compelling the government to build expensive protective structures. For
cyclone-prone northern areas of Australia, the provision of information of cyclonic
storm-surge risk must be an essential component of new policy. This can follow the
procedure currently in use by the US, where properties sold in a 100-year floodplain
are required by law to disclose flood risk in property sales contracts (King 2009).
While  the  internalization  of  economic  costs  of  natural  disaster  risk  into  property
prices in cyclone-prone areas of WA and other parts of Australia may be the most
economically  feasible  solution,  there  can  be  various  limitations  from  a  political
standpoint. Often there is a high demand for real estate in low-lying land at, or near,
the coast because of its’ high amenity value. State governments are often constrained
by  political  considerations,  making it  injudicious  to  intervene  in  the rights  of
developers/land-owners to build in such areas.
Furthermore, from the perspective of property buyers, awareness of risk alone may
not, however, always translate into action. For instance, an investigation into flood
insurance  purchase  for  coastal  properties  in  the  US,  found  that  only  49%  of
6 Non-print lecture notes presented at the Coastal and Marine Management (ENV381), at
Murdoch University, Murdoch, on 25 October 2011, by Vivienne Panizza, Team Leader,
Climate Change and Coastal Planning, Department for Planning and Infrastructure, Perth.-154-
households maintain flood insurance, despite mandatory purchase requirements for
federally-backed mortgages (Kriesel & Landry 2004). This implies that regulatory
measures alone are not sufficient to change economic decisions to buy risk-prone
property.  Given  that  Australia  has  no  mandatory  insurance  program  such  as  the
National Flood Insurance Program in the US, this begs the question, will such legal
requirements  change  the  way  the  Australian property  buyers perceive and  make
decisions  regarding  coastal  risk? Monetary  signals  through  higher  insurance
premiums or other forms of economic incentives may therefore be more effective in
influencing property purchase behaviour. This was found to be the case in the US,
where studies have shown that buyers who pay high insurance premiums for flood
risk-prone  properties pay lower prices  at  the  time  of  sale  (Troy  &  Romm  2004,
Guttery et al. 2004, Pope 2006).
For  the  cyclone-prone  north  of  Australia,  insurance  can  be  an  important  force  of
change in the way coastal land is developed. It will transfer the risk back into the
private costs of property owners, thereby creating monetary cognizance of risk. This
can, in  turn, reduce  both  the  individual  and  social  costs  in  present  and  future
generations. Following the 2011 flooding and cyclonic storm-surge experiences of
Queensland  and  the  increasing  restrictions  and  hesitance by  the  private  insurance
industry to insure flood prone areas, a national insurance program could pave the way
for future private  sector  development  of  coastal  inundation insurance  in  Australia
(Australian  Government, Treasury  2011d).  In  this  respect, federal government
involvement  may  provide  the  leadership  in  reducing  uncertainties  and  show  how
private insurance firms may be able to diversify risk. It may also pave the way to-155-
ensure  that  local  communities  in  areas  such as  Exmouth,  could  participate  in  the
program. National  insurance could also serve  to  change  current  patterns of
development driven by ‘Sea Change’ and the resources boom.
In terms of future research, as demonstrated with this case study, a wider scale of
HPM  analysis  on  coastal  property,  especially in large  urban  centres in  northern
Australia would  provide  a  useful  empirical  justification  towards  analysing  the
theoretical and institutional basis for coastal land-use and disaster policy in Australia.
5.7. Conclusions
This chapter addressed the question as to whether buyers factored risk into the prices
they paid for property at Exmouth. Properties subject to 4 m storm-surge risk were not
discounted for risk, and were, in fact, higher priced. Coastal amenity was considered
to be the primary reason for this. It was not possible to disaggregate amenity from risk
in the HPM for Exmouth due to the small spatial extent of the townsite. However,
findings for 100-year ARI flood risk suggest that property buyers are risk insensitive.
The absence of a cyclone Vance effect suggests that awareness alone is not sufficient
to change economic decisions made in the purchase of coastal property in places like
Exmouth. Evidence from the US indicates the importance of a monetary signal, such
as higher insurance premiums, to influence buying behaviour.
The failure to factor risk into private decisions, results in a substantial social costs in
the event of a disaster. This inequitable situation must be addressed through both
regulatory  and  economic  policy.  Legislation  is  important  to  ensure  disclosure  of-156-
property located in hazardous areas at the time of sale. Policy interventions such as
insurance and other economic disincentives to factor risk back into the calculations of
property owners must be considered, and these are discussed further in chapters six
and seven. It is anticipated that the combination of these two approaches would serve
to raise awareness of the potential costs of future risks, and create more equitable and
sustainable development in similar places in northern Australia.-157-
Chapter 6: Natural disaster insurance for cyclonic storm-surge
inundation risk in northern Australia
6.1. Introduction
Property  buyers  at  Exmouth  do  not  appear  to factor  risk  of  cyclonic storm-surge
inundation or 100-year ARI flooding into their purchase prices. The high cost of the
2011 Queensland flood and cyclone disaster is an example of the consequences of this
failure on a much larger scale. The nationwide flood levy imposed across Australia to
fund the cost of disaster recovery has also demonstrated how the failure of private
property  buyers  to  internalise  the  costs  of  risk  into  their  purchasing  decisions,
translates into a social cost with consequent implications on the rest of the economy.
Economic strategies that could be used to internalise these social costs of disasters
associated with coastal development in cyclonic storm-surge inundation-prone areas
in  Australia are  examined  in the  next  two chapters.  The  best  known  economic
instrument  for  this  purpose  is  natural  disaster  insurance,  which  can  be  used  to
internalise the costs back to the property owners who live in risk-prone areas via the
payment  of  premiums.  There  are, however, other  market  failures  and  government
failures,  namely  on  the part  of  developers  and  local  councils,  which  cannot  be
corrected through insurance. Further, there are also residual costs, such as increased
risk to other parts of the townsite, and resulting social costs, created as a result of the
loss of disaster mitigating ecosystem services from developments, such as the marina-158-
in Exmouth, which must be internalised through other  economic measures. These
problems require  other  economic  strategies including environmental  economic
instruments.
The aim  of  this  chapter was to  examine  the  potential  application  of  insurance  to
cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk, for cyclone-prone northern areas of Australia
like Exmouth. It will:
1 Explore the underlying principles of natural disaster insurance as a basis for
the design of insurance for cyclonic storm-surge inundation;
2 Investigate  international  experience  in  the  provision  of natural  disaster
insurance, and the role of the public and private sector; and
3 Propose an approach that can be used  for  cyclonic storm-surge inundation
insurance in northern parts of Australia.
6.2. Theoretical background
Insurance is considered a key measure for coping with risk from various sources such
as automobile accidents, theft and natural hazards (Kunreuther 1997, van den Bergh
&  Faure  2006,  Bouwer et  al.  2007,  Dlugolecki  2008). It is  the  world’s  largest
industry, in terms of the funds under management, control or investment, and the
array of participants including reinsurers, direct insurers, intermediaries, brokers, loss
assessors and adjustors, government regulators and the insured. Insurance is also a
key  tool used to  protect  people  against  catastrophic  events, and  proceeds  from-159-
insurance are typically a major contributor to recovery following a major disaster
(World Economic Forum 2008, Doepel 2009, Burningham 2011).
Through the purchase of insurance, risk perceptions are translated into risk-averse
behaviour, where each individual transfers their risk to the insurer at a price (Gollier
2005, Kunreuther 2006). The benefit for individuals is that the premium they pay is
less than losses they may incur in the future (Cummins & Weiss 2000). This is known
as ‘risk hedging’, and is a demonstration of the risk averse nature of individuals, who
prefer small, but certain losses in the present, to large and uncertain losses in the
future (Gollier 2005).
Risk  transferred  to  the  insurance  industry  is  pooled  across a  large  number  of
individuals, and diversified among several other categories of risks, such as theft and
motor vehicle accident insurance, in a practice referred to in the literature as the ‘law
of large numbers’ (Gollier 2005, Burningham 2011). This pertains to the notion that
there is a low probability of all the insured individuals being affected at the same
time. Insurers use their comparative advantage and economies of scale in the market
for risk to create surplus gains, where individual payments for risk, translate into
profits for companies (Kleffner & Doherty 1996, Priest 1996, Gollier 2005).
Risk pooling also enables the use of statistical measures to predict average loss. This
facilitates determination of the level of premium rates to be charged to cover potential
future losses, and the amount of equity capital that must be maintained to keep the
company  financially  viable.  Insurers  function  as mediators, through  the  use  of
scientific and economic information to understand risk better and by creating greater-160-
awareness of exposing vulnerable areas that require greater levels of risk management
(Gollier 2005).
The Arrow-Borch model
The theory of insurance is described under the Economic Model of Risk Exchange,
also known as the Arrow-Borch Model of Perfect Competition. This theory describes
the functioning of the insurance market under ideal conditions, whereby the insurer
and buyer are fully cognizant of the risk, and the potential damage that could result
from a catastrophic event. As with other economic models, this provides insights into
problems inherent in the various kinds of insurance (Gollier 2005). The Arrow-Borch
model assumes that insurance functions on the basis that there are no transaction
costs, insurers have full information on how risk is distributed through the economy,
can diversify risk via the financial markets, and are fully liable for risk that is taken
on. Violations of any of these conditions result in failure of the insurance market, and
Table 6-1 indicates how this can happen.
Insurance can fail, for example, in the provision of cover for coastal property from
cyclonic storm-surge inundation.  Insurers  have  to  carry  out  extensive  research  on
exposure to risk, through engineering and hydrological studies, which in turn creates
transaction costs. These costs are passed on to individuals as part of the total premium
that has to be paid. High premium rates result in a reduction in the number of people
taking out insurance. The purchase of insurance can also reduce in situations where
property owners in low-risk areas find out that they have subsidised the costs of those-161-
living in high risk areas. Another failure can result from property owners not taking
full action to minimise risk (Gollier 2005).
Table 6-1 Arrow-Borch model assumptions of an ideal insurance market and underlying reasons
for their violation
Assumptions Failures
No transaction costs are
involved
Imperfect scientific data, lack of historical data, unpredictable shifts in
weather conditions, and other uncertainties result in there being insufficient
knowledge about risk, requiring investment in expensive research and data to
forecast potential losses
Higher than normal premium rates charged because of risk ambiguity to
ensure that losses are fully covered
Transaction costs passed on to individuals and premiums too expensive for
risk-averse people, in turn, creating a condition of partial uninsurability
The distribution function
of risks is common
knowledge
Insurers face a heterogeneous population of low and high risk individuals, but
premiums are calculated based on the average risk of the population
Those with lower risk may exit the market because of the costs exceeding the
benefits they obtain from it (Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976)
Insurers are fully liable
for the risks
The limited liability condition protects insurers and so they do not bear the
full burden of risk. The government has to step in as insurer-of-last-resort
when insurers declare bankruptcy following a catastrophe
The model is static, or
there exists a complete set
of insurance markets for
future risks
Insurers diversify risk through financial markets, such as stocks. Since not all
people own stocks some bear more risks than others
Source: Gollier (2005).
Other criteria
There  are  also  other  sources  of  insurance  failure (Table 6-2) and  if  any  of  these
criteria are not met, the conditions of insurability and profitability become ineffective.
Risk is insurable if the law of great numbers may be applied and efficient operation of
the  insurance  market  requires  risk  to  be  mutual. This  implies  that  the  maximum
potential loss may very large or infinite.-162-
Table 6-2 Criteria for the insurability of risk
Criteria Description
Mutuality A large number of people who are at risk must combine to form a risk community
Need The insured must be placed in a situation of financial need when the anticipated event
occurs
Accessibility The expected loss burden must be assessable
Non-
randomness
The time at which the insured event occurs must not be unpredictable and the occurrence
itself must be independent of the will of the insured
Economic
viability
The insured community is be able to cover its future financial needs on a planned basis
Similarity of
threat
The insured community must be exposed to the same threat and the occurrence of the
anticipated event must give rise to the need for funds in the same way for all concerned
Source: Swiss Re (1998).
The risk must also be assessable, non-random, and the insured community must be
exposed to the same level of threat. Insurance must also be economically viable, and
the premium sufficient to cover the expenses and losses relative to what is termed the
‘historical average loss year’, representing the largest possible losses to the industry
calculated based on past data (Whittle et al. 2009).
6.3. Failures of natural disaster insurance
Turning to the failure inherent in the provision of natural disaster insurance, a key
aspect of socio-economic coastal resilience is the ability to recover from a natural
disaster through insurance (Berz & Smolka 1988, Doornkamp 1995, Clark 1998).
There are, however, various potential sources of natural disaster insurance failure,
both on the demand-side and the supply-side.-163-
Demand-side failures
In the case of Exmouth, those affected on the demand side would usually be property
owners. Property owners obtain financial protection by transferring this risk through
insurance, which also meets emotional needs, such as reduced anxiety, avoidance of
regret and assurance of compensation in case a loss occurs (Kunreuther & Michel-
Kerjan 2009). Possible demand-side failures created by disaster risk are summarised
in Table 6-3. As can be seen in the table, the demand-side of insurance can fail as a
result of five types of market failures. The first is moral hazard, which is a situation
where insured or uninsured individuals raise the costs for the insurer, or relief agency,
through risky behaviour, as they do not bear full costs for the risk (Arrow 1965, Baker
1996).
Government compensation can be affected by politics, as in the US, for example,
where greater disaster compensation has been provided during presidential election
years (Reeves 2004, 2005). Individuals may not have full information on the level of
their exposure to risk, a failure situation known as asymmetric information, where
insufficient or imbalanced information between contract holders can result in market
inefficiencies (Stigler 1961, Akerlof 1970, Spence 1973). Failure can also result from
cognitive bias, where even in cases where information is available, individuals may
not obtain insurance or mitigate in proportion to risk exposure. Such a situation is
described under prospect theory, where individuals diverge from optimising utility,
which  is  a  key  assumption  in neoclassical  economics, because  of  underlying
psychological  traits  and  other  motivations  (Becker  1968,  Kahneman  &  Tversky
1979).-164-
Table 6-3 Summary  of  demand-side  failures  of  natural  disaster  insurance compiled  from
relevant literature
Ideal conditions* Types of market failure and examples
Individuals take full
responsibility to
protect themselves
from natural hazard
risk
Moral hazard, charity hazard or natural disaster syndrome
Compensation from the government/donors reduces incentive to insure or mitigate
(Kunreuther 1996, Kelly & Kleffner 2003, Raschky & Weck-Hannemann 2007)
Little/no risk mitigation in California even following major earthquake damages
(Kunreuther 1978, Palm et al. 1990) with similar findings with flood-proofing in
other parts of the US (Burby et al. 1988,  Laska 1991)
Full knowledge
about disaster risk
is available and
individuals are fully
cognizant of their
risk exposure
Asymmetric information
Confusion because of expert disagreement (Bernknopf et al. 2006, Crichton 2008)
Local governments withhold information because of concerns about lowered effect
on property prices or getting sued for liability. Insurers may also withhold
information to avoid disagreements on premiums rates (Gares 2002)
Full provision of
information on risk
will ensure the
purchase of
insurance or risk
mitigation in
proportion to the
degree of risk
exposure
Cognitive bias
Incorrect interpretation and processing of risk information (Brilly & Polic 2005,
Bouwer et al. 2007, Botzen et al. 2009a) or people ignore /do not understand risk
probabilities (Kunreuther 1978, Palm et al. 1990)
Individuals are not able to connect the level of risk probability with the level of the
insurance premium rate (Kunreuther et al. 1985, Kleindorfer  & Kunreuther 1999,
Camerer & Kunreuther 1989, Kunreuther et al. 2001, Huber 2004, Huber et al. 1997,
Kunreuther 2006, Magat et al. 1987)
Unable to understand or distinguish between various probabilities of occurrence. For
example in the Netherlands, more risk-tolerant people discounted the level of risk
from that associated with damage from a 1-in-100 year flood ARI to that from 1-in -
100 year event, diminishing the importance of  insurance (Kunreuther et al. 1985,
Magat et al. 1987, Camerer & Kunreuther 1989, Huber et al. 1997, Kunreuther et al.
2001, Huber 2004, Brilly & Polic 2005, Bernknopf et al. 2006, Botzen et al, 2009a)
Differing perception and risk-taking behaviour affected by factors such as proximity
to a river, a recent major event, having purchased insurance in the past, having more
children and being more educated (Gares 2002, Botzen et al. 2009a)
Mitigation and insurance is placed at the end of a list of competing priorities when
discretionary income is limited, as is the case with low-income earners, females and
older people (Kunreuther 1978, Lewis & Nickerson 1989, Botzen et al. 2009a)
The occurrence of
the event must be
independent of the
will of the insured
Adverse selection
Individuals are more aware of their risk than insurers and obtain more cover. For
example, in the Netherlands, those living in areas not protected by dikes have a
greater demand for insurance (Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976, Camrer & Kunreuther
1989, Michel-Kerjan & Kousky 2008)
Individuals capable
of assessing
benefits over the
medium to long-
term
Bounded rationality and discounting the future
People take decisions to invest in mitigation/insurance based on the short-term, even
where there are long-term benefits (Meyer & Hutchinson 2001, Kunreuther 2006).
Policies are cancelled when there has not been a recent major event (Kunreuther &
Roth 1998)
*Ideal conditions denote assumptions under the Arrow-Borch model and Swiss Re (1998) criteria-165-
Adverse  selection is  where  an  individual  has  more  information  on  risk  than  the
insurer,  resulting  in  those  with  high  risk  purchasing  more  cover  (Freeman  &
Kunreuther 2003). Failures can also result from inconsistencies associated with the
higher  value  people  place  on  the  short-term,  in  comparison  to the  long-term,  as
described under the theory of intertemporal choice behaviour (Ainslie 1975, Raineri
& Rachlin 1993, Sozou 1998, Frederick et al. 2002).
Supply-side failures
As with failures on the demand side, natural disaster insurance also fails on the supply
side  owing  to  violations  of  the  Arrow-Borch  assumptions,  and  Swiss  Re  (1998)
criteria. Possible supply-side failures created by natural disaster risk and examples
from the literature illustrating their impact on the insurance market, are summarised in
Table  6-4. There  are  two  main  types  of  market  failures  that  affect  the  supply  of
natural disaster insurance: lack of information or uncertainties in the prediction of
natural disaster risk, and the correlation of risk. Climate change and its associated
potential  impacts  on  the  magnitude  and  frequency  of  meteorological  disaster  risk
compounds the problem, imposing greater uncertainties in the calculus of insurance in
high-risk areas.-166-
Table 6-4 Summary of supply-side failures of natural disaster insurance compiled from relevant
literature
Ideal conditions* Types of market failure and examples
Determination of the
level of risk does not
incur a transaction
cost, expected losses
are assessable and the
distribution function
of risk is common
knowledge
Information failures
Additional costs of research into risk, and other similar costs can result in 30% higher
premium rates (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan 2009)
Limited coverage or the inability to set actuarially fair premium rates when potential
liability cannot be determined (Born & Viscusi 2006, Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan
2008)
Higher premiums charged when insurers disagree on the level of risk (Cabantous 2007)
Natural catastrophes are not predictable on a year by year basis (Born & Viscusi 2006)
Uncertainties prevent prediction based on the past, resulting in higher than optimal
premium rates to cover unanticipated losses (Ellsberg 1961, Cummins 2006)
Uncertainties, as to whether all measures to reduce risk have been taken, resulting in
higher premiums, even for individuals who use mitigation measures (Aakre et al. 2010)
Financial insolvency after major events, where insurers are unable to raise capital for
large payouts or to raise capital quickly, resulting in exit from the market (Kleffner &
Doherty 1996, Cummins et al. 2002, Cummins 2006)
Following hurricane Katrina in the US, Poe Financial went bankrupt, Allstate
Insurance lost US$ 38 billion in insured losses and exited several coastal states, and
StateFarm opted not to renew some policies in the affected area (Born & Viscusi 2006)
After hurricane Andrew in the US in1994, insurers suffered major underwriting losses,
resulting in a restricted supply of insurance and higher premiums (Cummins 2006)
Major events in the 1990s in the US destabilised the industry, and resulted in the
failure of around 140 insurers (Cummins et al. 2002)
Uncertainty can  lead to insurance premiums being set either too high or too low,
which sends the wrong signal, resulting in underinsurance if premiums are too high, or
unsustainable losses to insurers if premiums are too low (Born 2001, Gollier 2005)
Additional uncertainties regarding climate change impacts on natural disaster risk and
the lack of empirical analysis on how this will affect the industry (Born & Viscusi
2006)
Insolvency resulting from investing in risky financial markets (Born 2001)
The insurer’s ability to provide adequate capital at given times is based on the
underwriting cycle of the insurance industry (Cummins 2006)
Risks among several
individuals can be
pooled so that the
total premium takings
are greater than the
payouts
Correlation of risk
Insurance works best with frequent events that do not cause severe devastation, which
are statistically independent of each other and have a probability of being relatively
evenly distributed over time (Born & Viscusi 2006). Several events over a short time
period will impede the calculation of an economically viable premium, disrupting the
market (Gollier 2005)
Economic inefficiencies can result in the industry holding on to large amounts of
capital to cover massive damage resulting from low-frequency, very severe events
(Jaffee & Russell 1997, Cummins 2006)
*Ideal conditions denote assumptions under the Arrow-Borch model and/or criteria required for the insurability
of risk as defined by Swiss Re (1998) and Gollier (2002)-167-
Uncertainties with regard to information on risk can create economic inefficiencies in
the insurance market, including premiums rates being higher than actuarially fair. This
can reduce the supply of insurance, and create withdrawal of coverage in areas where
the level of risk is perceived to be too high or unpredictable (Born & Viscusi 2006,
Cummins  2006,  Kunreuther  &  Michel-Kerjan  2009).  Correlated  risk  pertains  to
several individuals being affected at the same time by a major event, and all of these
losses have to be covered by the insurer.
This  is  distinguished  from  other  forms  of  insurance,  such  as  that  taken  for
automobiles,  whereby  a  single  accident  will  not usually affect  a  large  number  of
insured individuals. As a result of correlated risk, the profit margins and financial
viability of the insurer is reduced, resulting in a revaluation of the probability of loss
in the future, higher premiums in the following years, and lower coverage as some
insurers exit from the market. This often forces the government to step-in as insurer-
of-last-resort (Freeman & Kunreuther 2003, Born & Viscusi 2006, Cummins 2006,
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan 2009).
6.4. International experience with flood risk insurance
This section examines the empirical international experience, specifically in relation
to the provision of flood insurance, as this has the closest application to cover for
cyclonic storm-surge inundation  risk.  Examples  of flood  insurance  in developed
countries, to which Australia could be compared, are presented in Table 6-5.
The UK, the Czech Republic, Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Austria,-168-
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Germany and Belgium provide flood insurance through the
private sector. Germany had a public insurance scheme in the past, but following
European Union regulations,  has  been  providing  flood  cover  through  the  private
sector,  with  large  increases  in  premium  rates as  a  result  (Latham  et  al.  2011).
Insurance is not mandatory in most of these countries, except for the UK and the
Czech Republic. Switzerland has a mixed system, where public insurance is provided
in the majority of areas, while other parts of the country are covered through the
private sector (Latham et al. 2011).
Table 6-5 A summary of flood insurance in various countries compiled from relevant literature
based on provider, requirement and degree of market penetration
Country Insurer Compulsory Market penetration
UK Private Yes Total 95% but 30% for poor homes
Czech Republic Private Yes 25-75%
Sweden Private No >75%
Netherlands Private No 25-75%
Poland Private No 25-75%
Portugal Private No 25-75%
Austria Private No 10-25%
Greece Private No 10-25%
Hungary Private No <10%
Italy Private No <5%
Germany Private No 10% for contents & 4% for buildings insurance
Belgium Private No -
Switzerland Public-private No -
France Public-private Yes Almost 100%
New Zealand Public-private No 90%
Spain Public Yes >75%
Finland Public No 10-25%
USA Public No Partial
Sources: Thieken et al. (2006), Botzen et al. (2009b), Aakre et al. (2010), Latham et al. (2011), Keys (2011).
France  and  the  New  Zealand  have  similar  systems,  where  frontline  insurance  is
provided by the private sector, which is, in turn, reinsured by the government (Latham
et al. 2011). Insurance is compulsory in France, at a flat-rate fixed by the government-169-
(Botzen  et  al.  2009b,  Keys  2011).  Insurance  is  optional  and  subsidised  in  New
Zealand, and private insurers pass on this subsidy to the New Zealand Earthquake
Commission which in turn, reinsures internationally (Latham et al. 2011, Keys 2011).
A similar system exists in the US, and this is discussed in more detail in a later
section.
Despite the high rate of penetration in France, there have been challenges. The French
government faced large losses as a result of larger companies covering financially
viable and insurable risks, whose profits meant that they did not require reinsurance
from the government, leaving smaller insurers to provide cover for those individuals
with greater risk. In turn, these companies passed on these risks to the government
through the purchase of reinsurance. These losses meant that the government had to
provide greater subsidisation and lower cover (Latham et al. 2011).
In Spain and Finland, the government has a monopoly on the provision of disaster
insurance  (Botzen et  al. 2009b, Latham  et  al.  2011). Compulsory  natural  disaster
insurance, covering floods, storms, and earthquakes, is provided by the government in
Spain and premiums are the same across all types of risk (Keys 2011). Even though
insurance  is  not  compulsory  in  the  UK,  high  rates  of  cover  are attributed  to  the
geographical area  covered  by  the  private  sector and  their partnership  with  the
government (Swiss Re 1998, Whittle et al. 2009).
Most  insurance  programs  provide  cover  based  on  extent  of  damages  caused.  An
exception  is  the  Caribbean  Catastrophe  Risk  Insurance  Facility,  which  makes
payments  according  to  the  severity  of  the event,  such  as the severity  (based  on-170-
categories 1-5) of the hurricane, rather than on losses (Latham et al. 2011).
Private flood insurance in the UK
This chapter now turns to examine international experience in the provision of private
versus public natural disaster insurance, using the cases of the UK and USA, with the
aim of garnering underlying principles to be used as a basis for the proposed approach
for cyclonic storm-surge inundation insurance in northern Australia.
Flood-risk in the UK is covered by private insurers and the  government provides
mitigation, with no public compensation for flood-damaged properties (Whittle et al.
2009, Mechler et al. 2010). The provision of private insurance was related to the
general political economic ideology at the time, which was to allow the free market to
operate with minimum government intervention (Huber 2004). The system operates,
however, within various government driven policies and guidelines. Key elements of
the system are summarised in Table 6-6.
As a result of moral hazard through reduced investment in flood defences, ageing
infrastructure lead to a 200% rise in insurance payouts since 1995 (Crichton 2005).
Following major floods in 2000, a moratorium was proposed by the private insurers,
culminating in an agreement that property would no longer be insured for flood at
'whatever the cost' but differentiated based on exposure, and the government would
increase its financial commitment in flood protection and land-use planning measures
(Huber 2004). Cover for high risk property is only provided on the basis that they will
be protected by flood defences within two years (Whittle et al. 2009).-171-
Table 6-6 Key elements of the private flood insurance system in the UK
Key elements Description
Role of
insurers
Established in 1961 through a voluntary, or ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between the
government and the Association of British Insurers (Huber 2004)
Private insurers provided almost unconditional cover at a reasonable price for properties
facing a 1-in-75 year risk of flood or less (Salthouse 2002)
Operated within government driven policies and guidelines (Whittle et al. 2009)
Discretionary power to withhold cover or provide cover with higher loadings for higher
risk although constrained from charging more than 0.5% of the value insured in high-risk
areas (Salthouse 2002)
Covered as part of home and building insurance, bundled with other types of risk (Huber
2004)
Role of
government
Government carries out mitigation such as flood-works and land-use planning regulation
(Whittle et al. 2009)
One of the only countries in the world to not provide compensation for homes damaged by
floods (Mechler et al. 2010)
Market failure
and
consequences
'Systemic moral hazard' on the part of the government by reduced investment in flood
mitigation resulting in ageing flood defences and poor land-use planning (Huber 2004)
The obligation to provide insurance at ‘whatever the cost’ lead to increasing losses with a
200% rise in insurance payouts around 1995-2005 (Crichton 2005)
Major floods cost insurers GB£ 2 billion, and they pressurised the government to upgrade
ageing flood defences and address issues of property development in risk-prone areas
(Huber 2004)
Market
solution
Moratorium put forward to government or the insurers would no longer provide
unconditional insurance (Huber 2004)
Agreement reached between the government and insurers that property would no longer be
insured for flood at 'whatever the cost' but differentiated based on exposure (Huber 2004)
The government would increase its financial commitment in flood protection and land-use
planning measures (Huber 2004)
Current
system
Automatic cover available for low and moderate risk-rated areas, with insurance for high-
risk areas only if they will be protected by flood defences within two years, which will
bring down the risk ranking from medium to low (Whittle et al. 2009)
Case-by-case consideration of properties where no defences will be constructed in areas
with a long history of flooding (Whittle et al. 2009)
Local council and the Environment Agency to work with these property owners to
implement other means of protection, such as household flood products and construction
(Whittle et al. 2009)
Much more stringent rules in covering risk and differentiated premiums based on
geographic risk, creating a disincentive for people to purchase and build in high-risk areas
(Crichton 2005)
Risk information available for each individual property is sourced from historic insurance
information, combined with that obtained from the Environment Agency’s latest flood
hazard databases (Crichton 2005)
Risk is rated as significant, medium and low, based on the on the annual statistical chance
of flooding in a given area and local flood defence plans (Crichton 2005)-172-
The British system is not without its problems, which provides lessons for Australia
and other countries that may follow the same approach. Even after the moratorium
and in-principle agreement in the early 2000s, the government has still failed to meet
its  obligations  in  providing  flood  defences.  This  has  raised  concerns  that  insurers
might exit from the provision of flood cover, especially in areas most needed (Whittle
et al. 2009).
Furthermore, there has been continued development in risk-prone areas as a result of
difficulties in finding new land for development, with development occurring behind
existing defences, resulting in the aggregation of flood risk. Other issues include the
slow development of a  national database on flood defences, limited access to the
global reinsurance market, and concerns about future claims increasing as a result of
climate change impacts on weather-related damages (Whittle et al. 2009).
Public flood insurance in the US
In the US, flood insurance is provided under the National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP), and the key elements of the program are summarised in Table 6-7. Insurance
is not mandatory, and participating communities enter into an agreement with the
government to enforce the flood management ordinance, which comprise of flood
control  activities  and  measures  to  reduce  risk  for  new  developments  in  the  area
(United  States  Government, Federal Emergency Management Agency 2008,  Keys
2011).-173-
Table 6-7 Key elements of the public National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in the USA
Key elements Description
Role of
government
Established in 1968 and expanded to the coast in 1973 with government the sole insurer for
flood risk as a result of private insurers not covering flood insurance (United States
Government, Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] 2008)
Frontline insurance through a network of private insurance companies called Write-Your-
Own companies, with the government actually bearing the risk (Chivers & Flores 2002)
Land-use controls are usually adopted to steer new construction away from high-risk
locations and to otherwise mitigate construction in hazardous zones. Communities are
required to raise the floor of any new construction above the level of a 100-year ARI flood
(United States Government, FEMA 2008)
No building in areas where water potentially moves with high velocity and if they are, they
have to forgo the subsidised premium and pay the full price (United States Government,
FEMA 2008)
Legislation for mandatory insurance for properties in high-risk areas with federally backed
mortgages (United States Government, FEMA 2008)
Buildings constructed prior to the issue of a flood insurance rate map are provided with
subsidised premiums (discounted at between 35% and 40% of the full-risk premium), with
others constructed later charged actuarial rates (United States Government, FEMA 2008.
Properties located below the ‘Base Flood Elevation’ are charged high premium rates
(United States Government, FEMA 2008)
Role of
communities
The program is not mandatory, and participating communities enter into an agreement to
enforce the flood management ordinance which include measures to reduce risk for new
developments in the area (United States Government, FEMA 2008, Keys 2011)
Within the first seven years of inception, almost every community around the US which
experienced flood risk joined the NFIP (United States Government, FEMA 2008)
Market failure
and
consequences
The market distortion created by government intervention resulted in financial failure of
the program, created by borrowing from public funds. A market-driven system would have
resulted in higher premium rates and lower coverage following major events such as
hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Cummins 2006)
There are several reasons for lack of financial viability, including highly discounted
premiums for old buildings, inability of subsidised rates to cover losses, lack of
enforcement (40% of hurricane Katrina victims with mortgages not covered), moral hazard
creating a lack of incentive to mitigate, expectation of disaster relief funds resulting in
insurance not being taken out, repetitive loss payments, lack of oversight for frontline
companies and outdated maps not giving sufficient information on risk (Lewis &
Nickerson 1989, Skees 2001, Cummins et al. 2002, Kriesel & Landry 2004, Cummins
2006, Bagstad et al. 2007, King 2009)
Insurance is not able to function as an instrument that signals risk, thereby creating moral
hazard propagating the growth of settlement in risk-prone areas (Crichton 2008)
Market
solution
Following hurricane Katrina, reforms have been underway, with revision of maps and
designation of areas are under risk, review of the percentage of the flood losses to be
insured and the amount of insurance to be purchased for risky properties, and evaluation of
levees (King 2009)
Current
system
The current system still does not comprehensively cover coastal inundation, while the need
for increased private sector involvement and other reforms of the program are required
(Cummins 2006, King 2009). Coastal properties in non-participating communities are not
eligible for flood insurance. In participating communities, coverage is available for
subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or similar body of water as a result of erosion
or undermining caused by waves or currents of water exceeding anticipated cyclical levels
that result in a flood (US Government, FEMA 2012)-174-
Properties  certified  as  high-risk  are  those  located  in  a  100-year  ARI  flood  area,
delineated  through  flood insurance  maps.  Subsidised  flood  insurance  is  made
available to home-owners through a network of private insurance companies, called
Write-Your-Own companies. Within the first seven years of inception, almost every
community around the US which experienced flood risk joined the NFIP. Currently
the scheme covers about five million properties which are risk rated based on ten
different criteria with the majority of policy holders located in Texas and Florida
(United  States  Government,  Federal  Emergency  Management  Agency  2008,  Keys
2011).
The ability of property owners to purchase insurance at a lower rate to cover their
losses implies that property owners no longer have an incentive to carry out mitigation
(Bagstad et al. 2007). Furthermore, the expectation of compensation and repetitive
loss payments from insurance has resulted in increased development in risky areas
(Lewis & Nickerson 1989, Skees 2001). An example of this is the case of a coastal
development in Mississippi, where hurricane Camille of 1969 destroyed the Richelieu
apartment complex, and a shopping centre was built in its place. This, in turn, was
destroyed  by  hurricane  Katrina  and  plans  are  now  in  place  for  a  condominium
development (Wharton Risk Centre 2005).
The subsidised rates were not sufficient to cover the losses from Katrina which cost
the program a loss of around US$ 20 billion, double the losses it had paid up to that
time,  resulting  in  the  programme  going  bankrupt. Compensation  or  subsidised
insurance  from  the  government  results  in  the  loss  of  the  ability of  insurance  to
function as a monetary instrument that signals risk, thereby creating moral hazard and-175-
propagating the growth of settlement in risk-prone areas (Crichton 2008). The NFIP is
currently  kept  afloat  by  US  treasury  funds  (Bagstad  et  al.  2007, United  States
Government, FEMA 2008).
Various options  for  reforming  the  NFIP have  been  proposed, including increased
private sector involvement. Areas subject to coastal storm-surge inundation and other
similar risk-prone areas must be covered more comprehensively (Cummins 2006).
There is no compensation in the NFIP for beachfront property that is consumed by
erosion (Kriesel & Landry 2004).
Recently, there have been several important improvements of the NFIP. Coastal high
hazard  areas, called  ‘V  zones’
7 are  covered  subject  to  various  conditions.  For
example, the ability of a building to withstand wave action is taken into account in the
actuarial formula used to calculate the level of premium for buildings constructed or
substantially improved after 1st October 1981 (FEMA 2011). Flood insurance may
not be available for buildings and/or contents for properties located in areas protected
by coastal barriers (FEMA 2012). The highest sample premium (US$ 5,903) listed on
FEMA’s website is for a coastal area, high-risk residence and contents insured for the
full available coverage with a US$ 2,000 deductible. Properties subject to repetitive
losses are required to carry out mitigation measures or pay higher premium rates.
7 V  zones’ pertain to areas  with  primary  frontal  dunes  and  areas  along  coasts  subject to
inundation by 100-year ARI areas also subject to additional hazards associated with storm-
induced waves.-176-
6.5. Natural disaster insurance in Australia
This chapter has discussed the merits and challenges innate to flood insurance in other
developed countries. The review so far has been carried out to garner various lessons
from these approaches, and to determine how insurance can be applied to cyclonic
storm-surge inundation risk in northern Australia.
Insurance for natural hazards, covering risk from earthquakes and storms, has been
available in Australia since the earliest times of the European settlement. This was
provided mainly by major UK insurers, with underwriting rules derived from their
parent offices in Britain. Devastation caused by natural disasters, mainly floods, has
resulted in a series of major investigations and discussion between the government,
private  insurers  and  the  public  over  the last  forty  years.  Highlights  of  these  are
presented in Table 6-8. As evident from the table, the focus of these has been on flood
risk, with little attention paid to cyclone risk, including storm-surge inundation.
Currently, insurance is not mandatory for natural disaster risk (Latham et al. 2011).
Therefore,  when  there  is  a  major  natural  disaster,  damages  are  funded  through  a
system  of  private  insurance,  with  unpredictable  support  from  the  government  and
public donations (Latham et al. 2010). When government support is provided, this is
sourced from various state and territory governments through the Natural Disaster
Relief  and  Recovery  Arrangements,  which  comprises  of  partial  reimbursement  to
states if recovery costs exceed a particular threshold (Latham et al. 2010).-177-
Table 6-8 Evolution of policy on natural disaster insurance in Australia, 1970s to 2000
Early 1970s Building and contents insurance in Australia did not cover flood risk. Lack of information
on high risk areas and absence of mitigation measures, were the primary reasons for this.
The insurance industry at this time, was of the view that floods, earthquakes and associated
natural hazards were uninsurable
1974 The January 1974 Brisbane floods resulted in a widespread community backlash against
the insurance industry. The devastation caused by cyclone Tracy in Darwin, in December
that year, further increased pressure on the government to act. As a result of this, a
proposal was made to the Commonwealth government to establish a fund for natural
disasters
1976-1979 This was followed by an investigation and series of discussions between the insurance
industry and the government. Possible options discussed at these negotiations included
insurers providing cover for nominated hazards such as earthquakes, floods, tropical
cyclones and related hazards such as landslides and storm surge. Premiums were to be set
annually and differentiated on a broad zonal basis in terms of the perceived risk. The
government would provide reinsurance at a reasonable rate. Public interest in the issue
waned over this period and  memory  of earlier events receded , with no further disasters
and the devastation
1979 The Howard Liberal National Party government rejected the 1974 proposal based on
budgetary, technical and financial grounds. Furthermore, the prevailing political ideology
at the time opposed government intervention in areas considered better left to the private
sector. A positive factor surfacing  however, was the increased use of scientific and
technical information by the insurance industry, and their greater involvement in the field
of natural disaster management
1980-1983 A hands-off approach by the government and insurers excluded from insurance cover for
riverine flooding and coastal inundation
1984 -1996 With the establishment of the Commonwealth Insurance Contracts Act in 1984, under the
Hawke Labour Government, legislation was developed for insurance contracts, but a great
deal of debate occurred over what constituted a ‘flood’. There was a succession of flood
related events over this period, which created public backlash against insurers
1996 - 1998 The significant damages resulting from the Coffs Harbour flood of 1996 and the
Wollongong flood of 1998 resulted in renewed public debate on the issue as a result of
adverse publicity of the insurance industry, which failed to cover these costs (Lui &
Andrews 2009). The Woollongong floods of 1998, for instance, resulted in rallies outside
the headquarters of major insurance companies, requiring government intervention, and
forcing ex-gratia payments in some cases. This again brought to the table the possibility of
the government taking responsibility for uninsurable risks, i.e. floods with an ARI of 20-
years or less. Domestic building and contents coverage was extended to cover a portion of
riverine flood damage
1999 -2004 The Australian government continued to take a hands-off approach to natural disaster
insurance, leaving the market to the private sector
2004 Following an investigation into natural disaster resilience in Australia carried out by the
COAG, two key reccommendations were made to provide insurance cover for natural
disasters (COAG 2004). These were laid out in a report entitled ‘Natural disasters in
Australia: Reforming mitigation, releif and recovery arrangements. All hazards arising
from natural disasters were to be covered for residential properties and businesses, at fair
and competitive premiums, insurers provided with new access to information by the
government, with special data needs to be addressed collectively by the industry.
None of these were, however, implemented. The possibility of adopting the US model in
Australia was also discussed, but dismissed following bankruptcy of the NFIP resulting
from  hurricane Katrina in 2005
2011 A major Natural Disaster Insurance Review was carried out at a national level following
the 2011 Queensland floods and cyclone disasters
Sources: Except where indicated, this table is based on Latham et al. (2010), Leigh et al. (2010) and Walker et al. (2009).-178-
In the last couple of years, Australia has experienced a number of costly major natural
disasters, with significant losses both to insurers and the government (Table 6-9).
Costs for 2011 are expected to surpass AU$ 4.35 billion without counting losses from
the  Christmas  day  storms  in  Melbourne  (Insurance  Council  of  Australia  2011a).
Stimulated by the major losses resulting from these events and increasing advocacy
for the use of public natural disaster insurance scheme as a primary tool to finance
post-disaster recovery, a Natural Disaster Insurance Review (NDIR) was undertaken
by the Commonwealth government in 2011.
Table 6-9 Natural disaster statistics for major events in Australia in 2009-2011
Event Date Location Cost AU$
(million)
Average claim
cost AU$
VIC Christmas day storms Dec 2011 Metropolitan Melbourne 614 -
Margaret River bushfires Nov 2011 Margaret River, WA 53 -
VIC severe storms Feb 2011 Melbourne & suburbs 415 7,708
Perth bushfires Feb 2011 Perth & surrounds 35 -
Cyclone Yasi Feb 2011 Queensland 1,330 15,959
QLD flooding Jan 2011 Toowoomba, Queensland 2,380 45,374
VIC flooding Jan 2011 Victoria 122 7,708
West QLD flooding Mar 2010 Queensland 47 -
Perth storm Mar 2010 Perth 1,053 7,757
Melbourne storm Mar 2010 Victoria 1,044 -
Toodyay bushfires Dec 2009 Toodyay, WA 7 -
NSW & QLD inundation &
storm
May 2009 South-east Queensland &
northern New South
Wales
48 -
NSW flooding Apr 2009 Northern New South
Wales
37 -
Victorian fires Feb 2009 Victoria 1,070 107,000
Queensland floods Feb 2009 Far north Queensland 19 -
Source:  Insurance Council of Australia (2012).
A key concern has been the high number of properties damaged by the Queensland
flood and cyclone disasters, which were uninsured or underinsured for flood damages;-179-
about 15 % insurance claims were denied due to flood exclusions in home insurance
policies (Burningham 2011, Australian Government, Treasury 2011d). To cover these
costs, the Commonwealth was forced to impose a nationwide flood levy over 2011-
2012,  raising  around  AU$  1.8  billion,  (amounting  to  around  32%  of  its  total
contribution to fund the reconstruction process). The remaining AU$ 3.8 billion was
funded  through  cuts  in  other  public  programs  (Australian  Government,  Treasury
2011a).
High premium rates are considered to be one of the primary reasons for the low take-
up of insurance in Australia. Recent statistics show that, despite Australia’s insurance
sector representing 1.5% of the global market, insurance penetration is poor compared
to  other  OECD  countries  (Insurance  Council  of  Australia  2008).  Around  52%
residential  properties  do  not  have  contents  insurance,  23%  have  no  building  or
contents insurance, 25% of rental properties do not have building insurance, and as
much as 81% of households in Australia are underinsured by 10% or more, in terms
of their rebuilding costs (Australian Securities & Investment Commission 2005).
Premiums in Australia are currently calculated based on the level of risk exposure
(Lui  &  Andrews  2009,  Institute  of  Actuaries  of  Australia  2011). Table  6-10
demonstrates the high cost of premiums for natural disaster risk in Australia based on
recent building insurance quotes for bushfire, flood and cyclonic risk. As can be seen
from the table, rates charged for cyclone risk are substantially higher than other types
of risks. While the quote was for Cairns, in north-east Australia, similar rates can be
expected for northern WA. Others indicate that the premium of a strata property in
cyclone-prone areas can range from AU$ 2,000 to as high as AU$ 5,000 (Lui &-180-
Andrews 2009, Allianz Australia Insurance 2011).
Table 6-10 Examples of building insurance quotes from major insurers according to various
categories of risk, location and property details
Key risk Location Property details Insurance quotes (AU$ per annum)
Quote 1 Quote 2 Quote 3
Bushfire
(backs onto
bushland)
Warrimoo, Blue
Mountains
Single storey 3
B/R* brick and tile
591 537 429
Engadine, Sydney Two storey 3B/R,
brick and tile
1,356 875 686
Bushfire
and flood
Bonnet Bay, Sydney
(Woronora River)
Single storey 4 B/R
brick and tile
1,585 1,101 934
Flood Georges Hall, Sydney
(adjacent to Georges
River)
Single storey 3 B/R,
brick and tile
1,048 700 674
Cyclone Manoora, Cairns Single storey 3 B/R
fibro and tin
4,097 2,966 2,126
* B/R is bedroom
Source:  Quotes are based on a survey carried out by Ajilon (2011).
Insurers also face financial stress due to high reinsurance rates. Australia’s inclusion
with  earthquake-prone  countries  in  the  Oceania/Asia  group,  has  forced  insures  to
reinsure  at  higher  rates.  This  raises  the  question  as  to  whether  there  should  be  a
federal  agency  that  is  delegated  with  the  formal  responsibility  of  stepping  in  as
insurer-of-last-resort, while taking direct action in regulating where states and local
councils  locate  new settlement.  This  could,  however,  create  conflicts  over  the
constitutional powers of federal government.
National Disaster Insurance Review
The  main  focus  of  the  NDIR  was  on  flood  insurance,  with  some  references  to
cyclones and other types of disasters. An outcome of the review was an issues paper
that proposed three main options for insurance (Table 6-11). The first pertained to-181-
continuing  the  current status-quo,  with  no  government  intervention.  The  second
option  comprised  of  automatic  flood  cover  provided as  a  standard,  under  home
building insurance cover. The third option provided automatic flood cover with the
possibility of opting out. The main anticipated disadvantage associated with automatic
flood cover approaches (opt-in and opt-out), would be high premiums charged for
properties subject to high-risk of flooding. This would require the identification of
these  properties,  and  the  provision  of  some  form  of  financial  assistance,  such  as
discounted premiums.
Table 6-11 Proposed approaches for flood insurance in Australia
Approaches & key features Advantages Disadvantages
Status quo
Insurers remain free to offer full, partial or nil
flood cover for home insurance and homeowners
are free to decide whether or not to include flood
cover in their home insurance policies
No intervention required Low take-up of flood
insurance
Automatic flood cover
Flood cover to be provided automatically as part
of home insurance, just as it provides cover
automatically for bushfire and storm and at the
same level for every insured home
All disputes on the source
of water damage eliminated
and greater take-up of
insurance
High premium rates for
high risk properties
Automatic flood cover with opt-out
Flood cover provided automatically but property
owners are able to ’opt out’ and have home
insurance that includes cover for other causes of
damage but not flood
Greater take-up of
insurance than under status-
quo
High premium rates for
high risk properties
Source: Australian Government, Treasury (2011d).
The NDIR also proposed the establishment of a flood insurance pool, comprised of a
mutual  with  insurers  as  participants,  was  proposed  as  a  means  of  funding  these
discounts.  Sources  of  funding  would  be  through  the  Commonwealth  and  state
government and insurers, which would be ultimately be met by taxpayers. The only
recommendations made with regard to cyclone risks, were for fairer pricing and the-182-
need for further investigations into providing discounted premium rates (Australian
Government, Treasury 2011d).
6.6. Cyclonic storm-surge inundation insurance in Australia
Despite a great deal of consultation carried out under the NDIR with regard to riverine
flood risk, the current position of the Australian government with regard to cyclonic
risk is to allow the market to evolve to a point of being able to cover cyclonic storm-
surge inundation risk. There are, however, various concerns associated with such an
approach. As discussed in the previous section, the availability of flood insurance
cover in Australia has progressed from a situation of virtual non-existence, to the
current situation where most Australians can access insurance. It has, however, taken
almost four decades for insurance cover for riverine flood risk, which was previously
considered too complex and risky to insure, to reach this point. Currently, insurers
such as the Suncorp Group, GIO (Government Insurance Office) and TIO (Territory
Insurance  Office)  provide  cover  for  riverine  flood  risk,  while    NRMA  (National
Roads & Motorists’ Association) and AAMI (Australian Associated Motor Insurers)
continue to exclude cover (Table 6-12).
Others such as Allianz Australia Insurance hope to extend cover in New South Wales
soon (Allianz Australia Insurance 2011). Despite these positive developments there is,
however, evidence to suggest that prohibitive prices for flood insurance will result in
many residential properties continuing to underinsure or not insure (Whittle et al.
2009).-183-
Table 6-12 Examples  of  major  insurance  providers  in  Australia  by  geographical  area  and
provision of riverine and storm-surge cover
Insurer Geographical
area
Riverine
flood
Cyclonic
storm-
surge
inundation
Remarks
Suncorp
Group
All Yes No Automatic  flood  cover provided  for  flood
damage, and other water related disasters such as
storms  and  flash  flooding,  rising  rivers,  canals,
creeks and dams, rainwater run-off and pooling
over normally dry land, storm and flood damage
to gates and fences (Suncorp n.d.)
GIO NSW, ACT,
VIC, WA &
NT
Yes No Automatic  cover  for  loss  or  damage  caused  by
rain,  wind,  storm  and  flood,  including  flash
floods, storms, and rising rivers (GIO n.d.a,b)
TIO NT Yes Yes Also provides disaster cover, with a 30% increase
in sum insured to account for the rise in building
costs  in  line  with  demand  following  major
devastation.
NRMA NSW, ACT &
TAS
No No -
AAMI All No No -
Sources: Institute of Actuaries of Australia (2008), Whittle et al. (2009), GIO (n.d.a,b), Suncorp (n.d.a, b, c), TIO
(n.d), NRMA, (n.d,a, b).
Under  the  current  situation,  insurers  can  opt  to  provide  cyclonic  storm-surge
inundation cover either as standard, or as an option at the insurer’s discretion, or not
cover this category of risk at all (Whittle et al. 2009). While TIO,  a  government
subsidised insurer, operating in the Northern Territory of Australia offers cover for
cyclonic storm-surge inundation (CHU Underwriters Agency 2011), others commonly
exclude this risk from their policies (CHU Underwriters Agency 2011, Latham et al.
2011,  Leigh  et  al.  2010).  This  arises  from  concerns  that  the  financial  impact  on
insurers  of  such  catastrophic  losses  can  be  very  large  and  result  in  their  failure
(Whittle et al. 2009). A recent study showed, for example, that the total costs of
cyclone damage in Australia between 1971-2006, which was on average AU$ 260
million  per  annum,  was  substantially  higher  than  costs  of  flooding  (Australian
Building Codes Board 2010).-184-
Failures in the current approach
Potential  failures  on  the  demand  side  of  the  current  market-based  approach  to
cyclonic storm-surge inundation insurance in Australia are summarised in Table 6-13.
Table 6-13 Summary  of  market  failures  on  the  demand  side  associated  with  the status-quo
provision of cyclonic storm-surge inundation and flood insurance in Australia
Issues Description
Information
asymmetry
Following the Queensland floods complaints were made by property owners about
their lack of knowledge that they were in a flood zone and the possibility of risk of
damage associated with flood. This was made worse by varying terminology and
conditions of coverage.
There was also lack of awareness on flood cover in building insurance policies, with
added confusion on the definition of flood versus storm damage, with no market
standard vocabulary  (Whittle et al. 2009, Financial Ombudsman Service 2011)
A great deal of controversy was created as a result of many property owners not
being covered for the Queensland floods (Insurance Council of Australia 2011b)
Property owners are required to determine the value of the property to be insured.
This can result in incorrect estimation of the value to be insured and underinsurance.
Premium rates are increased each year causing property owners to maintain
minimum payments to reduce costs.
Rebuilding costs increase significantly after a disaster and payouts are not sufficient
to cover these, partly because of the failure to capture  inflation rates into the cost of
rebuilding.
Cognitive bias The “hierarchy of denial”, where people perceive  that an event will not happen to
them, but to someone else, . If it happens to them, they  tend to think it will not be
too bad, thereby downplaying the threat. Finally, they are of the view that if an event
does affect them badly, there will be nothing they can do about it anyway (Latham et
al. 2011)
Anti-selection Property owners with lower risk will not insure, leading to a smaller insurance pool
and lower cross-subsidy, resulting in higher premium rates (Whittle et al. 2009,
Latham et al. 2011)
Moral hazard The expectation of government compensation, as was the case in Queensland with
the Premier’s fund providing for disaster relief, results in people not purchasing
insurance due to an acquired sense of entitlement?. Government compensation
functions as a form of free insurance, driving up premium rates for those choosing to
insure (CHU underwriters agency 2011, Latham et al. 2011)
Inequity To cover high-risk areas, there will have to be cross-subsidisation by other policy-
holders
Unfair on equity grounds (Leigh et al. 2010, Allianz Australia Insurance 2011)
A small number of risks carrying a high percentage of the expected loss. Very few
property owners will insure on the basis of the additional costs required (Insurance
Australia Group 2005, Whittle et al. 2009, CHU underwriters 2011).
Sources: Compiled mainly from submissions made under the Natural Disaster Insurance Review in 2011, in relation to any kind
of flood insurance scheme in Australia, including cyclonic storm-surge inundation.-185-
As can be seen in the above table, demand-side failures arise from issue such as
information asymmetry, cognitive bias, moral hazard and inequity arising from low-
risk policy holders subsidising those with higher risk. The more successful global
solutions for natural disaster insurance have required some government support. Even
the UK, where insurance is covered by the private sector, it operates within policies
and guidelines provided by the government.
There are also various  supply-side  failures resulting from the current approach to
cyclonic storm-surge inundation insurance in Australia (Table 6-14). These include
financial failures, operational inefficiencies and information asymmetries between the
insurers  and  the  insured.  Financial  failures  can  mainly  occur  following  major
disasters, such as cyclone Yasi which affected Queensland in 2011, where the extent
of  the  losses  may  cause  insurers  to  either  withdraw  from  the  market,  or  increase
premium rates exponentially. This can, in turn, affect demand, resulting in higher
rates of underinsurance or noninsurance in cyclone-prone areas of northern Australia.
This will compel the government to step in as insurer-of-last-resort.-186-
Table 6-14 Summary of market failures on the supply side associated status-quo provision of
cyclonic storm-surge inundation and flood insurance in Australia
Issues Description and examples
Financial
failures
High risk areas may have such high premiums to render the purchase of insurance
unaffordable. Underinsurance can result when, following major catastrophes; demand for
reconstruction increases costs more significantly  than anticipated at the time the policy
was taken out. Market failure can result in locations where insurers are unable to provide
cover because of the extent of risk exposure and uncertain impacts. (Latham et al. 2011)
Transaction costs involved in operating and providing insurance can raise premium rates.
(CHU Underwriters Agency 2011)
Punitive pricing of premiums and red-zoning of high risk areas (increasing risks north of
the 22̊ S parallel) are indicative of worsening problems of non-insurance and exit of
insurers from the market (Ajilon 2011)
Government taxes currently raise premium rates by as much as 45% for home and
contents insurance in Australia (Insurance Council of Australia 2008). An econometric
study on the price elasticity of home and contents insurance premiums in New South
Wales showed that the removal of premium taxes would result in an additional 150,000
households taking up home and contents insurance (Tooth 2007)
Inefficiencies Delays and non-payment can result. For example, there were many complaints on the
delays in insurance payouts following cyclone Yasi. Insurers were accused of using delay
tactics, and duplicating and losing assessments. Other delays were created through
inconsistent assessments and disagreement on the scope of work between assessors and
builders. Some were able to follow up and get their claims settled faster, while older and
vulnerable people were unable to do so. The delays led to the additional damage as a result
of exposure to the elements and people living in sub-standard conditions. As a result of
these problems, people expressed the view that they would not insure in the future, as
those who were uninsured received help faster (Australian Red Cross 2011)
Insurance payouts not covering rebuilding costs as the surge in demand for rebuilding
following a major natural disaster results in higher costs of building materials.
Following major natural disasters, building costs rise as a result of higher demand. Often
insurance payouts fail to cover these increased costs. This was the case with cyclone Yasi,
after which people were not being able to afford the cost of rebuilding. In some cases,
insurers offered to replace only half the roof or floor, and people were unable to meet the
rest of the cost. This situation was made worse by insurers requiring that people  use
preferred builders, resulting  in individuals being unable to look for cheaper options
(Australian Red Cross 2011)
Information
failures
Concerns have been raised by property owners with regards to the deterrence of
consumers wishing to lodge a claim, poor practices with regard to the collection and use
of technical evidence,  as well as lay evidence such as eye witness accounts. Other
problems include delays in processing claims that are ultimately refused, and lack of
proper reasons for the refusal of claims (Consumer Action Law Centre 2011)
Sources: Compiled mainly from submissions made under the Natural Disaster Insurance Review in 2011, in relation to any kind
of flood insurance scheme in Australia, including cyclonic storm-surge inundation.
6.7. Proposed approach for cyclonic storm-surge inundation insurance
The  market  failures  inherent  in  the  current  approach  to  cyclonic  storm-surge
inundation insurance  in  Australia,  provides  scope  for  alternative  solutions.  A-187-
cooperative approach between Commonwealth and State Governments and the private
sector is proposed (Table 6-15).
Table 6-15 Synopsis of the proposed approach for cyclonic storm-surge inundation insurance
Key factors Description
Time-phased
subsidised
insurance for
high-risk
properties
Government would fund time-limited subsidies for existing properties located in high-
risk areas for cyclonic storm-surge inundation
For properties located in areas subject to high-risk of inundation insurance would be
compulsory. Other areas could be provided with a default option, with the possibility
of opting out
Cyclone storm-surge inundation risk insurance would be offered as a part of standard
building and property insurance cover
New
developments not
subsidised
To prevent the use of insurance as a safety net, where subsidised insurance could drive
more development in inundation-prone areas, it is proposed that property in new
developments will not be subsidised
Local council
disincentives
Local council could be penalised by requiring that they provide insurance cover if they
proceed with high risk developments
Government fund
for subsidy and
reinsurance
The Commonwealth government would maintain a fund that would be used to finance
the time-phased subsidy and reinsurance
Mitigation Insurance would be provided concomitant with mitigation, carried out at local, state
and national level.  Subsidised insurance would be phased out concomitant with
improved protection provided through mitigation
Risk information A risk repository on high risk properties and other relevant information would be
maintained at federal level, in cooperation with other tiers of government
Regulation Mandatory disclosure of location of high risk properties at the time of sale would be
required, with associated changes in federal and state legislation
The  proposed  approach essentially  comprises  of  a  hybrid  of  the  US  and  UK
approaches, with elements derived from Treasury recommendations for the provision
of riverine flood insurance in Australia. For locales such as Exmouth, the main aim of
this  approach  is  to  internalise  the social  costs  of  property  purchase  decisions  in
cyclonic inundation-prone areas into the private costs of the property owners. Using
insurance as a means for internalising risk is supported on the basis of equity grounds
(Australian Centre for Financial Studies 2011).-188-
Phased subsidy for high-risk properties
One  of  the  reasons  given  for  low  availability  of  insurance  in  cyclonic  regions  in
Australia  is  limited  affordability  (Lui  &  Andrews  2009,  Whittle  et  al.  2009).
Following  the  example  of  the  US,  and  the Australian  flood  insurance  scheme
described  under  the  NDIR,  it  is  proposed  that  the  government  would  fund  time-
limited  subsidies  for  existing  properties  in  high-risk  areas.  Such  a  scheme  could
provide an incentive for property owners in high-risk areas to insure, which would, in
turn,  reduce  the  burden  on  the  government  following  a  major  disaster  (Financial
Ombudsman  Service  2011,  Whittle  et  al.  2011).  The  provision  of  discounts  for
various  weather-related  disasters  such  as  cyclones  in  Australia  has  the  support  of
various entities (e.g. Insurance Australia Group 2005, Insurance Council of Australia
2008, Whittle  et  al.  2009,  Australian  Government,  Treasury  2011d,  Australian
Bankers Association 2011). It is important, however, to keep in mind the various
problems associated with the provision of subsidised premium rates (Table 6-16).
Underinsurance or non-insurance arising from the assumption of a lower level of risk
by  the  property  owner,  moral  hazard  by  the  property  owner  and  the  government,
premiums set at higher than actuarially fair rates and inequities created as a result of
cross-subsidies are the key issues. It is important to note, however, that under the
current arrangements in Australia, society as a whole subsidises those living in high
risk areas implicitly through government compensation derived from tax revenue or
donations.-189-
Table 6-16 Anticipated issues associated with the provision of a government subsidy for cyclonic
storm-surge inundation insurance in Australia
Issues Description
Underinsurance or
non-insurance
If a subsidy is provided, the property owner can assume a lower level of risk
exposure, resulting in less cover (Smith 1968). Such a pattern has been observed
with flood insurance under the NFIP in the US, where low coverage of flood
insurance has been attributed to the discount on premium rates (Kunreuther 2006)
Encourage moral
hazard on the part of
property owners
Property owners can have more information on their actual level of risk than
insurers and this can result, for example, in failure to carry out mitigation measures
and increased risk-taking behaviour (Lui & Andrews 2009, Australian Bankers
Association 2011,  Australian Centre for Financial Studies 2011, Institute of
Actuaries of Australia 2011)
Higher premiums send a signal to potential property buyers about the level of risk,
while a subsidy can mask the extent of risk exposure (Allianz Australia Insurance
2011, Australian Centre for Financial Studies 2011)
Subsidisation of insurance for high risk properties will increase their market value,
thereby resulting in arbitrary increases in wealth of these individuals (Australian
Centre for Financial Studies 2011)
Create moral hazard
on the part of the
government
Increased risk-taking behaviour on the part of local councils and developers by
dampening the effect of building in high risk areas and high cost of damage
(Bagstad et al. 2007, Institute of Actuaries of Australia 2011)
Subsidies to areas facing high risk can drive new development, and reduce
investment in other means of mitigation through the enforcement of more resilient
land-use planning, building standards, and protection of natural environmental
disaster mitigating services (Latham et al. 2010, Australian Bankers Association
2011, Institute of Actuaries of Australia 2011)
Insurance cannot be considered to be a substitute for poor land-use planning
decisions (Floodplain Management Association 2011)
Subsidised insurance will result in further inadequacies in planning, standards and
mitigation strategies (Australian Bankers Association 2011)
Insurers charge higher
premium rates
Subsidised cover may provide incentive for insurers to charge higher rates than the
level of risk exposure for high-risk properties, and limit the provision of
competitive rates as property owners do not bear the full cost of the premium
(Consumer Action Law Centre 2011)
Inequities created by
cross-subsidisation by
other policy-holders
Inequities from the cross-subsidisation of those with high risk by those with low
risk (Allianz Australia Insurance 2011, Australian Bankers Association 2011)
The use of a subsidy for insurance, which can create higher take-up of insurance, will
mean that at least some element of the social costs created will be borne by those
living in risk-prone areas, which will represent at least a second-best improvement
8 in
8 The theory of second-best in economics pertains to opting for the next best solution in
situations  where  strict  theoretical  measures  intending  to  increase  the  overall  economic
efficiency may actually decrease it (Lipsey & Lancaster 1956). In such situations, it may be-190-
the current situation. A final recommendation of the NDIR for flood insurance in
Australia reflects such a second-best approach. Here, the government has chosen to
intervene through the provision of reinsurance and a short-term subsidy for high-risk
properties.
To overcome these problems, this thesis proposes that various conditions are built into
the provision of cyclonic inundation insurance in Australia. Premium rates would be
tiered based on risk, so that even with a subsidy, those living in high-risk areas would
pay more. Subsidies would be phased out over a 15-year period, during which time
mitigation  would  be  carried  out  by  the  government  and  property  owners.  Other
means, such as compulsory cover, providing a time limit on the length of time over
which a subsidy would be provided, complementary mitigation measures, limiting
subsidies  to  only  existing  developments  and  disincentives  for  local  councils are
described in the following sections. It is important to note here, that implementing this
would  require  extensive  cooperation  between  the  Commonwealth  and  state
governments and possible amendments in existing legislation.
Compulsory insurance for high-risk properties
For high-risk areas, such as the marina area in Exmouth, it is proposed that insurance
would be compulsory, while properties in other parts of the townsite could opt-out.
For  northern,  cyclone-prone  coastal  areas  of  Australia,  cyclonic  storm-surge
inundation insurance would be offered as a part of standard insurance cover as the
necessary for the government to intervene in ways that are contrary to preferred policy.-191-
default option. This is based on evidence from behavioural economics that shows that
individuals tend to be biased towards default options (Australian Centre for Financial
Studies 2011). There are two possible approaches to the demarcation of high-risk. In
relation to flood-risk, Keys (2011) recommends that the 100-year ARI is used as the
first pass filter for developments, with additional assessments for other levels of risk.
Cyclonic  storm-surge  inundation  prone  areas,  such  as  Exmouth,  could  demarcate
high-risk, as areas as those located within 5 m elevation above the mean sea level.
This would indicate risk from a Yasi-like cyclonic storm-surge.
The requirement of compulsory insurance can also be considered as a second-best
option. In relation to flood risk, compulsory insurance was opposed because it was
considered important that property owners retain choice on the purchase of insurance,
or use some other form of mitigation (Abacus Australian Mutuals 2011, Australian
Bankers Association 2011). Concerns were also expressed about possible withdrawal
of insurers from the market and consequent reduction in the extent of available cover,
or  increase  in  premium  rates  (Abacus  Australian  Mutuals  2011,  Allianz  Australia
Insurance 2011, Australian Bankers Association 2011).
These points are valid, and compulsory insurance, is therefore, proposed only for the
short-term. Further, it will be required only for high-risk properties and phased out
over time. As mitigation measures are set in place, greater autonomy will also be
provided to property owners in high risk areas, with efforts focused on improving
awareness and understanding of risk. There may be, however, government failures, as
with the British flood insurance system, where mitigation may not be implemented.
Under  such  a  situation,  the  subsidy  and  compulsory  requirement  may  have  to  be-192-
extended,  and  further  negotiations  and  discussions  carried  out.  Over  time,  it  is
expected that property owners will become fully responsible for their risk, and be able
to fully understand the importance of undertaking insurance and mitigation measures
to  reduce  their  risk.  A  similar  approach  has  been  suggested  for  riverine  flood
insurance  in  Australia  (Abacus  Australian  Mutuals  2011,  Australian  Bankers
Association 2011).
Insurance would also be compulsory for mortgaged properties, to prevent problems of
non-payment following major cyclones. Such a system could require borrowers to
provide lenders with a certificate of insurance each year. This will provide savings for
the government, which is often required to step in as insurer of last resort in situations
where mortgaged properties are damaged through cyclones (Mortimer et al. 2011).
There may be problems associated with the higher transaction costs associated with
this  requirement,  which  convert  to  higher  premium  rates  (Australian  Bankers
Association 2011, Consumer Action Law Centre 2011, Financial Ombudsman Service
2011). This issue can be overcome by setting in place a minimum requirement that
lenders  send  annual  reminders  to  property  owners,  thereby  shifting  some  of  the
liability of not keeping up insurance. Another possibility is for lenders to take up
insurance and pass this on as part of the mortgage rates to property owners (Abacus
Australian Mutuals 2011, Australian Bankers Association 2011).
No subsidy for new developments
The  proposed  approach  must  ensure  that  there  must  be  no  incentive  for  future-193-
development  in  high  risk  areas. The  US  NFIP  is  the  classic  example of  a  failed,
publicly-subsidised, natural disaster insurance program, and Australia must take into
account lessons learnt from this experience. Insurance, ideally should not act as a
safety net, encouraging people to continue living in highly risk-prone areas. Instead, it
should function as an instrument to avoid costly disasters. Therefore, a subsidy must
not be offered to new developments constructed after legislation for insurance has
gone through.  By refusing cover in risky areas, insurers can transfer risk back to
individuals who choose to live in such areas. In the event of natural disasters, such
actions can provide savings for the government and society in the long term.
Local council disincentives for high-risk development
Another  important  condition  built  into  the  proposed  approach  would  be  to  avoid
government failure resulting from local councils promoting development in high risk
areas  with the expectation rehabilitation costs resulting from cyclonic  storm-surge
would  be  borne  through  insurance.  This  was  a  key  issue  raised  under  the  NDIR,
where the pressure on local councils by developers could be averted by creating a
financial  disincentive  for  local  councils  (Australian  Bankers  Association  2011,
Allianz Australia Insurance 2011). This could be in the form of the requirement that
local councils use council rate revenue to subsidise insurance premiums in high risk
areas based on their responsibility for creating the problem in the first place. These
pertain  to  those  approved  after  legislation  for  cyclonic  storm-surge  inundation
insurance is finalised. Under such a system, state and local government will be made
more accountable for allowing development in high risk areas.-194-
Arguably, local councils are, however, already financially constrained and in many
situations  the  development  currently  in  place  has  been  inherited  from  a  line  of
successive governments (Australian Local Government Association 2011, Brisbane
City Council 2011). This is why it is proposed that this approach is set in place for
future developments to act as a deterrent for developments in high-risk areas, such as
the Exmouth marina. This will also take away reliance on external sources of recovery
funding  from  taxpayers,  especially  in  areas  where  there  has  already  been
inappropriate land-use planning (Australian Bankers Association 2011).
Government fund for subsidy and reinsurance
Under the proposed approach, discounts for high-risk properties would be provided by
the Commonwealth government sponsored reinsurance pool as an interim solution,
over  a  period  of  15  years,  until  mitigation  measures  are  implemented.  This
recommendation follows the model used for reinsurance for acts of terrorism, under
the Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation. This pool was established following the
9/11  attacks  on  the  world  trade  centre  in  the  US,  in  response  to  withdrawal  of
international reinsurers from the market (Whittle et al. 2009, Latham et al. 2011).
Under this scheme, frontline insurance is provided through the private sector, with
reinsurance by the government for losses greater than AU$ 100 million (Australian
Government, Treasury 2006). The proposed fund could also be used to finance other
activities to mitigate cyclonic inundation risk (Table 6-17).-195-
Table 6-17 Other potential activities that could be financed through the proposed government
fund for cyclonic inundation insurance
Activity Details
Public liability or
professional
indemnity for states in
Australia that are not
currently covered
Current legislation in Australia requires public liability/professional indemnity
cover for all councils in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and
Victoria. Even in these states, the level of indemnity among councils is variable. It
is only in NSW, where there are legal measures overtly in place to prevent local
councils being liable for costs associated with coastal disaster risk. Affordable
cover is provided through state-wide mutual liability schemes, with replacement
payments ranging from AU$ 50-400 million for each occurrence. However, there
is no such requirement in the Northern Territory, Tasmania or Western Australia.
The government fund, at Commonwealth level, covering the subsidy for high-risk
areas, could be extended to cover insurance for public infrastructure in these states
Insurance cover for
roads and bridges for
local councils
While councils have adequate insurance arrangements for buildings and other
property, they do not, as a rule, insure roads and bridges. Consequently this type of
insurance is not available in the market
There are, however, high costs associated with damage to this type of
infrastructure. The Queensland flooding resulted in damage to 90,000 km of roads
(60% of the entire road network managed by local councils) (Australian Local
Government Association 2011)
A fund that covers public infrastructure would be important in cyclone-prone areas
in northern Australia. Often, premium rates in these areas are high, thereby
requiring external assistance
Used for grants or
loans to carry out
betterment restoration
of damaged
infrastructure
‘Betterment’ restoration pertains to the construction of more disaster-resilient
public infrastructure in the future. It will not only comprise of materials that are
cyclone-proof, but also incorporate more efficient design, such as road networks
being laid out in a way that makes it possible to evacuate people in shorter time
frames.
Such support would be tied in with regulations excluding certain kinds of
development such as hospitals, schools, childcare centres and aged care and
nursing facilities in high-risk areas. This can avoid high costs and effort required
for emergency rescue as was the case with aged care facilities in New South
Wales, which were built in high risk areas and required a specialist emergency
rescue mission following major floods (Keys 2011)
Information on risk This pool can also provide financial incentives for risk mapping and mitigation
actions, as was proposed for flood insurance by the Institute of Actuaries of
Australia ( 2011)
This condition has its pragmatic merits, in that the experience of the private sector in
the frontline is used to avoid the risks involved, as opposed to creating a whole new
government  agency  to  gather  appropriate  skills  and  manage  a  public  disaster
insurance  system  for  the  country  (Latham  et  al.  2010).  Such  a  fund  should  have
legislative authority within a governance structure that is independent of the insurance
industry, and operate on a not-for-profit basis (Financial Ombudsman Service 2011).-196-
The approach suggested can harness the already established partnership between the
private  insurance  industry  and  government,  created  through  the  successive  flood
insurance discussions over the last four decades. Such an arrangement could result in
a less complicated and less expensive outcome, and resolve concerns expressed about
the establishment of such a fund (Australian Bankers Association 2011). Furthermore,
the existence of the arrangement for riverine flooding would imply that banks and
other financial institutions are already aligned with the process.
Mitigation
An  important  aspect  of  addressing  the  economic  failures  of  any  type  of  natural
disaster insurance is through various forms of risk mitigation. In Europe, the stable
pattern of mitigation for some decades has created enabling conditions for natural
disaster  insurance  (Floodplain  Management  Association  2011).  The  US  and  UK
experiences also demonstrate that insurance fails when mitigation is not carried out. In
Australia, the importance of mitigation, as compared to the ‘quick fix’ of emergency
response  is  exemplified  by  the  experiences  of  NSW  and  Queensland.  Increased
mitigation  was  successful  in  reducing  emergency  management  costs  in  NSW.
However, Queensland failed to mitigate, resulting in higher costs (Keys 2011). In
NDIR discussions, several key bodies have highlighted the importance of mitigation
on the part of local councils and the need for more research into how this can be done
(Australian  Centre  for  Financial  Studies  2011,  Australian  Local  Government
Association 2011). Measures that could be used by the various entities involved are
presented in Table 6-18.-197-
Table 6-18 Key mitigation measures for cyclonic storm-surge inundation tied to insurance and
the role of various entities
Entities Description
Property owners Discounts on premiums tied in with mitigation by property owners (Kleindorfer &
Kunreuther 1997, Kunreuther 2006, Burningham 2011)
Commonwealth,
state
government,
local council
and other
government
agencies
All three levels of government carry out mitigation (Burningham 2011)
Curtailment of development in highly risk-prone areas in the future (Allianz Australia
Insurance 2011)
Enforcement of building standards, which can be more expensive, but cheaper than
rebuilding (Keys 2011)
Information on mitigation provided at street level (Ajilon 2011)
State Emergency Services and flood management agencies involved in development
approvals around floodplains, like that of the  rural fire services in Australia who provide
expertise to local council when building permits are provided in fire-prone areas (Keys
2011)
Insurers Can refuse to insure buildings that do not meet standards
Mitigation encouraged through premium reductions or lower deductibles so property
owners have lower total payments. Property owners have a strong preference for
deductibles, but premium discounts can also stimulate mitigation (Michel-Kerjan &
Kousky 2008, Botzen et al. 2009a,b)
Lenders Building inspections  tied in with mortgages (Kunreuther 2006)
Lenders such as banks and other financial institutions responsible for certificates of
approval for buildings that meet standards, such as those specified in the natural hazards
and disaster policy for buildings located in areas subject to storm-surge in WA, based on
a similar proposal for the US by (Kunreuther 2006)
Certifications tied in with incentives such as reductions in mortgage interest rates
The provision of residential mortgages can be coupled with home improvement loans
aimed at the construction of flood risk mitigation measures on the property (Kleindorfer
& Kunreuther 1999, Kunreuther 2006). This will be especially useful for those with
budget constraints who are unable to afford upfront costs of mitigation. This can, in turn,
reduce the cost of post-disaster assistance as often low income households are those who
need it most
Developers New developments need to include risk mitigation measures such as setbacks from the
coastline, allowing natural features such as sand-dunes and coastal vegetation to act as
physical buffers against storm-surge and waves.
While mitigation cannot be carried out from revenue obtained through council rates
(Brisbane City Council 2011), local government cannot, however, secede from all
responsibility  for  mitigation  of  high  risk  areas.  A  concern  is  that  insurance  may
become a substitute for poor land-use planning (Floodplain Management Association
2011).-198-
There is a ladder of adaptation options available for application, including planned
retreat, accommodation, soft protection and hard defences (Nueman et al. 2000). In
the case of coastal properties, there will be situations where, due to sea-level rise, and
increased risk of cyclonic storm-surge inundation through climate change, the most
economically viable option would be for the Commonwealth or state government to
buy  back  property.  Such  an  approach  has  been  taken,  for  example,  by  the  New
Zealand government following the Christchurch earthquake in 2011 with thousands of
homes on land too unstable for rebuilding to be bought back (Australian Broadcasting
Cooperation 2011). The Australian Floodplain Management Association (2011) has
proposed a similar approach for areas of the floodplain where development should not
occur.
The local government and insurers would also work with communities, such as those
in  Exmouth,  to  make  their  properties  more  resilient  to  cyclonic  storm-surge
inundation,  through  for  example  elevated  floor  levels  and  storm-proof  building
materials. Insurers, in turn, would provide various incentives to promote mitigation
such as subsidised premiums concomitant with mitigation and remediation works by
the local council, strata owners and developers, who will be also responsible to meet
building standards (Consumer Action Law Centre 2011). This will benefit the insurers
in the long-run, who could expect lower payouts.
It is important to note  here that any  mitigation activity  involving hard structures,
while they benefit property owners, may result in perverse outcomes. For example,
sea walls, functioning as a physical buffer against storm-waves may divert waves
elsewhere,  with  adverse  consequences.  Planners  must  take  all  these  factors  into-199-
consideration in the implementation of such risk mitigation works in coastal real-
estate.
Risk information
One of the key market failures in the provision of natural disaster insurance is in
relation to the provision and access to information about risk, whose aim would be to
address problems in insurance created by information asymmetry. Therefore, a key
aspect of the proposed approach is a central information repository. The partial public
good element in the creation of such information suggests that the Commonwealth
government coordinates this effort (Australian Centre for Financial Studies 2011). A
federal  agency,  such  as  Emergency  Management  Australia  (FM  Global  2011)  or
Geoscience Australia, which is supported by insurers could be designated with this
authority.
The importance of a central risk information repository was highlighted in the NDIR
discussions  (Ajilon  2011,  Allianz  Australia  Insurance  2011,  Australian  Local
Government Association 2011, FM Global 2011). In the provision of insurance cover
for  cyclonic  storm-surge  inundation,  one  of  the  key  aspects  to  be  considered  is
pricing.  This  requires  information  on  the  depth  of  inundation  at  various  return
intervals, combined with the damage curve, to derive a schedule of the expected costs
that will emerge from cyclonic storm-surge. There can be opposition on the part of
local councils, developers and insurers to the public availability of such information.
Local councils could be concerned that poor development decisions will be exposed-200-
with the possibility of legal liability. There may  also be  fears about the potential
impact on property values, criticism of various methodological approaches used for
local risk analysis and the additional costs that may be required to fund mitigation
works  (Australian  Local  Government  Association  2011,  FM  Global  2011).
Developers, real-estate interests and councillors may oppose flood education and talk
down the threat and insurers may fear moral hazard with property owners having
more information on their actual risk level (Keys 2011, Lui & Andrews 2009).
The  various  benefits  associated  with  the  public  provision  of  risk  information,
however, can outweigh these negatives. Availability of information on extent of risk
can increase coverage in areas that insurers are hesitant to enter into. For example,
Allianz Australia  Insurance (2011) will provide cover only to NSW based on the
inadequate quality of data on flood risk in other states. It has also been pointed out
that current disaster data is not sufficiently leveraged. This issue is exacerbated by
inconsistent capabilities within state and local councils across geographical areas and
natural disaster types, which in turn, reduces the efficacy of mitigation, response and
rehabilitation (Ajilon 2011).
Another anticipated benefit would be that the public provision of such information
would  make  individual  property  owners  more  responsible  for  the  risk  they  are
exposed to, requiring them to be more proactive in measures they take to protect
themselves  (Insurance  Council  of  Australia  2008,  Latham  et  al.  2010).  Ongoing
education will have to be provided, however, because as the years pass, people forget
about the destruction caused by major events (Keys 2011). Key types of information
to be provided to the various entities involved, including property owners, insurers,-201-
local  council  and  commonwealth  and  state  disaster  managers,  under  the  approach
proposed in this thesis is presented in Table 6-19.
Table 6-19 Types  of  risk  information  on  cyclonic  storm-surge  inundation  required  by  the
various entities
Entities Types of information
Property
owner
Disclosure to property owners on their extent of exposure to cyclonic storm-surge inundation
risk to support decisions to insure and mitigate risk (FM Global 2011, Abacus Australian
Mutuals 2011, Allianz Australia Insurance 2011). Amendments in legislation at
commonwealth and state level to create new regulations on property risk disclosure
Insurer Risk information for insurers so that premiums can be priced to reflect the actual level of risk
exposure and differentiate between high and low risk properties. This can result in more
affordable premiums (Lui & Andrews 2009, CHU Underwriters agency 2011)
Insurers require information on location of properties in relation to risk, their ARI, severity,
as usually measured by depth of cyclonic storm-surge inundation, and the potential for an
area to be affected by multiple events in a short time, or multiple areas to be affected to be
able to cover coastal inundation or riverine flood risk. Previously, insurers failed to provide
flood insurance based on the lack of sufficient information (Leigh et al. 2010)
Improvement of available information on demographic data for address-based pricing of
flood risks is considered to be one of the main aims of the Insurance Council of Australia’s
National Flood Information Database (Lui & Andrews 2009)
The Australian Local Government Association (2011) has expressed the view that the
insurance industry must contribute financially in the provision of information on risk
Local council Data on level of risk exposure at property level is required at all tiers of government  for
future planning and management (Burningham 2011)
Information on level of risk of properties provided  at the point of sale (Australian Bankers
Association 2011)
Consistent, plain English definition of terms and conditions used in insurance (Abacus
Australian Mutuals 2011, Allianz Australia Insurance 2011)
Information provided at state, regional and local geographical level (Ajilon 2011)
Disaster
managers
There is a great deal of inconsistency in the way risk information is used by local councils in
land-use planning and the establishment of new development. This should be addressed
through the implementation of a single national standard for flood mapping in Australia. It
can serve to eliminate controversy with regard to issues such as the frequency of events,
assumptions made in carrying out studies, and the minimum information required. It could
be coordinated by a federal agency, funded by Emergency Management of Australia,
supported by insurers (FM Global 2011). Disaster managers may operate at national, state or
local level
Risk maps must be prepared by independent experts (Australian Bankers Association 2011)
Insurers are also dependent on property valuers to provide information on environmental
risks (Abacus Australian Mutuals 2011)
In the establishment of a central repository, inconsistencies in the way assessments are
carried out, and the way risk information is used in land-use planning, must also be-202-
addressed. In the case of flood-risk under the NDIR, it was suggested that a single
national  standard  is  used  for  flood  mapping  in  Australia,  which would  serve  to
eliminate controversy such as the frequency of events to be used, assumptions used in
carrying out studies, and provide a guideline on the minimum level of information
require (FM Global 2011). For risk-prone coastal areas such as Exmouth, in northern
Australia, such a standard can similarly be used for cyclonic storm-surge inundation
risk assessment and mapping.
The central repository could be linked with the National Flood Information Database
(NFID) maintained by the  Insurance Council Australia. This database contains all
available  government  flood  mapping  based  on  data  obtained  from  Digital  Terrain
Models, but does not include information on specialist hydrological or hydraulic flow
modelling. At the time of release, the initial database consisted of information on
around 1.4 million addresses in NSW, Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania. Other
areas were not covered because of issues surrounding the validity of the data (Leigh et
al. 2010).
By amalgamating the NFID with the central repository proposed in this thesis, risk on
cyclonic storm-surge inundation can also be made available to insurers and can be
provided through geo-referenced address data linked to street address resolution. This
could  include  information  on  risk  under  various  storm-surge  heights.  It  can  be
integrated with local council information on property risk, and insurers will be able to
base prices with reference to mitigation available on each property and other risk
factors such as elevation (Ajilon 2011). Other key considerations to be accounted for
under the proposed approach are summarised in Table 6-20.-203-
Table 6-20 Other factors to be considered under the proposed approach for cyclonic inundation
insurance
Key factors Description
Uncertainties
associated with
climate change
Estimates are that insurance payouts for catastrophic climatic events will reach as much
as AU$ 1 trillion by 2040 (Mills 2009). While moderate increases in risk and premiums
do not affect demand for flood insurance significantly, large increases in risk from
climate change can cause premiums to rise to a level where the market will collapse
(Botzen et al. 2009b)
Insurers will have to factor into their rates the more long-term risks, in addition to other
strategies such as tighter contract wording, strengthening of reserves and review of
reinsurance strategies (Tripolitano et al. 2007, Insurance Council of Australia 2008,
McKenzie 2008)
Changes in weather patterns as a result of climate change can also hinder the realistic
assessment of cyclonic risk. Insurers have relied on historical weather data to estimate
premium rates. Coastal planning guidelines, building codes and standards, and storm-
water mitigation and drainage systems are based on historical information on extreme
events and sea-levels (Insurance Council of Australia 2008)
Community attitudes to natural disaster risk are based on previous exposure, among
other factors which, in turn, guides employment, lifestyle and industry. For example,
with the Queensland flooding, people were caught out because they had never
experienced flooding before, while others had last been affected during the 1974
Brisbane floods.
Income-based
subsidies
Subsidies may also be required for those living on welfare benefits or those living in
public or social housing, young people, single people, and people from ethnic minority
and migrant backgrounds living in rental properties who are unable to afford cover
(Financial Ombudsman Service 2011). Following the UK example, an ‘insurance with
rent’ scheme, or Centrelink deductions could be used to cover the cost of building and
contents insurance (Whittle et al. 2009, Brotherhood of St Laurence 2011)
Contents cover can also be provided, where loss of assets such as furniture would
significantly create or increase health problems and social exclusion (Consumer Action
Law Centre 2011). It is noted that subsidies must be targeted to premiums and not
claims and be designed only for low-income earners (Australian Bankers Association
2011)
6.8. Implementation challenges and the political economy of government
The  proposed  approach  requires  extensive  coordination  between Commonwealth,
state, local government, as well as private insurers. The implementation of this policy,
must therefore take cognizance of the existing relationship between these entities, and
some key concepts described under the paradigm of political economic theory can
provide a lens by which greater understanding of these can be obtained. It must be
noted here, however, that the political  economy of  government and the insurance-204-
industry can cover a broad range of areas, and an extensive analysis of this is beyond
the  scope  of  this  thesis.  The  aim  is,  rather,  to  highlight  some  key  issues  for
consideration, in the implementation of the proposed approach, to provide a basis for
more in-depth analysis.
The political economy of government
Under the theory of fiscal federalism, responsibility for the management of public
goods  must  be  allocated  within  government, with  the  aim  of  achieving  the  most
efficient  economic  outcome  (Oates  1972).  This  is  a  partial  view  of  the  problem,
however, and political participation and the protection of basic liberties and freedom
must also be considered (Inman & Rubinfeld 1997, Dollery et al. 2003).
Economies of scale and scope, gained by a reduction in per capita costs of providing a
public  good,  may  outweigh  efficiency  gains  from  decentralization,  which  is
considered the means by which efficiency can be achieved under the theory of fiscal
federalism. Also,  there  may  be  varying  levels  of  comparative  advantage  and
opportunities for forming partnerships with other organizations among different tiers
of government (Dollery et al. 2003). Dollery et al. (2006) highlight the principle of
‘subsidiarity’, which states that public responsibilities should be given to the “smallest
organizational unit possible” (p.43).
Government does not always act in a way that enhances social welfare (Tanzi &
Schuknecht 2000), but in extreme cases may ‘[embody] the interests of those who
inhabit the halls of power or those with whom they collude’ (Breton & Wintrobe 1982-205-
p.10). Such a situation is said to be a ‘government failure’, in that it is not possible to
expect that the government will always act with the best interests of its citizens. In
reality, the model of government is most often located somewhere along the spectrum
of these extremes.
One form of government failure, described in Dollery & Wilson (2001), comes from
economic rent-seeking
9, where citizens aim to maximise wealth by using government
intervention to create economic rents for themselves. Here, Commonwealth, state or
local government, in allocating property rights for public goods, can be influenced by
individuals, groups or organizations who aim to obtain control over resources and the
advantages gained from owning these resources. Land, considered to be an inelastic
factor of production, is very often subject to rent-seeking behaviour.
Institutional arrangements of government in Australia
Given that the proposed insurance approach requires extensive coordination between
the  Commonwealth,  state  and  local  government,  understanding  the  existing
institutional setup, and identifying sources of both opportunity and conflict among
these various tiers of government, can provide some guidance as to for the best means
of implementation of the proposed approach.
Australia has a system of federal government, with the Commonwealth at the highest
9The term economic rent, refers to prices of goods or services that are excessive to their
normal levels (Tollison 1982), and are often associated with exclusivity, such as a patent or
special kind of skill. In economic theory, economic rent is defined in terms of the opportunity
cost,  where  the  income  earned  from  a  commodity  is  above  the  payment  received  if  the
resource was used in an alternative employment (Dollery & Wallis 2001).-206-
level with certain legislative powers. The remaining responsibilities are allocated to
each of the six states and two territories, who govern the local government bodies
within their jurisdiction. Each state has its own constitution and legislation on the
operation, functions and level of accountability of local councils (National Office of
Local Government 2003). The High Court of Australia arbitrates on disputes on the
legal functions arising between the Commonwealth and state governments, or among
the states. The states oversee the activities of local government, whose main role is to
‘provide service to property’ (Dollery et al. 2006).
There  are 562 local governing bodies in Australia as a result of highly  dispersed
communities spread across the country (Australian  Local Government  Association
2010). Local  councils  are  also  highly  diverse, differing  in  spatial  and  functional
jurisdiction, ability to raise revenue and demographics of the population they serve
(Dollery et al. 2006).
Physical services provided by local councils do not extend beyond the boundaries of
their municipality. Local government traditionally provided services related to ‘roads,
rates and rubbish’ (Dollery et al. 2006, p. 13). In the recent years, however, these have
extended to other functions such as zoning, building and health standards, welfare,
drainage  and  local  economic  development.  State  government  has  taken  over  the
administration of several municipal services such as electricity, gas, transport, water
and sewerage services. This was with a view to improving efficiencies of scale, as the
state  government  was  considered  more  able  to  deliver  such  services  across
overlapping  council  boundaries (Ohlin  1992,  Australian Local Government
Association 1993, Dollery et al. 2006).-207-
Local councils in Australia are highly limited in their ability to raise revenue, and this
is partly due to their limited constitutional recognition (McNeil 1997, Dollery et al.
2006). Despite its low revenue earning capacity and limited constitutional capacity,
local government plays a key role in the Australian federal system of government and
makes a significant contribution to the economy (Dollery et al. 2006). In the fiscal
year 2007/2008, the local government sector earned a total revenue of over AU$ 27
billion, with around 37.4% of it income derived from taxes, 29.6% from sale of goods
and services, 8.9% from grants and subsidies, 3.1% from interest, and 21.1% from all
other  sources (Australian  Government, Department  of  Infrastructure,  Transport,
Regional Development and Local Government 2010).
There  are  various  areas  of  conflict  between  local, state  and  Commonwealth
government. Increased expectation of service delivery to communities could cause
additional stress on the already financially constrained local councils (Dollery et al.
2006). The important role of local government in terms of the significant economic
contribution and range of services indicates that new policy must factor this into its
design. There  has  also  been  conflict  between  the  Commonwealth  and  the  state
governments on the function of local councils. Attempts made by the Commonwealth
to provide a higher level of autonomy to local government have failed because of state
opposition (Dollery et al. 2006).
In proposing new policy, it is important to keep in mind the existing institutional
context and conflicts between the various tiers of government in Australia. Diversity
in local councils, including those located in coastal areas, will require a more tailored
approach to fit their individual needs and capacity. Conflicts between the state and-208-
local  councils  over constitutional  power  and  revenue  earning  capacity  can  create
further tension. Existing tensions between the Commonwealth and the state on the
role  of  local  government  will  require  thoughtful  negotiation, cooperation and
compromise between these tiers of government.
Political economic considerations under the proposed insurance approach
According to the theory of fiscal federalism, responsibilities within government must
be allocated to attain the most efficient outcome. Allocation of responsibility must
also take into consideration economies of scale, with the lowest cost per capita. Roles
in  the  implementation  of  the insurance approach  proposed  under  this  thesis  are
presented in Table 6-19.
Table 6-21 Allocation  of  responsibilities to  entities for  the  proposed insurance approach for
cyclonic storm-surge inundation
Entity Responsibilities
Private insurers Provision of frontline insurance at local level
Local councils Local scale mitigation
Providing information on local risk to higher tiers of government
State Mitigation across municipal boundaries
Coordinating information on risk across the state
Legislation and regulation at state and local level
Commonwealth Establishment of a federal funding pool for reinsurance
Subsidy for high risk properties coordinated through insurers
Subsidy for low-income households and insurance-with-rent scheme coordinated through
Centrelink
Information repository
Changes in legislation and regulation at national level
Private insurers and Commonwealth, state and local government are the key entities
involved in the proposed insurance approach. Allocation of responsibilities cannot-209-
only consider economic efficiency, but must give consideration to broader political
and institutional considerations (Dollery  & Wilson 2001). The possibility  of local
council collecting insurance premiums with council rates was considered under the
proposed  approach.  Collection  and  billing  costs  will,  however,  burden  local
government, who are already resource constrained.
Existing tensions with regard to this issue between the local and state government
may be exacerbated by this additional requirement. While providing local councils
with  an  annual  administrative  payment  to  cover  these  additional  costs  may  be  a
possible solution, this may increase transaction costs, which can, in turn, raise the
price of the premiums. The more economically efficient approach, therefore, will be
for private insurers to be the sole entity responsible for providing frontline services to
coastal property owners.
Mitigation activities, however, will have to be carried through all tiers of government
and the type of activity will have to consider economies of scale. Those which are
specific to local jurisdictions will be under the purview of local government. The role
of the state, however, will be in the provision of engineering and planning expertise,
and equipment, which may not be available at local level. For mitigation activities that
cut across local municipalities, the state will be in a better position to undertake or
provide oversight of these activities.
Information, another partial public good, will require extensive cooperation across all
tiers of government. Information on risk can be a sensitive issue, and local councils
may be reluctant to provide other tiers of government information that may reveal-210-
poor planning decisions. Therefore, changes in legislation at federal level may be
required to provide indemnity for local councils in relation to existing developments.
The proposed information  repository will, however,  be  best  managed  by  the
Commonwealth,  which is in a position  to  ensure  that  uniform  standards  on  risk
assessments and mapping are used across Australia. A Commonwealth agency, such
as  Geoscience  Australia, will  also  be  in  the  best  position  to  partner  with  other
agencies involved in collecting information on risk, such as the Insurance Council of
Australia.
Again,  the  management  of  the  reinsurance  pool  will  be  best  coordinated  by  the
Commonwealth government. Federal government has a better comparative advantage
with regards to negotiating various international reinsurance agreements than private
insurers, and this will enable better diversification of risk across other categories of
insurance (e.g., motor vehicles, medical), and financial markets, thereby optimizing
comparative advantage and economies of scale.
In the implementation of the proposed insurance approach, special interest and lobby
groups from within the various tiers and sectors of the government may oppose the
move. Property developers could be another significant group, where opposition could
be based on concerns about decreased property value as a result of the insurance
scheme,  as  well  as  loss of profits if land  with  high  coastal  amenity is no  longer
available for development.
The  lengthy  discussions  between  the  government  and  the  insurance  industry  in
Australia,  spanning  across  several  decades, with  no  clear  policy outcome,  and-211-
international experience with various models of private and public insurance, show
that implementing any new policy will have its challenges. It may not be possible to
fully meet the best interests of all levels of government, private insurers, property
owners  and  other  interested  parties.  The  experience  of  the  Queensland  flooding,
precipitating  the  NDIR  and  the possibility  of  negotiation,  compromise  and
cooperation with regard to flood insurance suggests, however, that the same can be
achieved  with  regard  to  cyclonic storm-surge inundation  insurance  for  northern
coastal  areas  of  Australia.  It  is  hoped,  however, that  it  will  not  require  a  major
catastrophe  like  the  Queensland  floods,  to  catalyse  action  by  the  Australian
government.
6.9. Conclusions
Development in areas at high risk translates to the high costs of disaster recovery and
rehabilitation. Often these costs are passed on to the rest of society, as was evident
with the Queensland flooding in 2011. This chapter has explored how natural disaster
insurance can be potentially used to internalise the monetary cost of risk for property
owners living in areas prone to cyclonic storm-surge inundation, in northern parts of
Australia. It  explored  the  underlying  principles  of  natural  disaster  insurance and
international experience as a basis for the design of a proposed approach for insurance
for cyclonic storm-surge inundation in Australia.
The proposed model comprises of the private sector providing cyclonic storm-surge
inundation insurance cover  under  home  and  contents  policies,  with time-phased
subsidies  on  premium  rates  provided for  high  risk  properties through  an-212-
intergovernmental  fund  between  the  Commonwealth  and  state government. The
subsidy for high-risk areas would be phased out over time, with the implementation of
mitigation  measures  during  this  period. Insurers  would  also  have  access  to
government reinsurance. Insurance would be provided concomitant with mitigation
and risk information would be publicly available through a central risk repository.
Future developments would not be subsidised, and disincentives for future residential
properties in areas highly prone to inundation could be implemented in the form of a
financial penalty on the local council for allowing risk-prone development. Various
political economic issues could impede the implementation of the proposed approach,
but there are also ways in which intergovernmental partnerships and a cooperative
approach could harness the opportunities and advantages provided.
Disaster insurance for cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk can only internalise the
social costs of disaster risk on the part of property owners. Disincentives for local
councils for new developments in high risk areas address, to an extent, the market
failure created through inappropriate land-use planning. Insurance cannot, however,
correct the externalities created by private developers, from whom the pressure to
build close to the ocean often originates, based on the high-value of such properties.
Furthermore, it does not account for the loss of natural disaster-mitigating ecosystem
services resulting from such developments, as is the case with the Exmouth marina.
This highlights the need for other economic instruments to address these failures,
which are explored in the next chapter.-213-
Chapter 7: The role of environmental economic instruments for the
management of cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk
7.1. Introduction
To fund the AU$ 5.3 billion cost of rebuilding affected parts of Queensland following
the flood and cyclone disaster in 2011, the Commonwealth government implemented
a temporary nationwide flood levy, aimed at raising around AU$ 1.8 billion of the
total costs (Australian Government, Treasury 2011a). The rest of the funding was
sourced through cuts in public environmental and infrastructure programs. The high
costs of recovering from the Queensland floods resulted in a great deal of discussion
among various economic and financial experts and organisations on sources of natural
disaster financing over the long-term in Australia. Recommendations included using
unspent  and  uncommitted  funds  from  the  Building  the  Education  Revolution,
redirection  of  funds  from  the  National  Broadband  Network,  reprioritising  other
spending  initiatives,  such  as  the  First  Home  Owner’s  Grant  and  extending  the
deadline imposed by the government in terms of achieving budget surplus. These are,
however, only temporary measures which cannot provide finance for natural disaster
recovery in Australia over the long-term.
These  discussions  failed,  however,  to  address  questions  about  sources  of  market
failure related to land-use and planning in risk-prone areas. In chapters four and five
of this thesis, it was found that coastal amenity  is a key factor that drives town--214-
planning  and  coastal  property  purchase  at  Exmouth.  Disaster  risk  is  insufficiently
factored into these elements. Natural disaster insurance, explored in chapter six, fails
to fully internalise the social costs of coastal land development in risk-prone locations.
The fact that the flood levy failed to address the market failure created on the part of
property developers building in risk-prone areas was also overlooked. Furthermore,
imposition of this tax as a nation-wide levy meant that the social costs created by the
decisions of a few to live in risk-prone areas, was not internalised into the private
costs of these property owners. Instead, these costs were spread across Australian
society.
To address these issues, this chapter examines the use of environmental economic
instruments as potential policy measures for mitigating risk in new coastal property
developments. Environmental  policy  for  coastal  disaster  risk  can  be  carried  out
through various means, including the application of legal mandates and regulation,
cooperative  institutions  and  sharing  of  information,  and  economic  instruments
(Hanley  et  al.  2007). The pros  and  cons  of  the first two  policy  measures were
discussed in chapter two of this thesis. This chapter focuses on the third measure,
environmental economic instruments.
The primary objectives of this chapter are to:
1 Explore  the  underlying  principles  of a range  of  environmental  economic
instruments as a basis for the design of instruments for coastal disaster risk;
2 Examine the market failure in coastal property development at Exmouth, and-215-
the potential role of economic instruments in addressing this failure; and
3 Propose suitable environmental economic instruments for mitigating risk for
new developments in risk-prone areas such as Exmouth.
7.2. Environmental economic instruments
Environmental economic instruments are part of a spectrum of environmental policy
approaches, with command-and-control and regulatory measures on the one end, and
market-based approaches on the other (Hanley et al. 2007). An economic instrument
is distinguished from regulatory approaches in that it uses incentives or disincentives
that transform the economic attractiveness of various development actions. Economic
instruments cannot be used as the only solution to environmental problems, and must
complement other types of policy (Ring et al. 2010). Compared to other approaches,
their  cost-effectiveness,  private  sector  engagement,  and  their  explicit  statement  of
environmental value in economic terms are considered to be important advantages
over other approaches (Sandor et al. 2002, Parkhurst & Shogren 2003, Jenkins et al.
2004, Ring et al. 2010). Unlike regulatory approaches, economic instruments also
provide  regulators  with  information  on  the potential costs  of  environmental
management (Eigenraam et al. 2007, Ring et al. 2010, Wissel & Watzold 2010).
There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  international  recognition  of  the  important  role
economic instruments can play in solving environmental problems (Grieg-Gran 2000,
Jenkins et al. 2004, Commission of the European Communities 2007, Eigenraam et al.
2007, UNEP 2009). There is already a long tradition of the application of economic-216-
instruments to air and water pollution (e.g. Anderson et al. 1979, Sterner 2003), and
more  recently  to  biodiversity  and  climate  change  (OECD  1999,  Watzold  &
Schwerdtner 2005, Stern 2007). Major international agencies such as the Organisation
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Bank, and the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) are well-known for their empirical research
into the use of economic instruments.
Classification
There  are  two  main  types  of  environmental  economic  instruments,  based  on  two
economic theories aimed at correcting market failures. These comprise of financial
incentives,  mainly  from  the work  of Pigou  (1920,  1932), and market-creation
instruments  originating  from  the  work  of Coase  (1960). The  primary aim  of  a
financial  incentive  instrument  is  to  internalise externalities  resulting  from  market
failures (Stavins 2001). The design of a financial incentive is based on Pigouvian
principles of aligning private marginal costs with social marginal costs through the
“polluter pays principle”. This involves the creation of price for an environmental
service, where previously there was none, thereby compensating for the failure of the
market to respond to the scarcity of environmental attributes (Pearce & Barbier 2000).
They  were  popularized  by  the  OECD whose  persistent advocacy  and  early  work
focused on taxation (Pearce 2002). Market-creation instruments, on the other hand,
based  on  Coase  (1960),  aim  to correct  market  failures  through  the allocation  of
property  rights  to  environmental  commodities, which  then  allows the  market
mechanism to operate (Stavins 2001, Hanley et al. 2007). Examples of two types of-217-
environmental economic instruments are given in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1 Types of financial incentive and market-creation environmental economic instruments
Sub-types
Financial incentive instruments
Environmental user charges and taxes
(see section 7.3)
Payment for environmental services
Resource user charges
Municipal service charges
Transport charges
Product disposal charges
Effluent and ambient taxes
Input and product taxes
Taxes on land and natural resources
Taxes on hazardous materials
Natural disaster tax
Subsidies
(see section 7.4)
Environmental subsidies
Tax incentives
Rate rebates
Environmental bonds
(see section 7.5)
Environmental performance bonds
Land/ecosystem reclamation bonds
Wetland banking
Habitat banking
Environmental accident bonds
Hazardous waste transport bonds
Environmental compensation and offsets
(see section 7.6)
Biodiversity offsets
Mitigation offsets
Market-creation instruments
Tradable environmental permits
(see section 7.7)
Tradable development quotas
Tradable biodiversity permits
Tradable water shares
Tradable resource shares
Tradable catch quotas
Emission trading permits
Tradable flood permits
Deposit-refund systems
Other instruments
Special environmental funds
(see section 7.8)
Global environmental facility
Sources: Pearce and Barbier (2000), Stavins (2001).
For the purpose of this thesis, the two broader classes of environmental economic
instruments are used; financial incentives and market creation instruments based on-218-
the early definitions of Pigou (1920) and Coase (1960), are considered to be relevant
for the  management  of  coastal disaster  risk.  Sections  7.3-7.8 explore  several
instruments  in  more  detail,  focusing  on  their  potential  for  coastal  disaster  risk
mitigation in regional coastal townships such as Exmouth in Australia.
7.3. Environmental user charges and taxes
The aim of user charges are to charge users of environmental services a fee which is
used to finance its provision, requiring individuals to internalise costs of degradation
(Pearce & Barbier 2000, Stavins 2001). They apply to the use of natural resources
such as the land, water, minerals, as well as various environmental amenities, and
provide  a  signal  of  scarcity  thereby  communicating  the  economic  value  of  the
resource to those who benefit from these environmental services (Stavins 2001).
User charges were originally designed on the basis that while many countries already
applied charges to these resources, these did not reflect their full cost. In other cases,
such  as  with  natural  amenity,  they  were  designed  to  correct  the  price  of  these
resources that lead to their degradation as a result of insufficient funding to cover the
protection and maintenance of the integrity of this service (OECD 2001). There are
five main types of charges (Table 7-2).
Unlike  Pigouvian  taxes,  which  are  market  defined,  user  charges  are  not  gauged
through the assessment of the socially optimal levels of resource use or emissions,
determined  through  the  market,  but  through  the  administrative  determination  of
government agencies (Pearce & Barbier 2000). The level of a charge, however, is-219-
ideally meant to be commensurate with the corresponding impact resulting from the
use of that resource (Ekins 1999).
Table 7-2 Description and examples of the various types of user charges
Types Description Examples
Payment for
environmental
services
These comprise of user charges paid
to landowners for managing their land
to provide various environmental
services (Sanchirico & Siikamaki
2007)
In Costa Rica, the Pago por Servicios Ambientales
program involves contracts for forest conservation
between the government and private landholders.
These are required to protect forests for a certain
number of years (Fondo Nacional de
Financiamiento Forestal [FONAFIFO] 2000,
Pagiola, 2002, S´Anchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007)
Resource user
charges
These charges require that those who
directly benefit from the use of an
environmental resource such as
minerals, timber and recreation to
finance its provision (Stavins 2001).
In Australia, recreational user charges are imposed
on visitors to Fraser Island, Moreton Island and the
Great Barrier Reef (EEA/OECD 2011)
Municipal
service charges
Require users of municipal
environmental services such as
potable water and waste disposal to
finance its provision (Stavins 2001)
“Pay-as-you-throw” policies where users pay in
proportion to the volume of their waste in the US
(US Environmental Protection Agency 2001)
Transport
charges
A charge aimed at containing traffic
congestion and for use in the
maintenance of highways and
waterways (Stavins 2001)
Fees for vehicle entry into the urban core in Oslo,
Bergen and Trondheim, Norway (Ekins 1999)
Product disposal
charges
A charge for disposing of
environmentally hazardous items
such as tyres, batteries and nuclear
waste (Stavins 2001).
Charges for the use of surplus fertiliser, beyond the
allocated amount in Belgium and the Netherlands.
These apply to transport, storage, and processing
(Speck 1998)
Sources: Compiled from the various sources given in the table.
Environmental taxes
An environmental tax, also known as a levy, is the most well-known of the various
types of financial incentives, whose aim is to correct the externality resulting from the
divergence between the marginal private cost and marginal social cost (Pigou 1920,
1932). They are similar to user charges in that they aim to internalise the costs of
degradation or protection of an environmental resource. They are different to user
charges in that they are based on Pigouvian principles. Five kinds of taxes that can be
used to address environmental problems are presented in Table 7-3.-220-
Table 7-3 Description and examples of the various types of environmental taxes
Types Description Examples
Effluent and
ambient taxes
Are levied on the discharge of each unit of pollutant
designed to reduce the quantity of pollution (Hanley et
al. 2007). They are aimed at changing behaviour by
creating financial disincentive to pollute. The charge or
the deposit is set at the marginal cost of the product
minus the real welfare costs of the operation of the
program (Stavins 2001)
Ozone protection and
synthetic greenhouse gas levy
in Australia (OECD/European
Environment Agency 2011)
Input and
product taxes
Are set on products or inputs considered to be causing
the problem, and aimed at encouraging the switch to
environmentally safer inputs or products (Hanley et al.
2007)
General fuel charge through a
surtax on oil excise duties in
the Netherlands to create a
general control on the
production process (Hanley et
al. 2007)
Taxes on land
and natural
resources
Taxes on land and other natural resources aim to
encourage or discourage development of new land
versus redevelopment of underutilized land, or provide
incentives or disincentives to restore, rehabilitate, or
improve existing structures and encourage more
sustainable resource use (Bagstad et al. 2007, Daley &
Farley 2004)
Environmental levy charged
on the Sunshine Coast, QLD
in lieu of environmental
improvements (Sunshine
Coast Council 2009)
Taxes on
hazardous
materials
In a relatively small number of countries, taxes are
levied on industries or groups to fund insurance pools
against potential environmental risks associated with
the production or use of taxed products. Such taxes can
have the effect of encouraging firms to internalize
environmental risks in their decision making, but, in
practice, these taxes have frequently not been targeted
at  risk-creating activities
Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund in Finland financed by
an oil import fee, to cover
spill preparedness, clean-up,
and damages (OECD 1997)
Flood levy Fund provision of emergency services in the event of a
disaster and costs of long-term rehabilitation and
recovery of damages caused by severe flooding
A flood levy was imposed in
Australia following QLD
floods and cyclone disaster in
early 2011 (Australian
Government, Treasury 2011a)
Emergency
Services Levy
Funding the operating cost of fire and emergency
services in WA
Fire and Emergency Services
(FESA) Levy (Western
Australian Government,
FESA n.d. b.c)
Sources: Compiled from the various sources given in the table.
A key advantage associated with an environmental tax is that it can be used  reduce
the  quantity  of  that  commodity  being  produced,  minimise  costs,  encourage  the
development  of  newer  and  more  efficient  technology  and  meet  non-economic
regulatory goals, such as compliance and administration and political viability (Pigou
1920, 1932, Baumol & Oates 1971, Fullerton & Metcalf 1998).
As  it  can  be  seen  in Table 7-3,  the  WA  FESA  emergency  services  levy  and-221-
nationwide  flood  levy  have  the  most relevance  to  coastal  disaster  risk mitigation.
These two instruments are explored in greater detail in the following sub-sections.
The  aim  is  to  examine  the  principles  used  in  their  design,  and  importantly,  the
institutional mechanism through which they are implemented.
Environmental taxes and user charges can be applied to natural disaster risk. The main
aim would be to internalise the social costs of coastal developers and property owners,
by  requiring  them  to  pay  for  various  environmental  and  other  disaster  mitigating
services.
Nationwide flood levy
To fund the cost of rebuilding, following the Queensland flood and cyclone disaster in
2011,  the  Commonwealth  government  implemented  a  temporary  nationwide  flood
levy,  aimed  at  raising around  AU$  1.8  billion  in  recovery  costs  (Australian
Government, Treasury 2011a). This was implemented in the form of a progressive tax
based on level of income (Table 7-4).
At the time of establishment of the flood levy, suggestions were made for establishing
a  natural  disaster  levy  or  natural  disaster  fund  as  a  permanent  component  of
Australian fiscal policy. Other leading economists and business groups opposed the
levy based on concerns on the management of the funds and effective oversight of
funds  raised  through  the  levy.  This  was  based  on  such  problems  with  other
Commonwealth  programs,  such  as,  for  example,  the  Home  Insulation  and  the
Building the Education Revolution programs, which were beset by cost over-runs and-222-
other administrative issues (Uren 2011).
Table 7-4 Percentage of income taxed under the temporary flood levy over the financial year
2011-2012
Annual taxable income in
2011/2012  (AU$) % of income Charges in AU$
0-50,000 and flood victims Exempt Nil
50,001-100,000 0.5% of taxable income in
excess of AU$50,000
Half a cent for each AU$ 1  income
over 50,000
>  100,000 0.5 % of taxable income in
excess of AU$ 50,000 and 1%
of taxable income in excess of
AU$ 100,000
AU$ 250 plus 1c for each $1 income
over AU$ 100,000
Source: Australian Government, Australian Taxation Office (2011).
The  argument  was  made  that  reprioritised  government  spending,  and  special
temporary  levies  should  be  implemented  as  a  last  resort  at  the time  of  a  disaster
(Chartered Practitioners of Australia 2011). A contention of this thesis is that the
flood-levy did not internalize the private costs of property owners and developers in
risk-prone areas. In the case of insurance, the market is considered to be actuarially
fair when insurers charge risk-adjusted premiums. By charging higher rates for those
properties  subject  to  higher  risk,  the  market  aims  to  not  only  discourage  new
development in hazard-prone areas, but also provide an equitable system where, those
who would sustain higher losses are not subsidized by those subject to lower risk. The
same  logic  can  be  applied  to  Australia’s  flood-levy,  which  did  not  discriminate
between  high  and  low  levels  of  risk  in  the  charges  imposed.  Based  on  these
arguments, it is possible to conclude that this  instrument will not be  an effective
measure to address coastal disaster risk in cyclone-prone areas of Australia.-223-
WA Emergency services levy
The lack of suitability of the flood levy to address the market failure in question requires
examination  of  other  possibilities  as a  means  of addressing  coastal  risk. This  section
examines the potential applicability of the emergency services levy (ESL), established in
2003 by the Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA) of Western Australia. It was
put in place to address failures in the previous system, such as the lack of transparency in
the way rates were calculated, and administrative complexities resulting from the use of
several  funding  systems  and  budget  deficits.  Further,  partial  funding  for  emergency
management in WA was dependent on the insurance industry, which in turn, raised funds
through a levy on home insurance premiums. This resulted in an inequitable situation,
with  not  everyone  who  had  access  to  emergency  services  contributing (Western
Australian Government, FESA n.d.b,c).
Rates under the emergency levy system are set to raise only the required level of
funding. It covers the FESA’s operating costs (running and maintenance of vehicles and
facilities, personal protective equipment, operational equipment and consumables), capital
equipment  (fire fighting  appliances,  vehicles,  road  rescue  trailers,  flood  boats  and
buildings),  training,  funding volunteer  State  Emergency  Service  units, fire
investigations, building inspections, community safety programs, emergency management
planning  and  administrative  costs. Current  services  cover  coastal  disasters  such  as
storms, cyclones, floods and tsunamis, in addition to other disasters.
The levy is administered through an agreement between the FESA, which is a WA
state government agency, and local councils around the state. Charges are included on
council rates notices issued by shire authorities. All of the fees collected by councils-224-
are sent to the FESA, who pays local governments an operating grant annually to
cover billing and collection costs. It also provides capital grants in the form of in-kind
contributions, such as emergency  equipment. Revenue from the levy  amounted to
around AU$ 234 million during the 2011/12, including AU$ 16 million for charges on
government  property.  Other  revenue  and Commonwealth  government  grants
amounted  to  around  AU$  34 million,  and  the total  FESA  budget  was  AU$  290
million. Rates  are  set  based  on  the  level  of  services  available  to  a property  and
location (Table 7-5).
Table 7-5 Types of services provided under each category used by the WA FESA Emergency
Services Levy
ESL
category Location Types of services provided
1 Perth metro fire district A network of career fire and rescue service stations,
plus the State Emergency Services
2 Regional cities (Albany, Bunbury,
Geraldton, Kalgoorlie-Boulder and
Mandurah)
A career fire station plus volunteer fire and rescue
service brigade and the State Emergency Services
3 Urban metro areas (periphery of the
metropolitan area)
A volunteer fire and rescue service brigade and/or bush
fire brigade supported by the network of career fire
stations in the metropolitan region and the State
Emergency Services
4 Country towns (90 regional towns,
including Exmouth)
Volunteer fire and rescue service brigade, or a
volunteer emergency service unit with breathing
apparatus, OR a bush fire brigade with breathing
apparatus, AND the state-wide state emergency
services network
5 Pastoral/ rural (all other areas of the
state)
Communities supported by the state wide State
Emergency Services network and generally a bush fire
brigade
Sources: Western Australian Government, Fire and Emergency Services (n.d.b,c).
Charges are calculated by multiplying the ESL rate specified under each category of
services by the Gross Rental Value (GRV) of the property (Table 7-6). Categories 1-4
are subject to minimum and maximum rates, based on property use (residential and
farming, versus commercial and industrial). This appears to be a  well-functioning
system,  which  indicates  a  high  potential  for  application  in  coastal  disaster  risk-225-
mitigation.
Table 7-6 ESL rates per gross rental value by category and minimum and maximum values
specified  for  residential,  farming,  commercial  and  industrial  property  for  the  financial  year
2011/12
ESL
category
Emergency Services Levy  Rates 2011/12 (AU$)
Residential, vacant land and
farming
Commercial, industrial and
miscellaneous
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
1 55 280 55 160,000
2 55 210 55 120,000
3 55 140 55 80,000
4 55 100 55 56,000
5 AU$ 55 per rate notice
Mining tenement AU$ 55 per rate notice
Sources: Western Australian Government, Fire and Emergency Services (n.d.a,b).
7.4. Environmental subsidies
An environmental subsidy uses the converse principles of a tax in its function (Pigou
1920, 1932, Fullerton 1997). Tax incentives and rate rebates can also be considered as
forms of environmental subsidies (Tietenberg 2006). While environmental taxes aim
to  increase  marginal  private  costs so  that  it aligns with  marginal  social  costs,
environmental subsidies aim to reward parties producing marginal social benefits, and
are usually provided in the form of a payment by a government to an individual or
business entity (Costanza 2001). In situations where the provision of public goods is
not socially optimal, if left to the market alone, subsidies can function as an effective
instrument in providing socially desirable quantities of the good (Tietenberg 2006).
There  are  two  forms  of  subsidies:  those  which  are  represented  directly  in  the
government in a monetary form and those which are off-budget, non-monetary forms,
such as stocks that are reflected in changes in assets and liabilities (van Beers & van-226-
Den  Bergh  2001). Various  types  of  subsidies  have  been  provided  to  encourage
environmentally  sustainable  behaviour.  In  the  US,  the  construction  of  municipal
treatment plants and soil conservation is subsidized; in France, loans are provided to
industry to control water pollution; and in the Netherlands,  financial  assistance is
provided  for  pollution  control  equipment  and  research  (Hanley  et  al.  2007).  In
Australia,  tax  reductions  are  provided  to  businesses  for  environmental  protection
activities, establishment costs for carbon sink forests and mining site rehabilitation
(EEA/OECD 2011).
Environmental subsidies and coastal disaster risk mitigation
The removal of subsidies that encourage development in risk-prone areas is another
economic strategy that can be used (Finegan 2000, Gaul & Wood 2000, Godschalk et
al. 2000). Termed as perverse subsidies, these create a divergence between social and
private costs, resulting in economically inefficient and damaging environmental and
social outcomes (Myers & Kent 1998).
For example, property tax breaks and infrastructure subsidies in Louisiana in the US,
implemented with the objective of stimulating economic and population growth in
sparsely populated areas, have been shown to encourage development in risk-prone
coastal areas (Costanza 2001, Bagstad et al. 2007). In other parts of the US, interest
and property tax deductions provided for second homes, which comprise of a large
proportion of new developments, have also driven development in flood-prone coastal
areas in the country (Bagstad et al. 2007).-227-
In relation to coastal land in Australia, there are two subsidies of relevance. The first
is the subsidy on the purchase of new homes (the First Home Owners Grant) (Costello
1998). Providing such a subsidy in areas prone to cyclonic storm-surge inundation
creates more incentive to develop real-estate in such areas. To overcome this problem,
a caveat can be built into to the First Home Buyers Grant, whereby this rebate is not
provided for properties located in risk-prone coastal areas.
Another type of indirect subsidy to property owners in Australia comes about as a
result  of  losses  from  negatively  geared  property  investment  being  currently  tax
deductible  against  income.  In  the  case  of  a  residential  property,  negative  gearing
occurs when the income from a rental property is less than the interest on the loan
taken  to  purchase  the  property.  However,  in  Australia,  it  is  possible  for  property
owners  to  deduct  negative  gearing  losses  from  other  income  for  the  purpose  of
reducing income tax, thereby offsetting some of the losses.
In coastal disaster prone areas, the adverse effects of negative gearing can result in
high interest rates on loans for risk-prone property being masked through subsidies
provided to offset the losses for residential properties. As with the First Home Buyer’s
Grant,  conditions  can  be  built  into  loan  and  income  tax  regulations  that  disallow
income tax deductions for negatively geared property.
Additionally, subsidies can be provided for coastal property in risk-prone areas that
carry  out  various  mitigation  activities,  such  as  adherence  to  building  standards
(Templet 2001). These can also be provided in the form of tax incentives or rate
rebates.-228-
7.5. Environmental bonds
The notion of an environmental bond was derived from the concept of materials user
fees first proposed by Solow (1971) and Mill (1972) and. By requesting users of
environmental resources to provide a fee in advance, a ‘bond is equal to the current
best estimate of the largest potential future environmental damages that may occur’
(Costanza  &  Perrings  1990  p.57). This  class  of  instrument  is especially  useful in
managing externalities  arising  from  development  projects,  whose  potential
environmental  effect  is  uncertain,  and  therefore  cannot  be  valued accurately in
monetary terms (Perrings 1987, Costanza & Perrings 1990). It is considered more
viable than legislative instruments from an efficiency perspective, in that it shifts the
responsibility of monitoring and evaluation to the user, who has to provide evidence
that  no  harm  has  taken  place  (Schmitt  &  Spaeter  2005). Six  types  of  bonds  are
generally used to address environmental problems (Table 7-7).
Bonds are legally enforceable and issued to proponents of projects by government
agencies or banks, as a form of guarantee that environmental costs are internalised at
the end of the activity, when the harm can be ascertained (Costanza & Perrings 1990).
In the event of damages to the environment, they are used to rehabilitate or repair the
environment,  and  to  compensate  injured  parties  (Costanza  &  Perrings  1990).  In
Australia, bonds are used for mining rehabilitation, and if this is not carried out, the
mining company forfeits the deposit (Stoianoff & Kaidonis 2005).-229-
Table 7-7 Description and examples of the various types of environmental bonds
Types Description Examples
Environmental
performance bonds
Bonds paid to the government prior to
project activities in lieu of potential
environmental damage (Stavins 2001)
Coal mines in the US (Stavins 2001)
Land/ecosystem
reclamation bonds
Bonds in lieu of damage to the land
through, for example, agricultural
activities (Stavins 2001)
Agricultural land in Europe (Van Dijk &
Kopeva 2006)
Wetland banking Bonds in lieu of potential damage to
wetlands as a result of development
activities (Briggs et al. 2009)
Wetlands in the US (Briggs et al. 2009)
Habitat banking Bonds in lieu of potential loss of
biodiversity as a result of habitat loss
caused through development activities
(Briggs et al. 2009)
Prevention of species loss in Qatar, Ghana,
South Africa, Madagascar, New Zealand,
Australia, and the US (Briggs et al. 2009)
Environmental accident
bonds
Bonds in lieu of environmental
accidents that may occur in the process
of working with hazardous
environmental substances (Stavins
2001)
Waste and tyre disposal in Quebec, Canada
(OECD 1995)
Hazardous waste transport
bonds
Bonds in lieu of spills and
contamination that may occur during
the transport of hazardous substances
(Stavins 2001)
Transport of hazardous wastes in
Queensland to cover the clean-up and
restoration cost of a potential environmental
accident (OECD/EEA 2011)
Aussie Infrastructure
Bonds
Issued for major infrastructure projects Funding for the national broadband network
(Australian Government, Australian Office
of Financial Management 2011)
Sources: Compiled from the various sources given in the table.
Coastal disaster-risk mitigation bond
A  bond  for  coastal  disaster  risk  mitigation  could be  based  on  a  combination  of
principles  of  environmental  accident  bonds  and  land  reclamation  bonds.  The
proponent  in  question  will  be  the  coastal  developer  and a  bond  is  placed  with  a
government entity at the commencement of the real-estate development project in lieu
of any harmful impacts created on disaster-mitigating environmental services. The
monetary  value  of  the  bond  could be  determined  by applying proxies  used  for
mitigation  compensation  used  in  other  parts  of  the  world  (Treweek  &  Thompson-230-
1997). However, there is a need for increased scientific understanding of the monetary
values of such compensation (Rundcrantz & Skärbäck 2003).
The  developer  must include  land  and  ecosystem  rehabilitation  activities  to
compensate  for  these  losses,  such  as  the  re-establishment  of  dunes  and  coastal
vegetation.  As  with  wetland  mitigation  banking  carried  out  in  the  US, these
rehabilitation  activities  can  be  carried  out  by  either  the  property  developers
themselves, or by third parties, paid by the developer to carry out these activities
(Hallwood  2007).  If  these  activities  are  implemented  satisfactorily,  the  bond  is
refunded at the end of the project.
There are, however, anticipated challenges. For one, it will be difficult to determine
the  potential  impacts  of  a  scheme  and  if,  or  when,  it  will  achieve  its  objectives
(McKenney & Kiesecker 2009, Maron et al. 2010). Rundcrantz (2006) examining the
use of environmental compensation in Swedish state road projects, found that the
proposed measures were not  commensurate  with  the  damage  caused  to  habitats,
natural processes, the microclimate, groundwater flows and other impacts.
In  addition,  political,  economic,  and  ecological  uncertainties  further  complicate
efforts to gauge the likelihood of a scheme meeting its objectives. This is especially
true, given that the parameters of bonds are not always well defined, and can be
implemented in ways that may lead to different environmental outcomes (Samuelson
1954, 1955, Bergstrom et al. 1986, Cornes & Sandler 1984, 1994, 1996, Kotchen
2005).-231-
7.6. Environmental offsets
Environmental offsets are also known as environmental or ecological compensation,
compensatory mitigation or habitat banks, and setasides. Essentially, they function on
the same principle as environmental bonds, in that they are implemented prior to the
commencement of projects that entail risky activities, where proponents are required
to invest funds as security (McKenny 2005). Through a process of compensation,
developers carry out various measures in lieu of the environmental damages caused
by the project (Rundcrantz 2006). This creates a market to compensate for harmful
environmental consequences that cannot be mitigated by other means (Rundcrantz &
Skarback  2003,  Cuperus  2004,  ten  Kate  et  al.  2004).  As  with  other  instruments,
offsets aim to equate the marginal private costs of environmental degradation with the
social costs (Hallwood 2007). Unlike bonds, however, offsets are not refunded at the
end of the project. Examples of environmental offsets are provided in Table 7-8.
Table 7-8 Description and examples of types of environmental offsets
Types Description Examples
Biodiversity offsets
in development
projects
The aim of this instrument is
to offset the negative impacts
on species and habitats
created as a result of
development, such as real-
estate and housing, and
resource extraction such as
mining
In New South Wales, this instrument was introduced
as a Biobank, aimed at reducing the loss of
biodiversity in the course of development projects
(Burgin 2008).
In WA, the harmful environmental impacts of the
Fortescue Metals Pilbara Iron Ore and Infrastructure
Project in 2005 were offset by a conservation fund
(Middle 2008)
Wetland offsets in
development
projects
The aim of this instrument is
to offset the negative impacts
caused by agriculture,
urbanisation and industry on
wetlands.
The US has used wetland mitigation offsets for the
last 30 years for various wetland habitats (Hough &
Robertson 2009)
Sources: Compiled from the various sources given in the table.
The main aim of an offset is to create a situation of ‘no net environmental loss’ or a
‘net  environmental  benefit’  outcome,  thereby  balancing  out  the  externalities  of
development,  and  ensuring  that  at  least  some  years  after  the  project  has  been-232-
completed, these lost values can be gained back (Western Australian Government,
Environmental  Protection  Agency  [EPA]  2006,  Rundcrantz  2006,  Kotchen  2009,
McKenney & Kiesecker 2009, Maron et al. 2010). Environmental compensation can
be  used  to  either  restore  lost  environmental  values  through  an  on-site,  in-kind
compensation, or replace lost values at another site, or other form of compensation
that is not necessarily equivalent to the damages caused by the project (Rundcrantz &
Skärbäck 2003).
In the recent years, there has been a growing research interest in the re-creation of the
natural  environment  following  the  negative  consequences  of  development  projects
(Cowell 2000, Cuperus 2004, Eden et al. 1999, van Bohemen 1998). Offsets are used,
for  example,  in  the  US,  Netherlands,  Germany  and  Sweden  (Cuperus  2004,  US
Government, National  Research  Council  2001,  Peters  1993,  Wende  et  al.  2005).
Currently,  carbon  offsets  are  the  most  popular and  influential  kind  of offset  used
(Kotchen 2009).
There has also been a great deal of research and empirical scientific knowledge gained
from wetland mitigation banking, used in the US since 1972 (Hough & Robertson
2009). Amounting to an average annual value of US$ 2.9 billion, the compensatory
mitigation industry in the US restores large tracks of wetlands in areas proximal to the
development  to  ensure  like-for-like  compensation  (Hallwood  2007,  BenDor  &
Riggsbee 2011).
The application of an offset to coastal disaster risk mitigation is similar in concept to
that of a bond, and therefore, it is not further discussed here. It is important to note,-233-
however, that unlike a bond, an offset will not be refunded at the end of the project,
but invested in activities aimed at mitigating the impacts of that development. Bonds
generally use unit value measures for determining compensation, however, metrics
used  for  offsets  tend  to  use  lump-sum  figures  to  estimate  potential  losses  from
projects. Table 7-9 depicts offsets policy in various other states of Australia.
Table 7-9 Aims of environmental offsets policy in other states of Australia
Government Offsets policy Aim
Commonwealth Government policies for native
vegetation, carbon credit schemes
and forestry
Reduce the national net rate of land clearing to
zero. Similar in nature to schemes adopted
internationally under the Kyoto Protocol
New South Wales BioBanking under the Threatened
Species Conservation Amendment
Bill of 2006
Purchase of offset credits produced by offset
bankers to offset impacts of development
activities to achieve an ‘improve or maintain’
outcome
Victoria Native Vegetation Management and
BushBroker scheme
Reversal of the long-term decline of native
vegetation in the landscape based to achieve a
‘net gain’ outcome based on quantity and quality
rations. Uses a system of registration and trading
of native vegetation credits
South Australia Vegetation under the Native
Vegetation Act of 1991
Funding of native revegetation within the same
region as where land clearing is carried out
Queensland Queensland Government
Environmental Offsets Policy
comes into effect when projects
require assessment of impacts on
environmental values under
legislation such as the Integrated
Planning Act of 1997
Three specific-issue offset policies are used.
These are the offsets for vegetation management
(Queensland Government, Department of Natural
Resources and Water), mitigation and
compensation for works or activities causing
marine fish habitat loss (Queensland
Government, Department of Primary Industries
and Fisheries) and offsets for net benefit to koalas
and koala habitat (Queensland Government,
Environmental Protection Agency). Other types
of offsets to mitigate various other types of
environmental problems can also be implemented
as required
Tasmania Offset policy under the Department
of Primary Industry and Water
Based on broad principles of application aiming
to ensure that the environment is ‘well off’ or
‘better off’ following the project
Northern
Territory and
Australian Capital
Territory
No offsets policy
Sources:  Australian  Government,  Department  of  Environment  and Water  Resources  (2007),  Queensland
Government, Environmental Protection Agency (2008).
In Australia, states such as New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia generally
require offsets for native vegetation. However, in Queensland and Tasmania, offsets-234-
are applied to damages resulting in total habitat loss. At present, there are no offset
policies in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, although they
come  under  conditions  of  the  national  offsets  policy  (Australian  Government,
Department  of  Environment  and  Water  Resources  2007,  Queensland  Government,
EPA 2008).
WA environmental offsets policy
Environmental  offsets  in  WA  pertain  mainly  to  biodiversity  and  are part  of  the
environmental  approvals process, overseen  by  the  WA  Environmental  Protection
Agency  (EPA). According to the  overarching  framework  provided  by  the WA
Environmental  Protection  Act  of  1986,  offsets  are  to  be  applied  to  ‘significant
proposals’,  which  are ‘likely,  if  implemented,  to  have  a  significant  effect  on  the
environment’ (WA Environmental Protection Act 1986, section 37b). In the last five
years, there have been various state-level discussions on the underlying principles
governing the application of offsets. The outcome of these has resulted in the issue of
a position statement and guidance papers on their application (Table 7-9).
The focus of these recent discussions, from the WA government point of view, has
been on refining the principles and guidelines in the application of environmental
offsets.  Independent  research  has  investigated  empirical  application  of  the  offset
policy in terms of like-for-like, practitioner acceptability and uncertain environmental
impacts (Hayes & Morrison-Saunders 2007, Middle 2008). No work has been done
with regard to property development, and the associated loss of coastal ecosystem-235-
services.  State-level  research  must  also  take  into  consideration  broader  national
environmental policy.
Table 7-10 Government position  statements, reports  and  research  studies  on  environmental
offsets policy in WA
Year Title Key focus References
2006 Environmental
offsets: Position
statement No. 9
This statement outlined EPA’s position on the
importance, key principles and provided decision making
guidelines for the application of environmental offsets in
WA
Western
Australian
Government, EPA
(2006)
2007 Use of environmental
offsets under the
Environment
Protection and
Biodiversity
Conservation Act
1999
This report provided background on the application of
offsets in Australia, including benefits and limitations of
this policy. Also discussed principles in the application of
offsets, including the most appropriate situations for the
application of offsets, what qualifies as offsets and their
magnitude, location, timing and approval conditions
Australian
Government,
Department of
Environment and
Water Resources
(2007)
Effectiveness of
environmental offsets
in environmental
impact assessment:
Practitioner
perspectives from
Western Australia
This study investigated support for the application of
environmental offsets in WA among 29 practitioners.
While there was  in-principle support for the use of
offsets, the study found that there were doubts about the
practical workability of ‘like for like’ and the ability to
deliver net benefits
Hayes and
Morrison-
Saunders (2007)
2008 Guidance for the
assessment of
environmental factors:
Biodiversity
environmental offsets
Apart from general guidance and principles of application
of offsets to biodiversity loss, this report indicated the
possibility of application to planning development and
mining proposals
Western
Australian
Government, EPA
(2008b)
The use of offsets in
EIAs as a way of
mitigating the
uncertainties
associated with
cumulative impacts of
major resource
proposals in the north
west of Western
Australia
This paper examined the application of offset policy in
major resources projects in the north of WA. The key
focus was on two kinds of offsets for uncertainty,
namely, ‘residual risk’ offsets and ‘banked’ offsets using
the Gorgon and Janz oil and gas fields to illustrate these
Middle (2008)
2011 Announcements:
Environmental offsets
policy
This report reiterated key principles in the application of
offsets in WA. It also stated that detailed guidelines on
the roles and responsibilities of agencies, proponents and
statutory bodies, legislative requirements, assessment and
decision making processes, auditing, monitoring and
review were  being prepared
Western
Australian
Government, EPA
(2011)
Sources: Compiled from sources given in the table.
WA  is  signatory  to  the  national  offset  agreement  under  the  Commonwealth
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1999. Offsets applied at-236-
national level come into effect when the impacts of projects cross state jurisdictions
(Western Australian Government, EPA 2002, 2006).
To provide further light on the institutional context of offsets policy in WA, it is
important  to  examine  the  manner  in  which  they  are  applied  to,  what  are  called,
‘significant projects’. In such situations, there are several steps in the environmental
approvals  process in  WA.  For real-estate development  applications, the  process
commences  with  a  series  of  preliminary  discussions  with  the  Western  Australian
Assessment  and  Compliance  Services  Division  of  EPA  (Western  Australian
Government, EPA 2011). The proponent is then required to submit an Assessment on
Proponent  Information,  which  includes  information  on  the  likely  environmental
impacts caused by the project (Western Australian Government, EPA 2011). The EPA
assesses this proposal,  and produces a report for submission to the minister, who
makes a decision as to whether the proposal should be implemented. If the go-ahead is
given, this will be followed by a Public Environmental Review, and a further series of
negotiations between the developer and EPA before project approvals are provided
(Western Australian Government, EPA 2011).
In situations where a project may cause significant environmental harm, proponents
are required to put forward commitments for environmental offsets. This proposal is
generally developed in collaboration with the WA Department of Environment and
Conservation (DEC).  Offsets are most often applied to counterbalance damages to the
environment resulting from the clearing of native vegetation, wetlands, habitat and
biodiversity and waste emissions (Western Australian Government, EPA 2006). With
the Exmouth marina, Landcorp, which was the state government agency responsible-237-
for  the  development,  was  required  to  follow  this  process,  culminating  in  the
preparation of an EPA report documenting potential impacts as a result of the project.
Despite acknowledgement of potential loss of flood mitigation services in the area in
which the marina was built, and impacts on coastal dunes in the marina PER report
(Bowman  Bishaw  Gorham 1997),  there  was  no  offset  applied  to  mitigate  these
damages, since they mainly pertained to non-living aspects of the environment.
Under the current system in WA, damage to the environment from a project is offset
through  contributions  towards  environmental  research,  management  and  other
environmentally beneficial activities. Potential damage to nature reserves, national
parks,  conservation  parks,  regional  parks, marine  parks,  marine  nature  reserves,
marine management areas and types of native vegetation, kinds of wetlands, rivers
and important  landscape  features,  state,  National  or  World  Heritage  sites  and
vulnerable ecosystems cannot be offset. No reference is made with regard to coastal
areas,  especially  damage  to  disaster  mitigating  services. While  offsets  in  WA
primarily focus on native vegetation and conservation, there is, however, scope for
their application beyond biodiversity in WA, as reflected by recent interest in wetland
banking  across  the  state  and  nutrient  trading  in  the  Swan  river  catchment  (Table
7-11). Therefore, for northern, cyclone-prone coastal areas of Australia, this indicates
that there is potential for the application of offsets that include non-living aspects of
the environment, which go beyond the narrow focus on biodiversity. Issues arising
from the narrow focus on only certain components of ecosystems are acknowledged
(Gillespie  2000). However,  despite  the  apparent openness  of  WA  EPA  to  apply
offsets  beyond  biodiversity,  no  research  appears  to  have  been  undertaken  in  this-238-
regard.
Table 7-11 Offsets in use and under development by state government agencies in WA
Type of offset Responsible agency Aim
Native vegetation Department of Environment
and Conservation
For the clearing of native vegetation regulated under
the Environmental Protection Act 1986
WA Planning Commission Offsets and mitigation policy for impacts to ‘Bush
Forever’ native vegetation sites
Conservation Department of Environment
and Conservation
Offsetting adverse impacts to conservation reserves,
state forest, threatened flora, fauna and ecological
communities
Nutrient trading Swan River Trust A draft framework for banking and trading nutrient
offsets in the Swan Canning catchment
Wetland
mitigation
banking
WA EPA A wetland credit-trading scheme, regulated through a
‘bank’, which would issue credits for wetland
improvements and debits for wetland degradation
Sources: Western Australian Government, EPA (2006).
7.7. Tradable environmental permits
This section now turns to the other main class of environmental economic instruments
which are market-creation instruments, based on the work of Coase (1960). The role
of government with market-creation instruments is the allocation of property rights to
various  common-property  environmental  resources, such  as  the  atmosphere  and
oceans, to correct market failure, and then allowing the free market mechanism to
operate in the distribution of these commodities (Pearce & Barbier 2000). The earliest
known  applications  of  market-creation  instruments were to pollution by  Crocker
(1966), Dales (1968) and Montgomery (1972).
Market creation instruments are generally used for the management of environmental
public goods, such as the atmosphere, coastal and ocean waters, and forested areas,
for which allocating individual ownership is not feasible and the costs of management
of these resources are high (Stavins 2000, Daily & Ellison 2002). These instruments-239-
can be used as part of the agreement to create new markets for the buying and selling
of  various  environmental  commodities  (Hockenstein  et  al.  1997,  Stavins  2000).
Unlike command-and-control approaches where monitoring standards can result in
high costs of management for implementing agencies, market-creation instruments
serve to encourage behaviours that are in the interests of the entities involved, through
a system of incentives, while at the same time meeting broader social goals (Stavins
1988, 2001, 2003).
Tradable  environmental  permits,  as  with  environmental  offset  instruments,  aim  to
balance economic gains with environmental tradeoffs (Shabman et al. 1998, Gutrich
& Hitzhusen 2004). This instrument involves representation of species, habitats and
ecosystems in the form of direct monetary value, thereby bringing the potential loss of
these assets  into  the  economic  realm and encouraging  private  individuals  to  use
resources in a way that does not compromise the wellbeing of society as a whole
(Hockenstein et al. 1997, Stavins 2000, Pearce 2004, Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005). It
allocates a transferable right to any kind of common-pool environmental resource,
such as the emission of a substance into the atmosphere or water, or natural resources
such as fisheries, forests and biodiversity (Ellerman 2005). An important benefit of
the  tradable  permit  system  is  that  it generates  funds  for  the  management  of
environmental  commodities  that  are  close  to  highly  degraded and  irreversible
conditions (Stavins 1988, 1991, OECD 1989, 1991, 1998). Key categories of market-
creation instruments, examples of their use and potential application to reduce coastal
disaster-risk are provided in Table 7-12.-240-
Table 7-12 Description and examples of the various types of tradable environmental permits
Types Description Examples
Tradable
development
quotas
Aimed at creating a balance between
conserved land versus developed land.
Developers purchase credits from those
living on undeveloped land for each unit
of land they develop.
The tradable development rights instrument
has been used in the US, such as those in
Maryland, New Jersey aimed at protecting
agricultural land, open space, ecological sites,
and historic heritage (Pruetz 1997, 2003, New
Jersey Pinelands Commission 2007).
Tradable
biodiversity
permits
Companies who damage ecosystems by
their activities are obliged to purchase
biodiversity credits to offset this. These
credits can reflect the cost of restoration
of the area damaged, or other comparable
ecosystems.
In Australia, these are the New South Wales
BioBanking Scheme & the Victorian Native
Vegetation Management Framework Scheme
(New South Wales Government, Office of
Environment & Heritage 2011, Victorian
Government, Department of Natural
Resource & Environment 2010)
Government agro-environmental payments
made to farmers in North America and
Europe for reforesting conservation
easements (Jenkins et al. 2004)
Tradable
water shares
Capping on the maximum allowable
water use, with a permit to exchange the
right to use this water.
Water markets in Australia, Chile, China,
South Africa and the United States (Grafton
et al. 2010)
Tradable
resource
shares
A cap on the maximum number of
various natural resources that can be
extracted, including minerals, fuel, and
industrial raw materials such as fibre,
boulders and various kinds of plant
material. Can also be applied to the
renewable energy market, where
companies producing green energy are
issued permits that can be traded.
Green Certificates are issued as a market
incentive system to companies producing
solar, wind or other forms of renewable
energy in Europe (Ford et al. 2007,
Verhaegaen et al. 2009, Verbruggen 2009).
Tradable
catch quotas
A limit on harvesting fish from the oceans Fisheries catch quotas implemented in
Australia, New Zealand, Canada & the US in
response to decimating fish populations
(OECD 2010)
Emission
trading
permits
Create a market to buy & sell the right to
pollute. Companies are provided with a
quota for the maximum number of units
of they are allowed to emit. Bigger
polluters can purchase pollution credits
from those who pollute less.
European Emissions Trading Scheme which
trades in Greenhouse Gases (European
Commission 2010)
The US Acid Rain Market with a cap on
Sulphur & Nitrogen Emissions (US
Government, EPA 2011)
Tradable
flood permits
Create a market to buy & sell the
mitigation of flood risk. Permits are
provided for each unit of flood risk
mitigation provided
Permits for risk traded between developer &
land owners, mediated by government entities
(Chang 2008)
Deposit-
refund
systems
Consumers pay a deposit at the time of
purchase and this is refunded at the end of
the environmental activity
Lead acid motor vehicle batteries in the USA
to reduce the incidence of lead entering
unsecured landfills (Stavins 2001)
Sources: Compiled from the various sources given in the table.
The first step in creating a tradable permit system involves setting a cap on the level
of  potential  harm  that  can  occur,  usually  set  by  the  government  (United  States
Government, EPA 1991). Examples of such limits, or rights, are represented in the-241-
form of a set number of credits, which can be the level of carbon emissions, or extent
of land developed. Each credit represents, for example, a unit of land restored, and the
rights to engage in the development of this land is traded among buyers and sellers in
the form of credits (Sandor et al. 2002, Tietenberg 2006, Arquitt & Johnstone 2008,
Ring et al. 2010).
Sellers of the credits will be those for whom the cost of land conservation is low
(Ring et al. 2010). These credits are purchased by, for example, land  developers,
whose  activities  can  create  the  loss  of  various  environmental  services  (Arquitt  &
Johnstone  2008).  The  level  of  activity  will  be  controlled  by  the  government,\ by
restricting the level of activity and rights to participate (US Government, EPA 1991).
This  will  be  part  of  a  legal  obligation  to  ensure  that  the  final  outcome  of  their
activities is zero, with the extent of damage, being balanced by restoration. Inter-
temporal variation is controlled for by the restorations being carried out prior to the
sale of credits (Arquitt & Johnstone 2008).
This instrument is more effective compared to other instruments such as subsidies or
user charges, in that it can ensure that the overall environmental value in a region is
constant (Sandor et al. 2002, Watzold & Schwerdtner 2005, Tietenberg 2006, Ring et
al. 2010, Wunder et al. 2008, Wissel & Watzold 2010). Tradable permit programs
have been implemented using two different approaches to date (Ellerman 2005). The
first is that implemented in Europe under the EU Green House Gas Emissions Trading
Program and in the US under the Acid Rain Program (Ellerman 2005). The other
approach comes from the recognition that a regulatory approach was not feasible, and
so the tradable permit system was used in its place. Examples of this approach are the-242-
Northeastern NOx Budget Program and the RECLAIM programs in the Los Angeles
Basin  in  the  US  (Ellerman  2005).  In  the  recent  years  international  recognition  of
market creation instruments is demonstrated, for instance with the publication of a
Green Paper on this instrument by the Commission of the European Communities
(2007).
Application to coastal disaster risk mitigation
The  most  suitable  type  of  tradable  permit  for  coastal  disaster  risk  mitigation  is  a
tradable flood permit, proposed by Chang (2008). Implicit in this instrument is the
exchange of risk between a sending and receiving zone, where the generators of the
externality, in this case flood risk, compensate the receptors via the influence of the
government. A cap-and-trade system is used to determine the highest allowable level
of  flood risk, and  the  difference  between  the  targeted  level  and  current  level  is
estimated and translated into the number of permits that can be distributed by the
market among zones.
Chang (2008) proposed that in the sending area, development is prohibited, while
restricted development is carried out in receiving areas. The aim of this system is to
encourage  investment  in  the  soft  engineering  and  non-structural  measures  that
generate less or zero adverse externality. Extending the analogy of the ‘transferable
right to pollute’, to the context of coastal disasters, an environmental permit could
pertain to the transferable disaster mitigation permits, whereby the rights to develop
land can be transferred between various developers.-243-
The heterogeneity of the various flood zones can, however, pose several complexities
in the application of this instrument to land policy (Ring et al. 2010). These relate to
temporal concerns, spatial configuration, and the type of habitat for which it is used to
compensate (Parkhurst & Shogren 2003, 2007, Hilderbrand et al. 2005, Drechsler &
Watzold 2009, Hartig & Drechsler 2009, Moilanen et al. 2009, Palmer & Filoso 2009,
Wissel & Watzold 2010).
7.8. Special environmental funds
Additionally, there are also special funds for the environment, often sourced through
foreign aid and external borrowing (United Nations Development Programme 1998).
These  include  revolving  funds,  green  funds,  relocation  incentives,  and  subsidized
interest or soft loans. This type of financing mechanism originated in the 1990s (Oleas
& Barragan 2003). The most well-known, is the financial mechanism used by the
Global Environment Facility that maintains conservation trust funds that obtain large
amounts of money from debt swaps or international grants, and ‘retails’ them into
smaller projects over long periods of time (UNDP 1998).
This type of instrument is often used in the case where other instruments are not able
to sufficiently internalise the various environmental externalities present in a country.
They are, however, not viewed as the most economically efficient option, and the
preference is to determine the use of other instruments as the first choice (World Bank
2003).-244-
National Partnership Agreement on Natural Disaster Resilience
In Australia, there are two types of programs which can fall under the category of
special funds and which are relevant to coastal disaster risk. These are the National
Partnership  Agreement  (NPA)  on  Natural  Disaster  Resilience (Australian
Government,  Attorney  General’s  Department, Emergency  Management  Australia
Division  2011) and  the  Western  Australian Natural  Disaster  Relief  and  Recovery
Arrangements  (WANDRRA) (Government  of  Western  Australia,  FESA  2012a,b).
The  NPA  is  a  federal-state  partnership  focusing  on ex-ante activities  such  as
mitigation, while the WANDRRA, which is a state level initiative, is implemented ex-
poste to cover emergency  and recovery measures. In WA, both the NPA and the
WANDRRA are overseen by the state Fire and Emergency Services (FESA).
The  NPA  replaced  the Bushfire  Mitigation  Program  (BMP),  the  Natural  Disaster
Mitigation Program (NDMP) and the National Emergency Volunteer Support Fund
(NEVSF)  (Australian  Government,  Attorney  General’s  Department,  Emergency
Management  Australia  Division 2011). Funding  under the  NPA  is  a  joint
commonwealth-state/territory effort  and  both  parties  are  also  responsible  for
performance  monitoring  and  evaluation  (COAG  2009).  Implementation  of  the
program  is  under  the  purview  of  the  states/territories (Australian  Government,
Attorney General’s Department, Emergency Management Australia Division 2011).
Since  the  NPA  came  into  effect  in  2009,  a  key  activity  across  the  nation were
state/territory-wide natural disaster risk assessments.
Since the NPA first came into effect, states and territories around Australia have been-245-
provided  with approximately AU$  97  million  in  Commonwealth  funding  (Table
7-13).  NSW,  Queensland  and  Victoria  receive  the  highest proportion,  while
Tasmania, the northern territory and ACT receive the lowest. Allocation of funding is
based  on size  of population,  costs  of previous disasters  and level  of relative
disadvantage. WA is allocated 12% of the total Commonwealth budget annually and,
over the last four years, has received a total of AU$ 24 million in funding. State and
local government contribution in WA in 2011/12 was around AU$ 3 million. This
meant that  AU$  16  million,  including  Commonwealth  funding,  was  available  for
mitigation  across  WA  (Australian  Government,  Ministerial  Council for  Federal
Financial Relations 2011). Local agencies can make applications to WA FESA for
funding of projects (Australian Government, Ministerial Council for Federal Financial
Relations 2010). The funding formula used in WA comprises of a 1:1:1 ratio, between
the commonwealth, state government and local councils.
Table 7-13 Commonwealth  funding  by  states/territories  under  the  National  Partnership
Agreement on Natural Disaster Resilience
State/territory
Commonwealth contribution
%
AU$ millions
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 Total
New South Wales 26 5.6 6.6 6.7 6.8 51.6
Queensland 23 5.0 5.8 5.9 6.0 45.7
Victoria 16 3.5 4.0 4.1 4.2 31.8
Western Australia 12 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.1 23.8
South Australia 8 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.1 15.9
Tasmania 5 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 9.9
Northern Territory 5 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 9.9
Australian Capital Territory 5 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 9.9
Total 21.6 25.2 25.7 26.1 97.3
Sources: Council of Australian Governments (2009).
Local  agencies  must  be  aware  of  the  criteria  for  the  selection  of  projects  and
conditions  under  which  their  contribution  can  be  waived.  Criteria  used  by FESA
include: (1) local council rate revenue and capacity to raise funds; (2) expenditure and-246-
service area; (3) population affected; (4) degree of risk and level of exposure of the
community; (5) level of risk mitigation created as a result of the project; and (6) co-
funding  from  other  sources (Western  Australian  Government,  FESA  n.d,). Local
agencies can apply to have 50% of their contribution waived for various reasons (e.g.,
low capacity of local councils, remote indigenous or unincorporated communities, and
volunteer organisations). Around WA, 34 projects were approved during the period
2009-10.
Projects carried out in Exmouth under the Natural Disaster Mitigation Program, which
was replaced by the NPA in 2009, are presented in Table 7-14. As can be seen in the
table, three projects focused on local issues related to flood mitigation, carried out by
state agencies in cooperation with the shire. Another project pertained to a regional
topographic  assessment  of  certain  parts  of  the  Gascoyne and  Pilbara  areas  by
Landgate.
Table 7-14 Disaster  mitigation  projects  in  Exmouth  funded  under  the  Natural  Disaster
Mitigation Program from 2003 to 2009
Project Description Local
agency
State contribution
(AU$)
Exmouth flood mitigation
design of Market Street
levee upgrade
Detailed design for the upgraded Market
Street levee, including a hydraulic and
geotechnical assessment and preparation
of tender documentation
DoW 60, 000
Exmouth floodplain
management study
Floodplain management study for the
Exmouth area
DoE 30,000
DoW 20, 000
Coastal vulnerability
support data
Topographic mapping of the northern
parts of WA
Landgate 77, 650
TOTAL 187,650
Source: Australian  Government,  Attorney  General’s  Department, Emergency  Management Australia  Division
(n.d.).
In Exmouth, NPA funding was allocated in 2010-11 to carry out mitigation under a-247-
project titled ‘Reed Street  Light  Industrial  Area Creek Exmouth Flood  Mitigation
Works (Stage 1)’ (Western Australian Government, FESA 2012a). The total budget
for this project amounted to around AU$ 2.3 million, in addition to AU$ 300, 000
council contribution. The council also submitted an application for additional funds
for flood mitigation, amounting to around AU$ 1.5 million (Shire of Exmouth 2008).
Western Australia Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements
Another type of special fund of relevance to coastal disaster risk is that provided
under  the  Western  Australia  Natural  Disaster  Relief  and  Recovery  Arrangements
(WANDRRA), instituted when emergency assistance and long-term recovery costs
exceed AU$ 240,000. The WANDRRA also provides various types of support to
individuals, families, small businesses and rural industries (Table 7-15).
Table 7-15 Types  of  assistance  provided  by  the  WA  Natural  Disaster  Relief and  Recovery
Arrangements (WANDRRA)
Entities Type of support provided
Individuals and
families
Emergency assistance (e.g., food, essential clothing, medical items, communications,
essential transport, document replacement costs)
Temporary accommodation
Essential household contents
Housing repairs
Small businesses Interest rate subsidies
Rural industries Grants for professional advice, freight costs, repair of boundary fences,  interest rate
subsidies and other measures
Local government
and state agencies
75% of the cost of essential repairing public assets, subject to a contribution cap which
limits total expenditure. Local councils contribute the rest, mainly through revenue
earned from council rates. This can cover betterment costs of infrastructure and
counter disaster operations, including overtime, contractor expenses and clean-up
costs.
Source: Government of Western Australia, FESA (2012a,b).
FESA is responsible for the overall administration of the WANDRRA, but unlike the-248-
NPA, is assisted by other state government agencies that manage specific components
of  the  WANDRRA.  For  example,  for  personal  hardship  or  distress measures,
individuals and families are supported through the Department for Child Protection,
road reconstruction is carried out by Main Roads, and support for primary producers
is provided through the Department of Agriculture and Food.
The  WANDRRA  covers  only  certain  kinds  of  disasters,  and  these  are  bushfires,
cyclones,  earthquakes,  floods,  landslides,  meteorite  strikes,  storms,  storm  surges,
tornadoes and tsunamis. Damages from drought, frost, heat waves and epidemics are
not  covered. Also,  no  support is  provided  where  human  activity  is  a  significant
contributing  cause  (e.g., poor  environmental  planning,  deliberate  personal
intervention and accidents). Assets which could be covered by insurance, such as
houses,  buildings,  and  vehicles  are  also  not  eligible  (Government  of  Western
Australia, FESA 2012a,b).
7.9. Examination of the market failure at Exmouth
This  section  now  turns  to  conceptualise  the  market  failure  in  coastal  property
development at Exmouth, discussing how economic strategies can be used to address
this  failure.  This provides the  basis  for  the  main  elements  in  the  design  of  an
instrument to address such failures in coastal land development in risk-prone coastal
areas such as Exmouth.-249-
Setting up the utility function for coastal property owners at Exmouth
In  terms  of  coastal  disaster  risk,  an  important  aspect  of  the  global  life  support
functions,  are  natural  disaster  risk  mitigation  services  (Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission 2009, UNISDR 2009, Partnership for Environment and
Disaster Risk Reduction 2010).  Natural  buffers,  such  as  sand-dunes,  mangrove
forests,  tree  shelter  belts  and  coral  reefs  have  been  shown  to  play  an  important
protective role during extreme coastal events (e.g. Badola & Hussain 2005, Dahdouh-
Guebas et al. 2005, Danielsen et al. 2005, Kathiresan & Rajendran 2005, Marris 2005,
Vermaat & Thampanya 2006, Williams et al. 2007).
There are two kinds of benefits that coastal property owners can gain. One is from
owning the property, while the other is from having access to coastal amenity. Each
individual is unique in how they use the various elements of the environment, and
derive wellbeing. In economic terms, wellbeing is measured by utility (Hanley et al.
2007). Individual utility is unique, and these unique preferences are represented in the
following mathematical equation, based on Hanley et al. (2007)
Uj =         U (X1, X2,...,Xm, W1, W2...,Wm, A1, A2...,Ao Q1, Q2...,Qm)
where:
Uj = utility for individual j;
X1...,Xn = coastal resources for production & consumption;
W1...,Wm = coastal waste assimilation functions;
A1...,Ao = coastal amenity; and-250-
Q1...,Qm = global life support services, including disaster mitigation.
The utility of individual j is obtained directly from the vectors of waste assimilation,
amenity, and global life support services (vectors W, A, and Q), and indirectly from
goods and services produced for the environment (vector X). These values provided
by the environment are highly interrelated (Costanza & Farley 2007). The utility of an
individual property owner j, will increase as a result of benefits of owning a coastal
property, by an amount Uj/ Xn..
The utility that individual j can derive from the environment is limited, because the
services provided by the environment are finite. In the case of regional coastal towns
like Exmouth, the focus on the economic production service of coastal land, namely
Xn,  representing  the  benefits  gained  from  owning  a  coastal  property  and  A0,  the
coastal amenity gained from access to the beach, has resulted in the corresponding
loss  of  Qm,  disaster  mitigation  values  (loss  of  the  natural  flood  detentive  area).
Mathematically,  this  decrease  in  mitigating  functions  can  be  represented  by
Uj/ Qm. Qm/ Xn (Hanley  et  al. 2007).  This  concept  of  the  scarcity  of
environmental functions, which thereby limits individual utility, is different to other
types of capital in the economy, such as labour, and technology, which are considered
to be substitutable (de Groot et al. 2003, Gaddis et al. 2007, Dietz & Neumayer 2007).
The social utility function and marginal social costs
The development of a single property will not result in a large effect on the loss of
these  other  functions  of  the  environment.  However,  the  level  of  Qm (disaster--251-
mitigating  functions)  will  not  depend  on  individual  j  alone  (Hanley  et  al.  2007).
Conflict in these different uses of the environment for the case of Exmouth, is created
as a result of the aggregate choice of all property buyers, which in turn have created
loss of the flood-detention services at the marina.
A  market,  via  prices, communicates  the  total  value  of  any  asset,  including  an
environmental asset. The failure of the price of coastal property at Exmouth to include
the value of Qm, results in the failure of the price of coastal land to reflect the scarcity
of these  environmental  functions,  creating  a  negative  externality. This, in  turn,
creates a gap between the decisions of private coastal developers and property buyers
in  towns  such  as  Exmouth,  and  what  society’s  objectives  are  in  relation  to  the
environment. The failure of price to allocate these environmental resources in a way
that generates the greatest social welfare results in a market failure, where the cost of
these decisions is imposed on the rest of society (Baumol & Oates 1988, Pearce &
Turner 1990, Cropper & Oates 1992, Tietenberg 1994).
There are various social costs resulting from this market failure. In the case of the
marina  development  at  Exmouth,  canals  were  built  to  replace  the  natural  flood
retentive functions and physical buffering services provided by the dunes. If there is a
major  cyclone,  additional  resources  will  have  to  be  provided  for  evacuation  and
emergency rescue. Long-term reconstruction, of not just private property, but also
public infrastructure such as roads and power lines, also has to be factored in. There is
also potential flood risk to other parts of the town because of the obstruction of flood
drainage pathways as a result of the marina development. All of these factor in as
costs to the rest of society, beyond the local disaster event, and by those not affected-252-
by the disaster itself, resulting in a situation of economic inefficiency (Gaddis et al.
2007). In the long-term, the loss of Qm, , will result in a loss of Xn.
Chapter  two  has  introduced  the  concepts  of  marginal  costs  and  benefits,  and  the
important  role  of  an  economic  instrument  in  aligning  private  marginal  costs  with
marginal social costs. Marginal private and social costs in relation to the specific case
of  the  development  of  coastal  land  in  natural  disaster  risk-prone  areas  such  as
Exmouth are illustrated in Figure 7-1. The upward sloping lines are the private and
social marginal cost curves, represent the costs associated with developing coastal
land.  These  costs  include  the  provision  of  public  infrastructure,  utilities  such  as
electricity and water, and structural protection against natural disaster risk such as
drainage channels and seawalls. Essentially, this curve shows the increased cost for
each additional unit of land developed. This curve is positively sloped to show that
development costs increase at an increasing rate.
The downward sloping line is the marginal benefit curve. This curve represents each
unit of additional benefit obtained in society for each unit of coastal land developed.
Each incremental unit of land developed provides fewer benefits to society since most
of the land is developed. While exact slopes of the private and social marginal cost
and benefit curves for coastal land are an empirical question, this figure is useful to
illustrate how economics conceives the use of any environmental resource.
According  to  economic  theory,  ideally,  coastal  managers  would  want  coastal
development to consider both the marginal cost and marginal benefit when selecting
the optimal level of coastal land development. If the marginal benefit > marginal cost,-253-
more land should be developed, to capture the net benefits, and if the marginal benefit
< marginal cost, land development should decrease to avoid net losses.
Figure 7-1 Marginal costs and benefits associated with risk-prone coastal property development
Source: Adapted from Hanley et al. (2007).
However, the socially optimal level of coastal land is achieved at the point where the
social marginal cost = marginal benefit (point B in the figure), where the net benefits
are  zero.  If  a  private  developer  receives  the  marginal  benefits  of  coastal  land
development without paying the marginal costs associated with making the area more
resilient to coastal disasters, the private optimum is set at point A.
Essentially,  an  environmental  economic  instrument  is  used  to  internalise  costs  by
charging developers for the increased risk they create. Ideally, such a change would
reduce the amount of coastal land developed, and raise the price of each unit of land
developed to point A, where marginal cost = marginal benefit. It is important to note,
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that not all forms of environmental economic instruments provide a positive outcome.
Their inappropriate use and design can result in unsustainable development, where the
true costs and benefits associated with the coastal environment are distorted, thereby
resulting in greater risk (Bagstad et al. 2007).
7.10. Proposed hybrid instrument
This chapter has reviewed the various economic instruments available that can be
applied in environmental policy, with some discussion on their potential application to
coastal  disaster  risk. A three-pronged  hybrid  instrument  is  proposed to  internalise
these costs (Figure 7-2). The reason behind the use of a hybrid approach such as this
is because a single approach alone fails to address both the market and government
failure in the management of coastal risk prone land in Australia.
The  first  component  targets  property  owners  in  risk-prone  areas,  who could  be
required to pay a mitigation levy, on top of the current FESA emergency services
levy, on an annual basis. The second component targets the developer, who would be
required to pay an offset for development of real-estate in areas prone to cyclonic
storm-surge  inundation.  Proceeds  from  the  offset  and  levy  will  go  into  a  coastal
disaster mitigation fund, which would be part of the federal-state fund maintained
under the National Partnership Agreement on Natural Disaster Resilience.-255-
Figure 7-2 Schematic of the proposed hybrid instrument for internalising the cost of cyclonic
storm-surge inundation risk at Exmouth
Mitigation and Emergency Services Levy
Through the implementation of a mitigation and emergency services levy, the market
failure arising from costs of coastal property in risk prone areas will be internalized.
This component of the proposed instrument would be integrated as part of the current
FESA emergency services levy, which has been used successfully in WA over the last
nine years, and appears to be a well-functioning and viable system that can be applied
to coastal disaster risk.
The  institutional  set-up  used  for  this  instrument  is  detailed  in  section  7.3.  To
recapitulate,  this comprises  of  an  agreement  between  state  and  local  government,
where  collection  of  the  tax  is  based  on  location,  types  of emergency services
provided, and the gross rental value of the property. Under the current system, the
emergency  services  levy effectively  internalises  the  costs of  providing  short-term
relief.  Mitigation,  however,  is  funded  by  the  Commonwealth,  state  and  local
government.  These  are  sourced  from  grants, such  as  those  from  the National-256-
Partnership Agreement program, and the WA Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery
Arrangements program. These, in turn, are sourced generally from tax revenue paid
by all Australians, not only those living in risk prone areas.
To internalise the cost of mitigation into the private cost of property owners, this
thesis proposes an extension of the FESA emergency services levy in WA to include
costs of medium to long-term storm-surge mitigation. To reflect this change, the new
instrument could be called the ‘mitigation and emergency services levy’. As with the
current system, mitigation charges could cover risks from various types of disasters
across  WA,  such  as  bushfires,  tsunamis  and  earthquakes.  For  the  purpose  of  this
thesis, however, focus is on the potential application of the proposed levy to cyclonic
storm-surge inundation in places like Exmouth, in northern parts of the state.
The institutional arrangements used under the current emergency services levy could
continue. That is, it would be administered under the same agreement between WA
FESA and local councils, with charges included on the annual council rates notices. The
fees collected by councils will continue to be sent to FESA and an administrative
grant will be paid annually to shire authorities to cover billing and collection costs.
However, not all arrangements under the current system would be the same.
The key difference of the proposed levy would be most obviously, higher rates for
some properties resulting from the inclusion of the cost of mitigation. No changes
would  be  made  to  the  prices  charged  for  emergency  management, as  they  are
currently calculated. Mitigation charges could comprise of an additional fee on top of
current  charges. Further, mitigation charges  under  the  proposed instrument would-257-
only be for properties subject to cyclonic storm-surge inundation risk. For places like
Exmouth, properties located in the 4 m storm-surge risk area, which represent risk of
a Vance-like category five cyclone, could be targeted. Charges could be tiered, based
on  level  of  risk exposure. Properties constructed  after  implementation  of  this
instrument  could  be  charged  higher  rates  than  existing  developments. Legislation
would be required to ensure that differences in these charges are disclosed to property
buyers at the time of sale. Properties not located in risk-prone areas would be exempt.
It must be noted, however, that in the initial stages of implementation, gathering this
kind of data could result in high transaction costs.
The design  of  the  proposed  levy  is based  on some  key underlying  economic
principles. It would aim to internalise mitigation costs arising from development in
high risk areas back into costs borne by the property owner. The goal would be to
bring into alignment, private marginal costs of risk-prone coastal property, with the
social cost not only from emergency management, but also long-term rehabilitation.
By charging a mitigation fee for those living in risk-prone areas, this proposed levy
aims to create a more equitable situation, such that it targets only those parties whose
activities impact the environment, and who also may benefit from the advantages of
living in such high coastal amenity areas. The levy could also function as a financial
disincentive, which  would discourage the  purchase  of  property  in these areas.
Including mitigation  charges  within the  current emergency services levy  will  also
serve to maximise economies of scale. This will serve to bring down transaction costs,
which would be higher if a separate mitigation services levy was charged, thereby
requiring the creation of new institutional arrangements to administer this instrument.-258-
In implementing the proposed levy, there are various other economic considerations
to be kept in mind (e.g., Baumol 1972, Carlton & Loury 1980, Kohn 1986, Barthold
1994, Parry 1995, Watson 1995). For one, rates charged must be based on standards
that are set on the highest allowable level of environmental damage resulting from
that  property  development  (Baumol  1972). Further,  for  the  best  environmental
outcome, the proceeds of any type of natural disaster tax must go into a trust fund, and
used specifically for the management of the environmental externality it is meant to
correct, rather than being funnelled back into the general government budget (Watson
1995, Pearce 2002). The proposed levy would also function as a form of an insurance
premium, which sends a monetary signal of the level of risk property owners are
exposed to.
A further consideration is that, ideally, if Pigouvian principles were to be followed,
the mitigation component of the proposed levy would be set at a level to cover the
difference  between  the  private  and  social  marginal  costs  of  coastal  inundation.
However, it has been argued that the optimal level of any kind of environmental tax
should be  lower  than  Pigouvian  levels  in  the  presence  of  other  economic  effects
(Bovenberg & de Mooij 1994). Such economic effects could include interactions with
other taxes, such as the Goods and Service Tax (GST), income taxes, or their effect of
inflation.
Another issue to keep in mind is the loss of social welfare, because of higher taxation
and consequential reduction in disposable income available to households. This issue
has been discussed extensively in the literature on taxation (e.g., Parry 1995, Goulder
& Kennedy 1997, Fullerton & Metcalf 1998). A final consideration is that, if a tax is-259-
to be based on Pigouvian principles, Carlton and Loury (1980) shows that it must be
accompanied by a lump-sum subsidy, tax-break or tax incentive, although others, such
as Kohn (1986) have argued otherwise. With the proposed levy, a tax rebate could be
provided  to  properties  which  have  carried  out on  mitigation activities, such  as
adherence  to  building  standards, ecosystem  restoration,  regeneration  of  coastal
vegetation and dune protection.
Developer mitigation offset
A second component of this hybrid approach would be through an environmental
offset, currently used by the EPA in WA to compensate for damages to biodiversity.
There is, however, provision under the WA Environmental Protection Act of 1986 to
extend the use of an offset to other aspects of the environment (Table 7-16). Under the
WA Environmental Protection Act of 1986, the various overarching principles, such
as the precautionary principle, principles of intergenerational equity and biological
diversity and ecological equity, pertain to not only the living, but also the non-living
components of the ecosystem. The Environmental Protection Policy also recommends
improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms. This can apply to the case of
coastal land, where developers causing harm to the natural functions must be required
to internalize this as part of their project cost-260-
Table 7-16 Items  of  relevance  to  coastal  disaster  mitigation  under  the  WA  Environmental
Protection Act of 1986
Relevant items under the WA Environmental
Protection Act of 1986
Interpretation with regard to disaster
mitigation offsets
Section 4A, item 1 states that ‘the object of this Act is to
protect the environment of the state, having regard to the
precautionary principle, principle of intergenerational
equity and principle of conservation of biological
diversity and ecological integrity
The precautionary principle requires that ‘where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing measures to prevent environmental
degradation. In the application of the precautionary
principle, decisions should be guided by: (a) careful
evaluation to avoid, where practicable, serious or
irreversible damage to the environment; and (b) an
assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various
options”
Use of the term ‘environment’ includes not only
the living components (such as biodiversity, but
also encompasses physical attributes such as the
regulating services provided by coastal
ecosystems
Thus, the loss of the natural disaster mitigating
functions in coastal areas from development
projects can be considered to be “serious or
irreversible damage”
“Careful evaluation is required” on the possible
harm of the project on coastal environmental
functions, including disaster risk
“Measures” are required to “prevent
environmental degradation”, which may include
investment in mitigation
Section 4A, item 2 states that under the principle of
intergenerational equity, “the present generation should
ensure that the health, diversity and productivity of the
environment is maintained or enhanced for the benefit of
future generations”
Residential development in risk-prone areas of
the coast, can create greater exposure of future
generations, especially in relation to sea level rise
and threats of more intense cyclones in northern
parts of Australia
Section 4A, item 3 states that under the principle of the
conservation of biological diversity and ecological
integrity, the conservation of both aspects should be a
fundamental consideration
Environmental policy in WA cannot only focus
on biodiversity, but must also focus on the
integrity of the entire coastal ecosystem
(“ecological integrity”)
Section 4A, item 4 pertaining to the principles relating to
improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms:
(1) environmental factors should be included in the
valuation of assets and services; (2) the polluter pays
principle  requires those who generate pollution and
waste should bear the cost of containment, avoidance or
abatement; and (3) the users of goods and services should
pay prices based on the full life cycle costs of providing
goods and services, including the use of natural resources
and assets and the ultimate disposal of any wastes; and
(4) environmental goals, having been established, should
be pursued in the most cost effective way, by establishing
incentive structures, including market mechanisms,
which enable those best placed to maximise benefits
and/or minimise costs to develop their own solutions and
responses to environmental problems
Cost calculations of coastal developers should
include environmental functions that are part of
the property under development. The “polluter
pays principle” can also apply to coastal
development, in which case property developers
must also be responsible for the damage created
through their actions
The ‘life cycle cost’ of coastal disaster mitigation
functions can cut across many decades, and this
must be factored into developer costs
Incentive structures, such as environmental
offsets, could be applied to coastal property
development to reduce risk exposure
Section 37B states that a ‘significant’ proposal pertains to
a proposal likely, if implemented, to have a significant
effect on the environment
Coastal real-estate development projects, such as
the Exmouth marina, can be considered to have
‘significant effects on the environment’
Section 40, item 2 states that the Authority may, for the
purposes of assessing a proposal: (a)  require any person
to provide it with such information as is specified in that
requirement; or (b) require the proponent to undertake an
environmental review and to report thereon to the
Authority
The potential impact of coastal developments on
sensitive areas of WA, could be required to carry
out an environmental review of the project
Source: Western Australian Environmental Protection Act (1986).-261-
. The term ‘significant project’, includes major property development projects, such as
the  Exmouth  marina,  which  would,  therefore,  require  an  environmental  review.
Another important point is that recent discussions on a potential wetland banking
mechanism across WA, and nutrient trading in the Swan River catchment (Western
Australian  Government,  EPA  2006)  indicate  openness  towards  the  use  of
environmental offsets for non-living aspects of the environment.
The recent offsets policy developed for Queensland also considers the entire habitat
(Queensland  Government,  EPA  2008),  and  may  be  an  approach  WA  can  use  for
coastal disaster mitigation. Based on these arguments, for projects located in risk-
prone  coastal  areas,  the  WA  EPA  may  consider  extending  the  application  of  the
environmental offsets instrument to disaster mitigation offsets.
The  disaster  mitigation  offset  proposed  under  this  thesis  would  comprise  of  a
compensation paid by coastal developers, to internalise their actions which can cause
loss  of  key  environmental  features,  specifically  disaster-mitigating  functions.
According to the WA Environmental Protection Act of 1986, large real-estate projects
which may pose significant environmental impacts, will be required to carry out an
environmental review in cooperation with the relevant agencies prior to commencing
operations.  This  approach  can  also  be  applied  to  risk-prone  development  in  areas
subject to, for example bushfires and riverine flooding across the state. The discussion
here will be limited to cyclonic storm-surge inundation.
There would be no change to the current institutional arrangements used to review the
potential environmental impacts and implement the offset. Key factors that can be-262-
taken into consideration in the review of coastal projects, could be the location of the
proposed project in relation to distance from the coastline or height above sea level,
and the presence of natural floodplains, coastal dunes and vegetation in the vicinity.
The EPA in turn, would call for further assessments of the potential damage to or loss
of coastal disaster-mitigating ecosystem services. These preliminary assessments will
indicate to the EPA that offsets may  be  required, and the developer  will have to
provide  more  detailed  information.  This  will  also  include  commitments  by  the
developer on the monetary compensation in lieu of the offset.
There are some key economic justifications for the implementation of the proposed
offset.  Currently,  property  owners  cover  at  least, part  of the  cost  of  emergency
management in WA through the FESA levy. Local councils, also bear part of the cost
of their decision to allow building in risk-prone areas through their contribution to the
NPA mitigation funding grants. However, property developers do not bear any part of
the cost of increased risk exposure created to communities from their activities. The
proposed  disaster  mitigation  offset  aims  to  remediate  this  problem  by  requiring
developers to offset development in risk-prone areas by paying the cost of protecting
other  sensitive  areas  subject  to cyclonic  storm-surge inundation. The  developer
effectively pays the government to manage the risk that is created in the course of
project  activities, to  correct  the  market  failure  pertaining  to  a  common  property
resource, i.e. foregone disaster mitigating ecosystem services.
The requirement of coastal real-estate developers to assess the consequences of their
actions on disaster risk, tied in with a monetary cost, will serve as a disincentive for
development  in  high-risk  areas  of  the  coast. In  cases where  their  actions  can  be-263-
directly  related  to  increased  risk  of  natural  disasters,  owing to, for  instance  the
clearing of natural barriers such as mangrove belts and coastal dunes, then the price of
the  offset  can  be  set  so  high, that  it  would  be  more  economically feasible  for
development to take place in less vulnerable areas.
Coastal disaster mitigation fund
As  an  alternative  to  the 2011 flood  levy for  funding  the  disaster  recovery  in
Queensland,  there  were  also  proposals  for  the  establishment  of  a  publicly  funded
natural  disaster  fund  that could  function  as  a  safety  net  for  natural  disasters  in
Australia (CPA 2011). This suggests scope for the use of the third component of the
proposed hybrid, which would be a special fund created through proceeds from the
developer offsets and the levy. The fund would be managed at state level by FESA,
and  would  come  under  the  same  funding  arrangements  as  FESA’s  National
Partnership  Agreement  (NPA)  on  Natural  Disaster  Resilience.  Discussed  in  more
detail in section 7.9, the NPA fund provides state and local funding for disaster risk
mitigation activities.
Collection of the mitigation levy will be under FESA’s purview, and it would not
require major changes in administrative procedures to ensure that collections received
under these arrangements are funnelled into the NPA. There will however, have to be
administrative arrangements with regard to funds obtained under the mitigation offset.
Coordination between the WA EPA and FESA will be required for this purpose.
For the best environmental outcome, the proceeds of a natural disaster levy must go-264-
into a trust fund, and be used specifically for the management of the environmental
externality  it  is  meant  to  correct,  rather  than  funnelling  it  back  into  the  general
government  budget  (Watson  1995,  Pearce  2002).  It  is  proposed  therefore  that
proceeds  from  the mitigation levy  and developer offset  are  earmarked  for  coastal
mitigation activities, especially towards investments in maintaining the integrity of
disaster-related environmental functions. Mitigation activities can include protection
of coastal dune, flood-detention areas, coastal vegetation and other natural physical
barriers. Funds can also be invested in soft-engineering measures or non-structural
mitigation measures in these areas.
Policy under the NPA requires contribution from state agencies and local councils
applying for mitigation grants under this program. There is a clause for the waiver of
50% of the funding contribution for councils that are financially constrained. If the
instrument proposed under this thesis were to be implemented, proceeds from the
offset and levy, which is generated from the shire, could be counted as local council
contribution, which would take away the need to implement this waiver. For areas in
which there is extensive development within risk-prone areas, proceeds from this fund
can be  used  to  purchase highly  risk-prone properties  through  a  system  of  rolling
easements. A rolling easement has been implemented in several states in the US, and
in some parts of the UK, where processes such as the rising sea-level has required
people and structures to move inland from these areas. When properties come to be in
the intertidal zone, or become submerged, the government purchases these, and they
become public land (Titus 1998, Caldwell & Segall 2007).
Use of the mitigation fund for government repurchase of risk-prone property is only-265-
an example of the potential use of the fund. Important to note is that rolling easements
are mostly applied in areas where there are slow and imperceptible changes to the
shoreline, rather than sudden changes. Caution is required in their application because
there can be various resulting legal challenges that can arise.
7.11. Implementation challenges and the political economy of government
Applying  the  three-pronged  hybrid instrument  will  have  its  challenges. Economic
factors alone cannot justify the potential application of this instrument. Consideration
has to be given to the political economy within the various tiers of government in
Australia. The  diversity  in  local  government  across  WA  and  the  complexity  of
federal-state relations naturally raises the question about which level of government
should be responsible for implementation of such an instrument. While a detailed
treatment of the institutional dimensions of this aspect is beyond the scope of this
thesis, this section makes some comments in this regard.
Concerns over the loss of local council rate revenue
Implementation  of  the  proposed  instrument  can  face  similar  problems,  as to the
proposed insurance approach discussed in chapter six. It has been noted that local
councils around Australia are resource constrained, and dependent on council rate
revenue as a key source of income. This can create pressure on local councils to
develop more land for real-estate, including that located in risk-prone areas. The levy
and offset aim to, however, create a disincentive for property owners and developers.-266-
Therefore opposition on the part of local government can be expected as a result of
concerns on the potential loss of council rates. Raising awareness on the long-term
benefits provided through the proposed approach, especially in relation to increased
access to funds for coastal disaster risk mitigation activities, may be instrumental in
creating local council buy-in.
State level funding for the start-up period of the instrument
Another concern has been with regard to cost shifting from higher tiers of government
without concomitant increase in finances to fund the provision of additional services
under the purview of local councils (Dollery et al. 2006). FESA will therefore have to
increase the size of the administrative grants provided currently for the emergency
services levy to cover the costs of collecting and implementing the mitigation levy.
Additional funding within the first year of implementation of the proposed levy will
be especially important, as the levy is based on the level of risk-exposure. Each local
council will have to carry out investigations into identifying the level of risk exposure
of the various properties under their purview. These activities will, however, fit within
the  current  objective  of  the  National  Partnership  Agreement (NPA) on  Natural
Disaster Resilience, which may be able to provide the start-up funding to implement
the proposed approach.
Level of implementation
Regarding the  level  of  implementation  of  this  instrument,  should  it  be  done  at a-267-
federal or state level? Since the NPA is overseen by the federal government, provision
of state grants under the current system may require that certain conditions are built
into  the  allocation  of  these  grants.  However,  state  governments  may  reject these
conditions and this will impede implementation at local level. In the design of new
policy under a federal governance system such as Australia, Dollery et al. (2006)
recommends an overarching centralised policy by the Commonwealth government.
The  implementation  of such policy will  then  be facilitated  through  strategic
cooperation between the state and relevant coastal councils.
The context-specific understanding on disaster risk at the local level is used as part of
the policy-design process. Further, given the advantages gained from the application
of this instrument, such as additional local funding available for mitigation, reduced
development in risk-prone areas, and equity created through the ‘user pays’ principle,
buy-in from state government could be achieved through various negotiations.
Another issue that must be factored into the decision on the level of government to
carry  out  mitigation  activities  is  with  regard  to  the  economies  of scale.  State
government may be better placed to carry out major mitigation infrastructural works,
such  as  seawalls  and  dikes.  Issues  of  scale  was  one  of  the  reasons  justifying  the
transfer of responsibilities for municipal services such as water and electricity from
the local to the state level, and a similar argument can be made for such disaster
mitigation works. There is also a role for local councils, and this pertains to the key
non-structural  measures  of  mitigation,  especially town planning,  which  is better
carried out at local, rather than regional or state level.-268-
Diverse application of the proposed approach
This thesis also recognises that local councils across the country are highly diverse. In
WA alone, coastal local government areas are unevenly spread and heterogeneous in
many respects. There are differences in size of population served, scale of functions,
human and financial capital in addition to the varying natural geographies and socio-
economic  conditions.  There  may  be  large  variations  even  between  similar  coastal
local councils in WA based on heterogeneous social and economic issues. Therefore,
it is not possible to recommend a prescriptive, one-size-fits all approach. While the
underlying economic principles of the proposed instrument will remain the same, a
tailored approach may be necessary to suit varying institutional, demographic, socio-
economic,  geographical  and  other  sources  of  diversity  in  coastal  communities  in
Australia.
Possible legislative changes
Another  issue  for  consideration is  the  limited  constitutional  recognition  of  local
government (Dollery et al. 2006). It is argued, however, that under the highly diverse
system of local government in Australia, the more effective solutions may be at local
level,  rather  than  a  uniform policy  solution  passed  down  from  higher  tiers  of
government (Dollery  et  al.  2006). Any  change to  the  current  system,  therefore,
requires concomitant  changes  in  certain  statutes  and  ordinances  governing  the
function  of  local  councils.  Particular  attention  will  have  to  paid  with  regard  to
legislation governing collection of the additional funds under the mitigation levy at
local level. At state level, amendments will be required with regard to offset policy.-269-
7.12. Conclusions
This  chapter  reviewed  the  various  types  of  economic  instruments  used  in
environmental  management,  and  analysed  their  potential  application  to  mitigate
coastal disaster  risk. They  are potentially a more economically efficient option in
comparison to other regulatory, legislative and moral suasion approaches.
Based on the review, a hybrid instrument was proposed to internalise the social costs
of  cyclonic storm-surge inundation  risk,  where  the  parties  involved  are  coastal
developers, property owners, and the local government. The implementation of the
instrument  requires  a  three-pronged  approach.  It  aims  to  create  a  disincentive  for
development  in  risk-prone  areas  by  requiring  an  offset  by  the  developer, and a
mitigation levy on the property owner. The proceeds go into the NPA fund, managed
by FESA at state level, with funds earmarked for investment in disaster mitigating
natural coastal capital, and other long-term recovery and rehabilitation measures.
The hybrid economic instrument proposed for coastal disaster-prone parts of regional
Australia such as Exmouth is designed to complement existing coastal regulation,
including the WA coastal setback guidelines. The aim of this instrument is to bring
into alignment private marginal costs of development with social marginal costs by
internalising the loss of natural mitigating environmental services into the calculations
of coastal developers and property owners.-270-
Chapter 8: Conclusions
Recent coastal disasters such as, hurricane Katrina in the US (2005), the Japanese
tsunami (2011) and cyclone Yasi in Australia (2011) have revealed the toll they can
have  on  human  lives,  livelihoods,  assets  and  economies.  Australia  is  particularly
vulnerable, with 85% of its population living on the coast (ABS 2004a, b), and the
growing demand for the release of previously undeveloped coastal land to construct
buildings, amenities, transport networks and utilities.
Australian coastal development, has to date, been carried out with the expectation of a
stable and unchanged sea-level (Australian Government, DCCEE 2009a). A particular
challenge pertains to development in highly risk-prone areas. When a disaster strikes,
currently, the costs of these decisions are not borne by those enjoying the coastal
amenity and other benefits of living in such areas, but by the rest of society.
This thesis has addressed the overarching research aim of: what are the economic
strategies for the reduction of coastal disaster risk? The contention of this thesis is
that town planning and property purchase decisions in regional Western Australia fail
to factor in risk of coastal disasters, specifically cyclonic storm-surge. Unsustainable
town-planning, in  turn, influences  the  purchase of property  in  risk-prone  areas,
requiring economic intervention to address these failures.
The town of Exmouth, in north-western Australia, was used as a case study, as it-271-
typifies  expanding  coastal  and  industrial  development  in  areas  prone  to  extreme
weather events. The Exmouth townsite is subject to cyclones, which cause strong
winds, heavy rain and storm-surge leading to cyclonic storm-surge inundation of the
low lying coastline. Further, flooding associated with run-off from Cape Range during
storm/cyclone events is of particular concern.
The first component of this thesis investigated vulnerability to coastal disaster risk
through a scenario-analysis  of  cyclonic  storm-surge, using  spatial  data  in  a  GIS.
Results indicated that if the town is  affected by  a  category  five cyclone, such  as
cyclone Vance of 1999, generating a storm-surge almost 4 m, much of the recent
development in the south of the town, around the marina, will be inundated. This is a
matter of significant concern, especially with future development focused primarily in
this area, close to the shoreline, at 2-6 m in elevation.
The thesis also examined the town plans that that guide land-use at the Exmouth
townsite.  For storm-surge  heights >5  m,  newly  released  land for future  urban
development, located in the vicinity of the marina will come under risk. However,
older  residential  areas  built  during  earlier  phases  of  town  development are less
vulnerable to cyclonic storm-surge risk.
Construction of the marina has also resulted in the loss of disaster-mitigating natural
capital functions in the area. This is as a result of filling in and compaction of land
immediately north of the marina, behind the coastal dune system. Originally this area
functioned as  a natural  flood detention area,  capturing excess water during heavy
storms and  cyclone  events,  gradually  sending  it  out  into  the  ocean (Western-272-
Australian Government,  DoW  &  SKM  2007). Channels and  other  protective
engineering structures have been built to compensate for the loss of these functions,
but a recent study suggests that these might be insufficient to withstand large flooding
or cyclonic storm-surge inundation events (Western Australian Government, DoW &
SKM 2007). Erosion, as a result of storm-surge will exacerbate the situation, and
there is additional concern in the context of an almost 1 m predicted sea level rise
along the coast of WA by the end of the century.
The  second  aim  of  this  thesis  was  to  determine  if  the  purchase  of  real-estate  at
Exmouth factored in coastal disaster risk. Property sales data over the period 1988-
2010 for Exmouth were used in a HPM to assess the effect of cyclonic storm-surge
inundation risk and 100-year ARI flooding. Results indicated that location in risk-
prone areas had no sustained effect on property prices. In addition, it was found that
there was no effect on house prices following cyclone Vance in 1999.
These findings indicate that property owners did not perceive coastal disaster risk as a
significant factor in their decision of where to build houses. A possible reason for this
could  be  that  the  amenity  gained  from  living  proximal  to  the  ocean  outweighed
concern regarding coastal disaster risk. The expectation of government compensation
in  the  event  of  a  disaster  could  be  another  factor  that  takes  away  individual
responsibility for risk-mitigating actions. A major concern arising from these findings
is that land-use planning and private property purchase in such high-risk areas could
imply high  costs to  society,  both  in  terms  of  emergency  rescue  and  long-term
recovery  and  rehabilitation in  the  event of  a  major  cyclone.  Government
compensation sourced from a nation-wide flood levy following the Queensland flood-273-
and cyclone disasters in 2011, indicates the high social cost arising from development
in high-risk areas.
This thesis then  turned  to  examination  of economic  strategies  to  correct  market
failures arising from the externalities created by developers and property buyers, and
failure on the part of state and local governments. Following the Queensland floods, a
national disaster insurance review recommended flood insurance for riverine events.
This thesis proposed how this approach could be extended to include cyclonic storm-
surge inundation,  whereby  a  compulsory  private  insurance  scheme,  subsidised
through a federal government fund could be used over the short-term for high-risk
areas. Conditions could  be built  into  the  provision  of  insurance  to  penalise  local
councils who  allow  high  risk  development in  the  future in  order to alleviate  any
perverse incentives that might arise from such a program.
Natural disaster insurance cannot, however, internalise the risks created to other parts
of the community through development in high-risk areas. It also fails to internalise
the social cost of disasters created by property developers. Furthermore, because of
the uncertainties surrounding  natural  hazards,  there  are  various  conditions  of
insurability that are violated. The use of subsidised insurance in the long-term for
high-risk properties could also create distortions in the market, finally resulting in
reduced participation and under-insurance and thereby subverting the original goals.
These findings indicate that while natural disaster insurance could still be a useful tool
to manage coastal disaster risk in Australia, it has to be used in tandem with other
economic policy measures.-274-
Finally, the role of economic instruments as an incentive for town-planners, coastal
developers, and property owners to create resilience from disaster risk, was examined.
Environmental taxes and subsidies, charge systems, environmental assurance bonds,
market creation instruments, and environmental offsets were reviewed. Environmental
taxes and offsets were found to have the most potential for addressing coastal disaster
risk in cyclone-prone areas such as Exmouth.
A  three-pronged  hybrid  instrument was  proposed. The  first component  targets
property  owners in  risk-prone  areas,  who  could  be required  to  pay  an  annual
mitigation levy, on top of the current FESA emergency services levy. The second
component of the instrument targets the property developer, who would be required to
pay an offset to the EPA for development of real-estate in areas prone to cyclonic
storm-surge inundation. Proceeds from the offset and levy will go into the third prong
of the instrument, which comprises of a WA state fund maintained under the National
Partnership  Agreement  on  Natural  Disaster  Resilience. However,  it  was
acknowledged  that  political  constraints  may  impede  the  institution  of  this  hybrid
instrument.
The  findings  of this  thesis also highlight  the  need  to  plan  for  the  complexities
associated  with  the coastal  zone  through  the  lens  of  vulnerability  to  future  risk.
Coastal development cannot be driven by economic interests alone, but must balance
environmental goals and equity considerations, especially with regard to who pays for
the cost of disaster risk.
The findings for Exmouth also have implications for most parts of northern coastal-275-
Australia which is prone to cyclone risk, especially with respect to the extent of the
coastal setback. Many of these areas are subject to the resources boom and amenity-
driven Sea Change, and these could drive demand for residential development in low-
lying  areas  close  to  the  shoreline.  The  current  guidelines  for the  coastal setback
provided by the WA Planning Commission, which delineate the distance development
must  be  set back  from  the  shoreline  (Western  Australian Government,  Planning
Commission 2003c) do not provide sufficient protection for northern areas which are
prone to cyclonic storm-surge inundation.
Hence, the WA coastal policy, which is currently under review, must take into greater
consideration  storm-surge  and  associated  erosion  from  extreme  events  such  as
cyclone Vance. It must also incorporate the potential increase in coastal erosion due to
future sea-level rise, as well as the predicted higher intensity of severe weather events.
Alternative options to the lateral setback currently in use in WA, such as elevation
setbacks, like the 5 m contour line used in the UK, or variable setbacks, as used in the
US, which account for the natural topography and geomorphology of the land, could
be explored. It must be kept in mind that policy alone is insufficient to encourage
sustainable coastal development, and legislative or economic measures must be set in
place.
The apparent lack  of factoring of  coastal  disaster  risk  in  current  town  planning
decisions is another issue. As a result of this, town planning in Exmouth appears to be
actually driving coastal development into high risk areas, thereby creating a situation
of  vulnerability  among  people  purchasing  property  in  the  area. Furthermore,  the
development has not attached sufficient importance to the value of protective coastal-276-
ecosystems, as was the case with the sand dunes and flood-detention functions. Short-
term planning perspectives will create a burden on government and the rest of society,
because of the costs of future disaster management.
This  cost  comes  from  various  sources,  including investment  in  mitigation
infrastructure,  emergency  rescue, and  compensation  for  damages  in  the case  of  a
cyclone. Social goals such as health, education, and access to public infrastructure are
compromised by the use of funds for risk mitigation. There are also long-term costs to
the economy, as sea-level rise and potential changes in risk of cyclonic storm-surge
inundation may impact property values. Properties situated close to the shoreline, or
in very low-lying areas, may fail to qualify for insurance, and the government will
have to step in as insurer-of-last-resort. Existing properties on the foreshore may even
have been bought back by the government through an easement.
Major  flooding  and  cyclonic storm-surge inundation  in  Queensland in  2011, has
highlighted  the  issue  of  local  councils allowing development  in highly  risk-prone
areas. In  future,  by  utilising  the  interpretative  lens  of  behavioural  economics  to
examine  the  underlying  political-economics,  planners  could better  understand  the
complexities and driving forces for such coastal developments. Further research on
the costs and benefits associated with such coastal development, would be worthy of
investigation, not only to strengthen the case for improving coastal resilience, but also
to find ways to prevent loss of important disaster mitigating ecosystem services.
The effect of coastal risk on property prices, particularly in cyclone-prone areas of
Australia, is not well known. While this thesis partially addresses this research gap in-277-
the context of WA, there are clearly limitations to an analysis restricted to residential
property in Exmouth. Future studies might usefully build on the current analysis, and
investigate the effects on property prices not only in other regional areas, but also
major urban centres in the north of Australia (Darwin and Cairns).
Finally,  the  current analyses  suggest that  there  is  potential  for  the  application  of
environmental economic instruments to coastal disaster risk, mainly through a system
of  disincentives  for property developers  and buyers  in  high-risk  areas. To  help
overcome organizational challenges, future research might need to consider how these
can be applied within the institutional politics of federal, state and local government
in Australia. It is possible that there may be resistance to the use of such instruments
due to various political and other motivations, and there is certainly further scope to
explore the perceptions of government, with regard to the utility of adopting such
approaches.
In summary, this study aimed to contribute to existing knowledge on the linkages
between  economics  and  coastal  disasters,  using  the  case  of  cyclonic  storm-surge
inundation risk. While it focused on Exmouth in the north of WA, the need to assess
the economics of planning and coastal property development in disaster-prone areas is
equally germane for similar tropical areas across Australia and abroad. Government
alone cannot mitigate disaster risk, but policies and programs implemented on the
coast  can  certainly facilitate  more  sustainable  and  resilient patterns  of  property
development. In  order  to  make  judicious  land-use  decisions,  state  and  local
governments concerned with natural disaster management, must be cognizant of the
long-term social cost of real-estate development decisions. It is the contention of this-278-
thesis, that policies and programs will be more effective if they take into account the
economics of natural disaster risk.-279-
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Results of the correlation covariates for independent variables used in the Hedonic Property Model at Exmouth (1988-2010)
Independent
Variables
Lot size
(m
2)
House
age
(years)
Family
room Flat Villa House Duplex
unit
Single
unit Iron wall
Steel
frame
wall
Brick
wall
Fibro
wall
Asbestos
wall
Distance
to nearest
grocery
shop (km)
Lot size (m
2) 1 -.102** -.001 .004 -.004 -.039 .069** -.088** -.006 .045* .005 .022 -.058* .227**
House age (years) -.102** 1 -.072** -.023 -.118** .262** -.078** .145** -.075** -.155** -.105** -.085** .481** -.346**
Family room -.001 -.072** 1 -.013 .198** .161** -.001 -.107** .087** .118** .183** .057* .000 .065**
Flat .004 -.023 -.013 1 -.003 -.064** -.006 -.016 -.005 -.006 -.007 -.005 -.018 -.010
Villa -.004 -.118** .198** -.003 1 -.096** -.009 -.024 -.007 .167** -.011 -.008 -.060** -.033
House -.039 .262** .161** -.064** -.096** 1 -.195** -.508** .046* .050* .087** .057* .279** -.099**
Duplex unit .069** -.078** -.001 -.006 -.009 -.195** 1 -.049* .090** .040 .025 .078** -.093** .127**
Single unit -.088** .145** -.107** -.016 -.024 -.508** -.049* 1 -.039 -.047* -.058** -.043 .164** -.296**
Iron wall -.006 -.075** .087** -.005 -.007 .046* .090** -.039 1 -.014 -.018 -.013 -.097** -.005
Steel frame wall .045* -.155** .118** -.006 .167** .050* .040 -.047* -.014 1 -.021 -.016 -.116** .088**
Brick wall .005 -.105** .183** -.007 -.011 .087** .025 -.058** -.018 -.021 1 -.019 -.145** .091**
Fibro wall .022 -.085** .057* -.005 -.008 .057* .078** -.043 -.013 -.016 -.019 1 -.107** .087**
Asbestos wall -.058* .481** .000 -.018 -.060** .279** -.093** .164** -.097** -.116** -.145** -.107** 1 -.283**
Distance to nearest
grocery shop (km) .227** -.346** .065** -.010 -.033 -.099** .127** -.296** -.005 .088** .091** .087** -.283** 1
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)